1,721,024 research outputs found
L'anima e il corpo. Un'introduzione storica alla filosofia della mente
No full textnuova edizione aggiornata e ampliat
Seele, Geist und Koerper. Historische Wurzeln und philosophische Grundlagen der kognitionswissenschaften
No full textDeutsche Bearbeitung von Sibylle Mahrd
I move,Therefore I am
No full textThe position taken by Haselager et alii (see pp. 1-11 of the same volume) consists of three theses: 1) The core of human sense-self-consciousness is not language or thought but the body sense; 2) The distinction between external and internal senses is false; 3) There is no prominence of the brain over the rest of the body with regard to the sense of identity that every human being has. This paper aims at showing that - while thesis (1) is perfecly convincing - theses (2) and (3) must be revisited in part since they are too committed to the kind of anti-representationalism proposed by Brooks
La seconda svolta cognitiva in filosofia della mente
No full textFor fifty years the philosophy of mind has been permeating Italian philosophy and has been contributing to internationalise it. In the history of the philosophy of mind three main conceptual turns are recognizable: the linguistic turn (1950-1960), the first cognitive turn (1960-1990) and the second cognitive turn (1990- ). Thanks to the the last turn that is still underway the image that we human beings have of ourselves is deeply changing because of the impact of cognitive neuroscience on the philosophy of mind. A very animate debate is underway in Italy as well as all over the world about the possibility of naturalizing consciousness
La Nottola di Minerva. Storie e dialoghi fantastici sulla filosofia della mente, Milano, Mimesis, 2008.
No full textIn un lontano futuro uno Straniero proveniente dal pianeta Elea giunge sulla Terra per tenervi una serie di conferenze di fronte ad un pubblico di umani e di androidi che impersonano varie correnti del pensiero filosofico. In questa forma, a metà tra fantascienza e filosofia esposta in modo dialogico, vengono toccati tutti i principali temi dell’odierna filosofia della mente – dal problema mente/corpo alla natura e all’origine nella evoluzione biologica della mente stessa, della coscienza e dell’io nella loro interazione con il mondo esterno – e viene difesa, contro ogni tipo di dualismo e di spiritualismo, una concezione materialistica della mente che si nutre delle scoperte più recenti delle neuroscienze e delle altre scienze cognitive
Inconscio, coscienza e intenzionalità nel naturalismo cognitivo
No full textSandro Nannini, Unconscious, consciousness and intentionality in cognitive naturalism
New studies on unconscious show an increasing reciprocal interest between psychoanalysts on the one hand and neuroscientists and philosophers of mind oriented toward naturalism and materialism on the other hand. Such an orientation was already manifest in Freud’s Entwurf der Psychologie and other essays. Moreover Freud could deny Descartes’ identification of mind to consciousness thanks to F. Brentano’s concept of intentionality. Freud could maintain that unconscious states such lapsus are strictly mental acts endowed with a goal, a content and a meaning, although they are not conscious, only because he followed Brentano and did not define mentality by its identification to consciousness but by its being endowed with intentionality. However, Freud unlike Brentano was not a dualist and oscillated between materialism and functionalism with regard to the Mind-Body Problem. Therefore, one can read in Freud’s psychoanalysis the attempt to reconcile naturalism with an anticartesian concept of mentality based on intentionality and not on consciousness.
The same attempt can be recognized in philosophers of mind such as D.C. Dennett or the Churchlands. More in general, consciousness and the self can be naturalized only if intentionality has been previously reduced to a first order property of brain dynamics. In this perspective consciousness is reducible to a higher order property (a “format”) that gives unity and coherence to certain parts of brain activity.
To sum up, those psychoanalysts who correct Freud’s theories in the light of contemporary neurosciences do not betray him but realize his deepest aspiration
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