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FGV/EPGE - 2014 Workshop on Economic Theory - Muhamet Yildiz (MIT)
No full textImportant economic theorists such as David Martimort (Paris School of Economics), Alessandro Pavan (Northwestern University), David Rahman (University of Minnesota), Yuliy Sannikov (Princeton University), Federico Echenique (California Institute of Technology), Muhamet Yildiz (MIT) and Roland Strausz (University of Berlim) presented their work. This workshop represents a great opportunity to disseminate some of the recent developments in the field. The workshop was organized by the FGV/EPGE and sponsored by the FGV EPGE "Mestrado em Economia e Finanças Empresariais
Essays on economic theory
Get PDFThesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2005.Includes bibliographical references.These four essays concern the theory of games and its application to economic theory. The first two, closely linked, chapters are an investigation into the foundational question of the sensitivity of the predictions of game theory to higher-order beliefs. Impact of Higher-Order Uncertainty with Muhamet Yildiz In some games, the impact of higher-order uncertainty is very large, implying that present economic theories may be misleading as these theories assume common knowledge of the type structure after specifying the first or the second orders of beliefs. Focusing on normal-form games in which the players' strategy spaces are compact metric spaces, we show that our key condition, called "global stability under uncertainty," implies a variety of results to the effect that the impact of higher-order uncertainty is small. Our central result states that, under global stability, the maximum change in equilibrium strategies due to changes in players' beliefs at orders higher than k is exponentially decreasing in k. Therefore, given any need for precision, we can approximate equilibrium strategies by specifying only finitely many orders of beliefs. Finite-Order Implications of Any Equilibrium with Muhamet Yildiz Present economic theories make a common-knowledge assumption that implies that the first or second-order beliefs determine all higher-order beliefs.(cont.) We analyze the role of such a closing assumption at any finite order by instead allowing higher orders to vary arbitrarily. Assuming that the space of underlying uncertainty is sufficiently rich, we show that, under an arbitrary fixed equilibrium, the resulting set of possible outcomes must include all outcomes that survive iterated elimination of strategies that are never a strict best reply. For many games, this implies that, unless the game is dominance-solvable, every equilibrium will be highly sensitive to higher-order beliefs, and thus economic theories based on such equilibria may be misleading. Moreover, every equilibrium is discontinuous at each type for which two or more actions survive our elimination process. Conversely, the resulting set of possible outcomes must be contained in rationalizable strategy profiles. This yields a precise characterization in generic instances. Price Dispersion and Loss Leaders Dispersion in retail prices of identical goods is inconsistent with the standard model of price competition among identical firms, which predicts that all prices will be driven down to cost. One common explanation for such dispersion is the use of a loss-leader strategy, in which a firm prices one good below cost in order to attract a higher customer volume for profitable goods.(cont.) By assuming high transportation costs which indeed force each consumer to buy all desired goods at a single firm, we create the possibility of an effective loss-leader strategy. We find, however, that such a strategy cannot be effective in equilibrium, so that additional assumptions limiting price search or rationality must be introduced to explain price dispersion or loss leaders. Two Notes on the Blotto Game We exhibit a new equilibrium of the classic Blotto game in which players allocate one unit of resources among three coordinates and try to defeat their opponent in two out of three. It is well known that a mixed strategy will be an equilibrium strategy if the marginal distribution on each coordinate is U [0, 2]. All known examples of such distributions have two-dimensional support. Here we exhibit a distribution which has one-dimensional support and is simpler to describe than previous examples. The construction generalizes to give one-dimensional distributions with the same property in higher-dimensional simplexes as well. As our second note, we give some results on the equilibrium payoffs when the game is modified so that one player has greater available resources. Our results suggest a criterion for equilibrium selection in the original symmetric game, in terms of robustness with respect to a small asymmetry in resources.by Jonathan Weinstein.Ph.D
FGV/EPGE - 2014 Workshop on Economic Theory - Roland Strausz (University of Berlim)
No full textImportant economic theorists such as David Martimort (Paris School of Economics), Alessandro Pavan (Northwestern University), David Rahman (University of Minnesota), Yuliy Sannikov (Princeton University), Federico Echenique (California Institute of Technology), Muhamet Yildiz (MIT) and Roland Strausz (University of Berlim) presented their work
FGV/EPGE - 2014 Workshop on Economic Theory - Yuliy Sannikov (Princeton University)
No full textImportant economic theorists such as David Martimort (Paris School of Economics), Alessandro Pavan (Northwestern University), David Rahman (University of Minnesota), Yuliy Sannikov (Princeton University), Federico Echenique (California Institute of Technology), Muhamet Yildiz (MIT) and Roland Strausz (University of Berlim) presented their work
FGV/EPGE - 2014 Workshop on Economic Theory - Opening
No full textImportant economic theorists such as David Martimort (Paris School of Economics), Alessandro Pavan (Northwestern University), David Rahman (University of Minnesota), Yuliy Sannikov (Princeton University), Federico Echenique (California Institute of Technology), Muhamet Yildiz (MIT) and Roland Strausz (University of Berlim) presented their work. This workshop represents a great opportunity to disseminate some of the recent developments in the field. The workshop was organized by the FGV/EPGE and sponsored by the FGV EPGE "Mestrado em Economia e Finanças Empresariais
Stable One-To Matchings With Externalities
No full textWe consider one-to-one matching with externalities, where the individuals are allowed to be single. We present sufficient conditions for the existence of the stable set and the core. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.Turkish Academy of SciencesTurkish Academy of SciencesThe authors thank an Associate Editor and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions. The authors also thank Jan Eeckhout and Muhamet Yildiz for helpful discussions. This paper was written while the authors were respectively visiting the University of Pennsylvania and Massachusetts Institute of Technology, to which they are grateful for their hospitality. An earlier draft of this paper was written while the second author was affiliated with Bogazici University. The second author also acknowledges the support of Turkish Academy of Sciences, in the framework of Distinguished Young Scientist Award Program (TUBA-GEBIP)
Workshop on Economic Theory
No full textImportant economic theorists such as David Martimort (Paris School of Economics), Alessandro Pavan (Northwestern University), David Rahman (University of Minnesota), Yuliy Sannikov (Princeton University), Federico Echenique (California Institute of Technology), Muhamet Yildiz (MIT) and Roland Strausz (University of Berlim) presented their work. This workshop represents a great opportunity to disseminate some of the recent developments in the field. The workshop was organized by the FGV/EPGE and sponsored by the FGV EPGE "Mestrado em Economia e Finanças Empresariais
FGV/EPGE - 2014 Workshop on Economic Theory - David Rahman (University of Minnesota)
No full textImportant economic theorists such as David Martimort (Paris School of Economics), Alessandro Pavan (Northwestern University), David Rahman (University of Minnesota), Yuliy Sannikov (Princeton University), Federico Echenique (California Institute of Technology), Muhamet Yildiz (MIT) and Roland Strausz (University of Berlim) presented their work. This workshop represents a great opportunity to disseminate some of the recent developments in the field. The workshop was organized by the FGV/EPGE and sponsored by the FGV EPGE "Mestrado em Economia e Finanças Empresariais
FGV/EPGE - 2014 Workshop on Economic Theory - David Martimort (Paris School of Economics)
No full textImportant economic theorists such as David Martimort (Paris School of Economics), Alessandro Pavan (Northwestern University), David Rahman (University of Minnesota), Yuliy Sannikov (Princeton University), Federico Echenique (California Institute of Technology), Muhamet Yildiz (MIT) and Roland Strausz (University of Berlim) presented their work. This workshop represents a great opportunity to disseminate some of the recent developments in the field. The workshop was organized by the FGV/EPGE and sponsored by the FGV EPGE "Mestrado em Economia e Finanças Empresariais
FGV/EPGE - 2014 Workshop on Economic Theory - Federico Echenique (Caltech)
No full textImportant economic theorists such as David Martimort (Paris School of Economics), Alessandro Pavan (Northwestern University), David Rahman (University of Minnesota), Yuliy Sannikov (Princeton University), Federico Echenique (California Institute of Technology), Muhamet Yildiz (MIT) and Roland Strausz (University of Berlim) presented their work. This workshop represents a great opportunity to disseminate some of the recent developments in the field. The workshop was organized by the FGV/EPGE and sponsored by the FGV EPGE "Mestrado em Economia e Finanças Empresariais
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