175 research outputs found
The Economics of Scientific Misconduct
No full textThis article presents a model of the research and publication process that analyzes why scientists commit fraud and how fraud can be detected and prevented. In the model, authors are asymmetrically informed about the success of their projects and can fraudulently manipulate their results. We show, first, that the types of scientific frauds that are observed are unlikely to be representative of the overall amount of malfeasance; also, star scientists are more likely to misbehave but less likely to be caught than average scientists. Second, a reduction in fraud verification costs may not lead to a reduction of misconduct episodes but rather to a change in the type of research that is performed. Third, a strong "publish or perish" pressure may reduce, and not increase, scientific misconduct because it motivates more scrutiny. Finally, a more active role of editors in checking for misconduct does not always provide additional deterrence. The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected], Oxford University Press.
Individual preferences, organization, and competition in a model of R&D incentive provision
No full textUnderstanding the organization of R&D activities requires the simultaneous consideration of scientific workers' talent and tastes, companies' organizational choices, and the characteristics of the relevant industry. We develop a model of the provision of incentives to corporate scientists, in an environment where (1) scientists engage in multiple activities when performing research; (2) knowledge is not perfectly appropriable; (3) scientists are responsive to both monetary and non-monetary incentives; and (4) firms compete on the product market. We show that both knowledge spillovers and market competition affect the incentives given to scientists, and these effects interact. First, high knowledge spillovers lead firms to soften incentives when product market competition is high, and to strengthen incentives when competition is low. Second, the relationship between the intensity of competition and the power of incentives is U-shaped, with the exact shape depending on the degree of knowledge spillovers. We also show that the performance-contingent pay for both applied and basic research increases with the non-pecuniary benefits that scientists obtain from research, while the fixed component decreases. We relate our findings to the existing empirical evidence, and also discuss their implications for management and public policy. © 2012 Elsevier B.V
Time for Blood: The Effect of Paid Leave Legislation on Altruistic Behavior
No full textOrganizations and public agencies that promote pro-social activities constantly struggle to attract and encourage more contributions. In this article, we study the effects of an explicit reward in the context of blood donation. Specifically, we analyze the effects of a legislative provision that grants a one-day paid leave of absence to blood donors who are employees in Italy, using a unique data set with the complete donation histories of the blood donors in an Italian town. The across-donor variation in employment status, and within-donor changes over time are the sources of variation that we employ to study whether the paid-day-off incentive affects the frequency of their donations. Our analysis indicates that the day-off privilege leads donors who are employees to make, on average, one extra donation per year, which represents an increase of around 40%. We also find that the provision has persistent effects, with donors maintaining higher donation frequencies even when they cease to be eligible for the incentive. We discuss the implications of our findings for policies aimed at reducing the shortages in the supply of blood and, more generally, for organizations that try to motivate voluntary contributors
Individual preferences, organization, and competition in a model of R&D incentive provision
No full textUnderstanding the organization of R&D activities requires the simultaneous consideration of scientific workers' talent and tastes, companies' organizational choices, and the characteristics of the relevant industry. We develop a model of the provision of incentives to corporate scientists, in an environment where (1) scientists engage in multiple activities when performing research; (2) knowledge is not perfectly appropriable; (3) scientists are responsive to both monetary and non-monetary incentives; and (4) firms compete on the product market. We show that both knowledge spillovers and market competition affect the incentives given to scientists, and these effects interact. First, high knowledge spillovers lead firms to soften incentives when product market competition is high, and to strengthen incentives when competition is low. Second, the relationship between the intensity of competition and the power of incentives is U-shaped, with the exact shape depending on the degree of knowledge spillovers. We also show that the performance-contingent pay for both applied and basic research increases with the non-pecuniary benefits that scientists obtain from research, while the fixed component decreases. We relate our findings to the existing empirical evidence, and also discuss their implications for management and public policy
The economics of scientific misconduct
No full textThis article presents a model of the research and publication
process that analyzes why scientists commit fraud and how fraud can be detected and prevented. In the model, authors are asymmetrically informed about the success of their projects and can fraudulently manipulate their results. We show, first, that the types of scientific frauds that are observed are unlikely to be representative of the overall amount of malfeasance; also, star scientists are more likely to misbehave but less likely to be caught than average scientists. Second, a reduction in fraud verification costs may not lead to a reduction of misconduct episodes but rather to a change in the type of research that is performed. Third, a strong “publish or perish” pressure may reduce, and not increase, scientific misconduct because it motivates more scrutiny. Finally, a more active role of editors in checking for misconduct does not always provide additional deterrence
Il razionamento proteico del cavallo
No full textConfronto del razionamento proteico in 27 allevamenti di cavalli sportivi secondo il sistema delle proteine digeribili (Pd) e delle proteine digeribili cavallo (Pdc
Formal and Informal Academic Entrepreneurship
No full textResearch and public policy on academic entrepreneurship in the United States is based on the assumption that the entrepreneurial activity of U.S. academics is accurately represented by efforts of faculty to commercialize inventions that they have disclosed to university administrators and that, in most cases, have been patented. In this paper, we analyze a sample of 11,572 university professors, representative of the entire population of academics affiliated to Carnegie I and II United States universities, and we find that a large part of the academic entrepreneurship activities occur outside the IP-system. In particular, a large proportion of businesses started by academics (about 2/3) are not based on disclosed and patented inventions. Moreover, we show that individual characteristics, departmental and organizational affiliation, as well as working time allocation, of academics starting business outside the IP-system are systematically different from those who have started businesses on disclosed and patented inventions. These findings have implications for research on academic entrepreneurship, as well as technology transfer policies
Above a swamp: A theory of high-quality scientific production
No full textWe elaborate a model of the incentives of scientists to perform activities of control and criticism when these activities, just like the production of novel findings, are costly, and we study the strategic interaction between these incentives. We then use the model to assess policies meant to enhance the reliability of scientific knowledge. We show that a certain fraction of low-quality science characterizes all the equilibria in the basic model. In fact, the absence of detected low-quality research can be interpreted as the lack of verification activities and thus as a potential limitation to the reliability of a field. Incentivizing incremental research and verification activities improves the expected quality of research; this effect, however, is contrasted by the incentives to free ride on performing verification if many scientists are involved, and may discourage scientists to undertake new research in the first place. Finally, softening incentives to publish does not enhance quality, although it increases the fraction of detected low-quality papers. We also advance empirical predictions and discuss the insights for firms and investors as they “scout” the scientific landscape
Sticky price for declining risk? Business strategies with “behavioral” customers in the hotel industry
No full textUsing data from about 25 million hotel room postings in four countries, we document that rather than decreasing to zero as the likelihood of cancellation declines, the difference between the prices for refundable and nonrefundable reservations remains positive at roughly 10%–15% of the full price. A model where travelers have different willingness to pay and some of them overestimate the probability to cancel their trip explains these price-setting patterns more consistently than alternative interpretations. We denote these business strategies as naiveté-based price discrimination. Our data and theory, therefore, show that this form of apparent inertial behavior of companies regarding a major strategic variable can be an intentional managerial choice. We demonstrate, finally, that this profit-enhancing commitment to limited flexibility may also benefit customers in some cases, by expanding the reach of the market. Thus, strategies that rely on cognitive biases on the demand side may not necessarily exploit consumers
- …
