1,721,008 research outputs found
Introduction to nonparametric and bootstrap methods in econometrics, statistics and management engineering
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Asimmetrie informative e decisioni di entrata nei processi di internazionalizzazione delle imprese
No full textAtti del VII Convegno Nazionale dell'Associazione italiana Ingegneria Gestional
Competizione nei Servizi di Trasporto Ferroviario e Gestione della Rete Infrastrutturale
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Vertical relations in the air transport industry: A facility-rivalry game
No full textThis paper investigates contracts between airports and airlines, in the context of two competing facilities and three types of agreements. The downstream market consists in a route operated by one leader and n - 1 followers competing a la Stackelberg in each facility. We develop a multistage game where each airport and its dominant airline decide whether to enter into a contract and which one to engage in. We find that the airport and its dominant airline have incentives to collude in each facility. Nevertheless, the equilibrium is not efficient in terms of social welfare: there is a misalignment between private and social incentives. (C) 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved
Airport–Airline interaction: some food for thought
No full textWe provide an interpretive analysis of vertical relations between airports and carriers,
while assessing the way in which deregulation of the airline market and the privatization of airports
have created incentives for airport–airline interaction. In particular, if the vertical structure
approach has become the standard approach in air transport research, we add to the literature by
discussing three issues that we believe need further understanding. The three issues that we think
should be the focus of future research on airport–airline interaction are (i) incomplete contracts
and asymmetric information structure; (ii) upstream horizontal complementarities; and (iii) airports
as two-sided platforms
Foreign market entry strategies under asymmetric information
No full textA home firm signals her private cost information by expanding in a foreign firm’s country. Credible signalling to deter counter-entry may occur through a direct investment (but not through exports) and may even entail entering an unprofitable market. While this produces social benefits, uninformative signalling may be welfare-reducing. Hence, we argue that moderate to high location costs may be socially desirable. We also show that there are not simple monotonic relationships between technology/demand conditions and firms’ entry modes. Thus, the signalling explanation of international expansion makes it possible to motivate some controversial empirical findings on a theoretical groun
Foreign Market Entry Strategies under Asymmetric Information
Full text linkA home firm signals her private cost information by expanding in a foreign firm’s country. Credible signalling to deter counter-entry may occur through a direct investment (but not through exports), and may even entail entering an unprofitable market. While this produces social benefits, uninformative signalling may be welfare-reducing. Hence, we argue that moderate to high location costs may be socially desirable. We also show that there are not simple monotonic relationships between technology/demand conditions and firms’ entry modes. Thus, the signalling interpretation of international expansion makes it possible to explain some controversial empirical findings on a theoretical ground
Pricing and Allocation of Rail Track Capacity
No full textSelected Papers of the International Conference on Operations Research 9
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