1,782,172 research outputs found
Technologies for Future Precision Strike Missile Systems
No full textNATO Lecture Series, Tbilisi, Georgia; Bucharest, Romania; Madrid, Spain; Stockholm, Sweden, June 18-29, 2001.This report documents the results of NATO Research and Technology Organization (RTO) lectu series number 221, entitled Technologies for Future Precision Strike Missile Systems. The primary purpose of the lecture series was the disseminating of state-of-the-art scientific and technical knowledge among a wide audience. The lecture series identified significant developments in the enabling technologies and provided examples of the advancements. It also addressed the challenging requirements in areas such as adverse weather capability, time critical targets, high kill probability, no collateral damage, high survivability light-weight expeditionary warfare weapons, and affordability. Emerging technologies for precision strike missile systems that were addressed in the lecture series included: Mission planning technology. Assessments included off-board sensor integration, near-real-time mission planning, flight altitude, terrain following, and missile data links for in-flight targeting. Missile aeromechanics technology. Assessments included hypersonic airframes, low cost/high temperature structure, and ramjet propulsion. Guidance and control technology. An overview of existing guidance and control was given. Assessments included precision guidance and optimal guidance laws. Missile GPS/INS sensor technology. Assessments included low cost INS and GPS/INS integration. Missile design technology. An overview of the missile design process was given. Assessments included computer programs and electronic spreadsheets for conceptual design and missile deign criteria. Seeker technology. Assessments included active and passive imaging infrared and radar seekers. Missile/aircraft integration technology. Assessments included high firepower weapon concepts, reduced observables, and insensitive munitions. Simulation/validation technology. Assessments included hardware-in-the-loop and design validation. Automatic target recognition technology. Assessments included robust algorithms and hardware/algorithm optimization. The material in this publication was assembled to support a Lecture Series under the sponsorship of the Systems Concepts and Integration (SCI) Panel and the Consultant and Exchange programme of RTO. The lectures were first held March 23-24, 2000 in Atlanta Georgia USA, at the Georgia Institute of Technology. Following the lectures at Georgia Tech, the lectures were held April 3-4, 2000 in Turin, Italy and April 6-7, 2000 in Ankara, Turkey. Due to the interest in the lectures, they were reprised in 2001. Updated lectures were presented in Tbilisi, Georgia (18-19 June 2001), Bucharest, Romania (21-22 June 2001), Madrid, Spain (25-26 June 2001), and Stockholm, Sweden (28-29 June 2001)
The EU and NATO: Towards a Joint Future in Crisis Management? College of Europe EU Diplomacy Paper 11/2010
Get PDFThe European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are two major players in post-Cold War crisis management. With dissimilar strengths and weaknesses and a somewhat different focus, the two organizations tackle conflicts and crises around the world. Based on insights from expert interviews with EU and NATO officials, the following questions are addressed: How effective has EU-NATO cooperation in crisis management been so far, and how will or should EU-NATO relations develop in the future? In recent years, the cooperation between these two largely overlapping institutions has become difficult and was at times blocked. I argue that effective EU-NATO cooperation is obstructed by differences at the very top. Quarrels between NATO member Turkey and EU member Cyprus limit the scope of political dialogue. The resulting lack of consultation and coordination impedes cooperation at the military-strategic and operational levels and entails the risk of unnecessary duplication in capability development. The presentation and analysis of five future scenarios for EU-NATO cooperation leads to the conclusion that the EU should develop an independent Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), capable of providing security and stability in the region and of performing the whole spectrum of the Petersberg tasks, including high-intensity conflicts. A strengthened CSDP would benefit NATO in terms of additional European capabilities and the US with regard to increased burden sharing. However, it certainly will take some time until this vision materializes. Meanwhile, the EU and NATO should gradually increase the efficiency of what resembles an ad hoc division of labor in crisis management
The role of biotechnology in countering BTW agents Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop
No full textPublished in cooperation with NATO Scientific Affairs DivisionCentro de Informacion y Documentacion Cientifica (CINDOC). C/Joaquin Costa, 22. 28002 Madrid. SPAIN / CINDOC - Centro de Informaciòn y Documentaciòn CientìficaSIGLEESSpai
Strategic Communication for Crisis Management Operations of International Organisations: ISAF Afghanistan and EULEX Kosovo. EU Diplomacy Paper 1/2010, January 2010
Get PDFStrategic communication is crucial for the success of civilian and military crisis management operations. Domestic publics have to be convinced that the operations are worth pursuing, and the publics in the countries where the operations take place have to be persuaded to support the missions’ objectives. Two major security actors have recently increased their strategic communication efforts: the EU, with EULEX Kosovo, and NATO, with the ISAF mission. Through a comparative study of these two cases, this paper addresses the question how and why strategic communication of the EU and NATO in crisis management operations varies and what general principles of strategic communication of international organisations can be deduced. NATO has recently stepped up its communication activities due to domestic pressure, while communication for EULEX remains technical and information-oriented because of the political disagreements among EU member states regarding Kosovo. I argue that five factors determine the communicative roles of international organisations: the role of the member states, the need for domestic ratification, the possibility of promoting the international organisation through the operation, the international organisation’s communicative capabilities and the importance of the foreign public to the success of the operation. The member states’ communicative activity largely determines the communicative tasks of international organisations. If member states require domestic ratification, they are likely to boost their domestic communication efforts, which makes a ‘unity of message’ difficult for international organisations that then have to focus primarily on coordinating member states’ domestic communication efforts. Additionally, member states are generally more reluctant to communicate to foreign publics, forcing international organisations to assume communicative leadership
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