1,721,562 research outputs found
Replication Data for: Inequality and Violent Crime: Evidence from Data on Robbery and Violent Theft, Journal of Peace Research, 42 (1), 2005, pp. 101-112
No full textThis article argues that the link between income inequality and violent property crime might be
spurious, complementing a similar argument in prior analysis by the author on the determinants of
homicide. In contrast, Fajnzylber, Lederman & Loayza provide seemingly strong and robust evidence
that inequality causes a higher rate of both homicide and robbery/violent theft, even after controlling
for country-specific fixed effects. The results in the present article suggest that inequality is not a statistically
significant determinant, unless either country-specific effects are not controlled for or the sample
is artificially restricted to a small number of countries. The reason for the link between inequality and
violent property crime being spurious is that income inequality is likely to be strongly correlated with
country-specific fixed effects, such as cultural differences. A high degree of inequality might be socially
undesirable for any number of reasons, but that it causes violent crime is far from proven
Replication Data for: Inequality and Violent Crime: Evidence from Data on Robbery and Violent Theft, Journal of Peace Research, 42 (1), 2005, pp. 101-112
No full textThis article argues that the link between income inequality and violent property crime might be
spurious, complementing a similar argument in prior analysis by the author on the determinants of
homicide. In contrast, Fajnzylber, Lederman & Loayza provide seemingly strong and robust evidence
that inequality causes a higher rate of both homicide and robbery/violent theft, even after controlling
for country-specific fixed effects. The results in the present article suggest that inequality is not a statistically
significant determinant, unless either country-specific effects are not controlled for or the sample
is artificially restricted to a small number of countries. The reason for the link between inequality and
violent property crime being spurious is that income inequality is likely to be strongly correlated with
country-specific fixed effects, such as cultural differences. A high degree of inequality might be socially
undesirable for any number of reasons, but that it causes violent crime is far from proven
Replication Data for: Transnational linkages and the spillover of environment-efficiency into developing countries (with Richard Perkins), Global Environmental Change, 19 (3), 2009, pp. 375-383
No full textArguments about the ‘‘positive’’ influence of growing transnational linkages have typically focused on
their role in diffusing environmentally superior innovations which help to raise countries’ environmentefficiency.
The present article empirically tests these claims by examining whether developing countries’
linkages with more CO2- and SO2-efficient economies contribute to domestic improvements in CO2- and
SO2-efficiency. Our large-N, statistical findings caution against some of the efficiency-oriented optimism
voiced by supporters of globalization. Although imports ties with more pollution-efficient countries are
found to spillover into improved domestic CO2- and SO2-efficiency, neither transnational linkages via
exports, inward foreign direct investment (FDI) nor telephone calls appear to have any influence on
domestic pollution-efficiency
Replication Data for: Environmentalism, Democracy, and Pollution Control (with Richard Damiana, Per G. Fredriksson and Scott Gates), Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 49 (2), 2005, pp. 343-365
No full textThis paper makes two empirical contributions to the literature, based on predictions generated by a lobby
groupmodel. First, we investigate how environmental lobby groups affect the determination of environmental
policy in rich and developing countries. Second, we explore the interaction between democratic participation
and political (electoral) competition. The empirical findings suggest that environmental lobby groups tend to
positively affect the stringency of environmental policy. Moreover, political competition tends to raise policy
stringency, in particular where citizens’ participation in the democratic process is widespread
Replication Data for: A New Moral Hazard? Military Intervention, Peacekeeping and Ratification of the International Criminal Court, Journal of Peace Research, 46 (5), 2009, pp. 659-670
No full textThe newly established International Criminal Court (ICC) promises justice to the victims of genocide,
war crimes and crimes against humanity. Past offenders can be punished, while future potential offenders
may be deterred by the prospect of punishment. Yet, justice is no substitute for intervention for
the benefit of people at acute risk of being victimized. The Court may create a new moral hazard
problem if the promise of ex post justice makes it easier for states to shy away from incurring the costs
of intervention. This article indirectly tests for the relevance of this potential problem by estimating
the determinants of ratification delay to the Rome Statute of the ICC. If the Court represents an
excuse for inaction, then countries that are unwilling or unable to intervene in foreign conflicts should
be among its prime supporters. Results show instead that countries that in the past have been more
willing to intervene in foreign civil wars and more willing to contribute troops to multinational peacekeeping
missions are more likely to have ratified the Statute (early on). This suggests that the Court is a
complement to, not a substitute for interventio
Replication Data for: Famine Mortality and Rational Political Inactivity (with Thomas Plümper), World Development, 37 (1), 2009, pp. 50-61
No full textFamine mortality is preventable by government action and yet some famines kill. We develop a political theory of famine
mortality based on the selectorate theory of Bueno de Mesquita
et al
. [Bueno de Mesquita, B. B., Morrow, J. M., Siverson, R. M., &
Smith, A. (2002). Political institutions, policy choice and the survival of leaders.
British Journal of Political Science, 32
(4), 559–590, Bueno de Mesquita, B. B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow J. M. (2003).
The logic of political survival
. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press].
We argue that it can be politically rational for a government, democratic or not, to remain inactive in the face of severe famine threat.
We derive the testable hypotheses that famine mortality is possible in democracies, but likely to be lower than in autocracies. Moreover,
a larger share of people being affected by famine relative to population size together with large quantities of international food aid being
available will lower the mortality in both regime types, but more so in democracies
Replication Data for: Qualified ratification: Explaining reservations to international human rights treaties, Journal of Legal Studies, 36 (2), 2007, pp. 397-430
No full textData and do-fil
Replication Data for: Unequal Access to Foreign Spaces: How States Use Visa Restrictions to Regulate Mobility in a Globalised World, Transactions of the British Institute of Geographers 31 (1), 2006, pp. 72-84
No full textNation-states employ visa restrictions to manage the complex trade-off between
facilitating the entrance to their territory by passport holders from certain countries for
economic and political reasons and deterring individuals from other countries for
reasons of perceived security and immigration control. The resulting system is one
of highly unequal access to foreign spaces, reinforcing existing inequalities. Trans-
national mobility is encouraged for passport holders from privileged nations,
particularly rich Western countries, at the expense of severe restrictions for others.
Visa restrictions manifest states’ unfaltering willingness to monitor, regulate and
control entrance to their territory in a globalized world
Replication Data for: International Terrorism and the Clash of Civilizations (with Thomas Plümper), British Journal of Political Science, 39 (4), 2009, pp. 711-734
No full textHuntington referred to a ‘clash of civilizations’ revealing itself in international terrorism, particularly in
the clash between the Islamic civilization and the West. The authors confront his hypotheses with ones
derived from the strategic logic of international terrorism. They predict more terrorism against nationals
from countries whose governments support the government of the terrorists’ home country. Like
Huntington, they also predict excessive terrorism on Western targets, not because of inter-civilizational
conflict per se, but because of the strategic value of Western targets. Contra Huntington, their theory does
not suggest that Islamic civilization groups commit more terrorist acts against nationals from other
civilizations in general, nor a general increase in inter-civilizational terrorism after the Cold War. The
empirical analysis – based on estimations in a directed dyadic country sample, 1969–2005 – broadly
supports their theory. In particular, there is not significantly more terrorism from the Islamic against other
civilizations in general, nor a structural break in the pattern of international terrorism after the Cold Wa
Replication Data for: The determinants of aid allocation by regional multilateral development banks and United Nations agencies, International Studies Quarterly 47 (1), 2003, pp. 101-122
No full textThis paper examines which factors can explain the allocation of aid by four regional development banks as well as three United Nations agencies. The results suggest the following: Most donors examined also exhibit a bias apparent in bilateral aid allocation in favor of less populous countries. Some of them also share another bias of bilateral donors who give more aid to their former colonies. However, the three United Nations agencies contravene a third bias of bilateral aid allocation and provide more aid to countries geographically more distant from the centers of the Western world. While the regional development banks with the possible exception of the Inter-American one focus exclusively on economic need as measured by per capita income, the three United Nations agencies also take into account human development need in their aid allocation as measured by the Physical Quality of Life Index. Some tentative evidence is found that respect for political freedom is rewarded with higher aid receipts at the aggregate multilateral level and by the Inter-American Development Bank as well as perhaps, in a few estimations, by two of the three United Nations agencies. Neither respect for personal integrity rights nor low levels of perceived corruption play any role in the allocation of aid by the donors looked at. In general, higher military expenditures and arms imports are not associated with higher aid receipts, with a few notable exceptions
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