132,211 research outputs found
OPTIMAL EXPORT POLICY IN THE PRESENCE OF R&D INVESTMENT
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the optimal export policy in a two-stage game in which a domestic and a foreign firm compete in price and R&D investment. Under international Bertrand duopoly, an export subsidy directly promotes excess price competition, as delineated by Eaton and Grossman (1986). But, in the presence of international R&D rivalry, an export subsidy indirectly reduces the rival's R&D level, and thereby raises its cost. This effect offsets the negative effect of the export subsidy resulting in excess price competition. We show that an export subsidy (tax) policy is optimal if the relative return to R&D is great (small), provided that a government can precommit to an ex ante optimal export policy.
R&D in Developing Countries: What Should Governments Do?
I consider the implications of recent research for R&D policy in developing countries. Typical new growth models, which assume free entry and no strategic behaviour by R&D producers, are less appropriate for policy guidance than strategic oligopoly models. But the latter have ambiguous implications for targeted R&D subsidies, and caution against the anti-competitive effects of research joint ventures. A better policy is to raise the economy-wide level of research expertise. This avoids the need for governments to pick winners, is less prone to capture, and dilutes the strategic disincentive to undertake R&D with unappropriable spillovers.R&D spillovers, R&D cooperative agreements, RJVs (Research Joint Ventures), strategic trade and industrial policy, absorptive capacity
Public policy towards R&D in oligopolistic industries
We consider the free-market and socially optimal outcomes in a general oligopoly model with many firms which first engage in R&D and then compete in either output or price. Strategic behavior by firms tends to reduce output, R&D, and welfare and so justifies higher subsidies except when R&D spillovers are low and firms' actions are strategic substitutes. It also reduces the benefits of R&D cooperation. Moreover, policies to encourage cooperation are likely to be redundant (since it is always privately profitable) and simulations suggest that the welfare cost of lax competition policy is high.N.B. Professor Neary was based at the Department of Economics, University College Dublin when this article was first published. The full-text of this article is not currently available in ORA. Citation: Leahy, D. & Neary, J. P. (1997). 'Public policy towards R&D in oligopolistic industries', American Economic Review, 87(4), 642-662
Heart and lungs of Holstein calves
Heart and lungs of Holstein control calves (Calves 1, 3, and 5) and calves administered isoprenaline (10 mg/kg/d) (Calves 2, 4, 6) for 2 weeks
Pulmonary histology of Holstein calves
Pulmonary histology from control calves (Calves 1, 3, and 5) and calves administered isoprenaline (10 mg/kg/d) (Calves 2, 4, 6) for 2 weeks. 0.25 mm scale bar
Cardiopulmonary pressures in Holstein calves
These data files show the pressure waveforms in control calves (Calves 1, 3, and 5) and calves administered isoprenaline (10 mg/kg/d) (Calves 2, 4, 6) for 2 weeks
Pulmonary histology of Holstein calves
Pulmonary histology from control calves (Calves 1, 3, and 5) and calves administered isoprenaline (10 mg/kg/d) (Calves 2, 4, 6) for 2 weeks. 0.25 mm scale bar
Heart and lungs of Holstein calves
Heart and lungs of Holstein control calves (Calves 1, 3, and 5) and calves administered isoprenaline (10 mg/kg/d) (Calves 2, 4, 6) for 2 weeks
Hepatic histology of Holstein calves
Hepatic histology from control calves (Calves 1, 3, and 5) and calves administered isoprenaline (10 mg/kg/d) (Calves 2, 4, 6) for 2 weeks
Hepatic histology of Holstein calves
Hepatic histology from control calves (Calves 1, 3, and 5) and calves administered isoprenaline (10 mg/kg/d) (Calves 2, 4, 6) for 2 weeks
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