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    Per un'epistemologia dei nudge: dall'evidenza alla causalità

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    This article investigates the foundation of the concept of nudge from the perspective of the new mechanical philosophy. The research program on nudges has always underappreciated the role of mechanistic explanation, favoring an evidence-based approach. We propose a taxonomy for the different objectives of a mechanistic explanation of nudges with three main categories: stability, legitimacy, and development. Then, capitalizing on this epistemological framework, we analyze the theory of nudge as affordance (Motterlini, Perini, 2020b). This theory provides an explanation of the efficacy of nudges by postulating the involvement of the parieto-frontal network responsible for affordance perception. Here we expose the main epistemic advantages of this model, consisting mainly in its contribution to the ethics of nudging and its heuristic potential for the development of new research hypotheses and real-world application

    2006. “Paul K. Feyerabend”, The Philosophy of Science.An Encyclopedia, Sarkar, S., Pfeifer, J. (eds.), Routledge, New York, London, vol. 1, pp. 304-310

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    A Viennese émigré, Paul Feyerabend taught philosophy of science wherever his restless nature brought him – especially Berkeley, London, Auckland, Berlin and Zurich. His views on methodology and the politics of science established him as one of the most controversial, eccentric, and outrageous figures in contemporary philosophy. Allegedly an irrational thinker, Feyerabend was in fact a sceptical master and iconoclast about the sciences and their philosophy. He denounced the gap between abstract normative philosophical accounts of science and actual, complex, and context-dependent scientific practice
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