1,720,992 research outputs found
Comunicazione selettiva dagli amministratori agli azionisti e presidi a tutela del mercato
No full textL'articolo individua le situazioni nelle quali sia ammissibile un dialogo selettivo intrattenuto dagli amministratori di una società quotata con un socio o un gruppo selezionato di soci e entro i quali sia legittimo lo scambio di informazioni, diretto dai primi ai secondi, che, in questa occasione, può avere luogo
Director–shareholder dialogues behind the scenes: searching for a balance between freedom of expression and market fairness
No full textThe freedom of speech of European issuers’ directors is subject to severe restrictions. This article aims to cast light on the behind-the-scenes dialogues that occur between shareholders and directors, and on the boundaries that directors cannot cross when selectively speaking to shareholders outside of general meetings. The article proposes considerations that may apply to a broad range of cases. Not only may boards of directors need to involve their main shareholders in decision-making processes, but boards may also face institutional investors’ requests to arrange specific discussions on company matters. Such engagement aligns with the latest trend in corporate governance that calls for the increasing involvement of institutional investors in ongoing dialogue with the board, thus placing directors in a delicate position under the influence of management and as the voice of shareholders.
The result is a framework in which behind-the-scenes dialogues are not governed by the principle of shareholder democracy, while rules governing shareholders’ meetings are. The board of directors may organise private meetings with the most influential or ‘vocal’ shareholders (as market sounding procedures clearly envisage), in which only some shareholders are invited to participate, without violating the principle of equal treatment. However, the article points out that (i) strict limitations on transmittable content in these situations derive from the European Market Abuse Regulation, and (ii) the principle of equal access to information, convincingly adopted in the European system, significantly affects the conduct of selective dialogues with shareholders. When directors speak to shareholders, engaging in selective or improper disclosure might be just around the corner
Il Report 2015-2016 del Takeover Panel nel Regno Unito
No full textIl Report del Takeover Panel nel Regno Unit
Should shareholders be rewarded for loyalty? European experiments on the wedge between tenured voting and takeover law
Full text linkCorporate law reveals its democratic background when it comes to the general meetings of shareholders, finding, on both sides of the Atlantic, its most tangible expression in the ‘one share, one vote’ principle. While in the political landscape, the ‘one person, one vote’ standard is absolute dogma and weighting votes according to people’s preferences and interests has never proved feasible, in the corporate scenario the ‘one share, one vote’ principle is constantly challenged by the incentives of companies and their shareholders to shape corporate rights according to specific needs. In this respect, some legislators (specifically in France and Italy) have provided for
mechanisms that allow more loyal shareholders to increase their voting power. Tenured voting (or time-phased voting rights) should be analysed in light of the modern corporate governance debate, which calls for a stronger role for long-term investors. However, the other side of the coin should be considered: the increase in voting rights broadens the range of control-enhancing mechanisms, although specific sunset clauses (whether provided for by law or voluntarily opted in by companies) may restore the ‘one share, one vote’ rule. The analysis suggests that the mechanism based on tenured voting is more transparent and potentially less stable than other common controlenhancing mechanisms and deserves to be considered in the debate. At the EU level, the possibility left to the Member States of weighting shareholders’ voting power according to their long-term interests, leads to legislative fragmentation across Europe.
Specifically, in Italy, the adoption of tenured voting coupled with a tradition of ownership concentration sharply empowers controlling shareholders. At the same time, European takeover regulation plays an exogenous role in indirectly selecting the companies that adopt time-phased voting rights. The final result is completely mistrusted, as tenured voting rights disappoint their expectations and are rarely used to meet a true need of long-termism. The paper describes the paradox that emerges when tenured voting rights interact with the core principles of the EU financial market law system, and it offers various ways to alleviate this difficult coexistence
La Corte di Giustizia dell'Unione europea si esprime sul potere delle autorità di vigilanza nazionali di rettificare il prezzo dell'opa obbligatoria
No full textLa Corte di Giustizia dell'Unione europea si esprime sul potere delle autorità di vigilanza nazionali di rettificare il prezzo dell'opa obbligatori
Aggiornamento delle Q&A Esma in materia MiFID II e MiFIR
No full textAggiornamento delle Q&A ESMA in materia MiFID I
Un passo avanti nella creazione di un sistema di vigilanza integrata per i mercati finanziari europei
No full textUn passo avanti nella creazione di un sistema di vigilanza integrata per i mercati finanziari europe
OPA ed azione di concerto
No full textSOMMARIO: 1. Introduzione alla nozione di “concerto”. — 2. La disciplina del “concerto” oltre trent’anni fa, ossia prima dell’entrata in vigore del Testo Unico della Finanza. — 3. La “prima fase” dell’evoluzione della nozione di “concerto” ai sensi del Testo Unico della Finanza. — 4. Una “seconda (breve) fase” dell’evoluzione della nozione di “concerto”. — 5. La “terza fase”, ancora in corso, dell’evoluzione della nozione di “concerto”. — 6. Considerazioni finali
Riflessioni intorno alla nozione di commercializzazione delle azioni delle SICAF e di raccolta del risparmio
No full textThe SICAF is a collective investment undertaking according to the AIFM directive.
It is a FIA (alternative fund) but also a public limited company whose shares can be admitted to trading if so provided in the articles of incorporation. The marketing of shares is a mechanism to raise the company’ capital, often together with a public offer. It also raises issues in terms of cross-borders distributions of financial instruments and investor protection. Despite lacking a legislative definition, the activity plays an important role in understanding the activity of a collective investment undertaking within the framework of the directive
Offerte pubbliche di acquisto e competizione nel mercato dei capitali
No full textSOMMARIO: 1. Introduzione. — 2. La direttiva opa: tra minima armonizzazione e competizione.
— 3. Opa obbligatoria: le leve a disposizione dei legislatori nazionali (soglia, prezzo e altro
ancora). — 4. Opa obbligatoria: investor protection e costo delle operazioni di change
of control. — 5. Opa e assetti di “potere” in presenza di diritti di voto multipli. — 6. Spunti
di riflessione
- …
