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Relativismo aletico, asserzione e ritrattazione
Full text linkIn this paper
I argue against John MacFarlane’s (2014) radical relativist semantics. By developing an argument of Ross & Schroeder (2013) I claim that belief in this relativist theory is incompatible with being a rational agent that acts in accordance with the norms of assertion and retraction. My conclusion is therefore that MacFarlane's semantics is committed to postulating that competent speakers are ignorant of the very theory that provides a
– putative – correct account of their linguistic behaviour
Diaphonic pluralism: from truth pluralism to disagreement pluralism
Full text linkIn this paper, I offer a pluralistic framework for disagreement and I develop a strategy to account for the varieties of disagreement on the basis of the varieties of the truth across different domains of discourse. Truth-pluralism is thus sufficient for delivering pluralism about disagreement-that is, diaphonic pluralism
Verità e Post-Verità: dall'Indagine alla Post-Indagine
Full text linkIn this book, we interpret post-truth as a multifaceted phenomenon which involves fake news, emotion-driven rhetoric (vs fact-driven discussion), credulism in the social-media, conspiracy theories and scientific denialism. We develop three models intended to represent the multifaceted nature of post-truth in terms of deviated forms of enquiry – which we label “post-enquiries”. The first form of post-enquiry posits the existence of alternative facts; the second prioritizes emotions over facts; the third limits the scope of the norms of enquiry. We elaborate on the third model in relation to scientific denialism and we apply it to analyse the case of flat-earthis
Ecumenical alethic pluralism
Full text linkABSTRACTEcumenical Alethic Pluralism is a novel kind of alethic pluralism. It is ecumenical in that it widens the scope of alethic pluralism by allowing for a normatively deflated truth property alongside a variety of normatively robust truth properties. We establish EAP by showing how Wright’s Inflationary Arguments fail in the domain of taste, once a relativist treatment of the metaphysics and epistemology of that domain is endorsed. EAP is highly significant to current debates on the nature of truth insofar as it involves a reconfiguration of the dialectic between deflationists and pluralists
Filosofia con i bambini. Introduzione
No full textPresentazione del tema della filosofia dei bambini e l'approccio didattico della pratiche filosofiche
Logical pluralism, indeterminacy and the normativity of logic
Full text linkAccording to the form of logical pluralism elaborated by Beall and Restall there is more than one relation of logical consequence. Since they take the relation of logical consequence to reside at the very heart of a logical system, different relations of logical consequence yield different logics. In this paper, we are especially interested in understanding what are the consequences of endorsing Beall and Restallâ s version of logical pluralism vis-Ã -vis the normative guidance that logic is taken to provide to reasoners. In particular, the aim of this paper is threefold. First, in Sections 2 and 3, we offer an exegesis of Beall and Restallâ s logical pluralism as a thesis of semantic indeterminacy of our concept of logical consequence â i.e. understood as indeterminacy logical pluralism. Second, in Sections 4 and 5, we elaborate and critically scrutinize three models of semantic indeterminacy that we think are fit to capture Beall and Restallâ s indeterminacy logical pluralism. Third, in Section 6, following Beall and Restallâ s assumption that the notion of logical consequence has normative significance for deductive reasoning, we raise a series of normative problems for indeterminacy logical pluralism. The overall conclusion that we aim to establish is that Beall and Restallâ s indeterminate logical pluralism cannot offer an adequate account of the normative guidance that logic is taken to provide us with in ordinary contexts of reasoning
Interworld Disagreement
Full text linkDisagreement plays an important role in several philosophical debates, with intuitions about ordinary or exotic cases of agreement and disagreement being invoked to support or undermine competing semantic, epistemological and metaphysical views. In this paper we discuss cases of (alleged) interworld doxastic disagreement, that is to say, cases of doxastic disagreement supposedly obtaining between (the beliefs of) individuals inhabiting different possible worlds, in particular between an individual inhabiting the actual world and his/her counterpart in another possible world. We draw a distinction between propositional and attitudinal disagreement, bring it to bear on the issue of the conditions of this kind of disagreement, and raise some metaphysical and epistemological worries about the claim that an individual inhabiting the actual world can disagree with an attitude or a speech act of his/her own counterpart, or of another individual, in a different possible world
Che cosa serve per essere in disaccordo?
No full textNel saggio viene discussa la relazione di disaccordo doxastico intermondano nelle sue varianti proposizionale e attitudinale. Gli autori sostengono due tesi. La prima è che, per avere uno stato di disaccordo doxastico intermondano di tipo attitudinale, è necessario che le affermazioni o le credenze coinvolte vertano non sulla medesima circostanza di valutazione, ma su circostanze di valutazione sufficientemente simili sotto i profili pertinenti. La seconda è che l'impressione che sia possibile descrivere perspicuamente come situazioni di disaccordo intermondano le situazioni in cui gli atteggiamenti di individui appartenenti a mondi possibili differenti sono tali che l’accuratezza dell’uno preclude l’accuratezza dell’altro è un artefatto dell’adozione del gergo realistico dei mondi possibili e delle controparti
Basic disagreement, basic contextualism and basic relativism
Full text linkThe paper shows how basic forms of semantic contextualism and of alethic relativism cannot account for an intuitive and straightforward notion of disagreement, which characterizes those disputes of inclination that have been claimed to be better accounted for by those theories
ALETHIC PLURALISM AND THE NORMATIVITY OF TRUTH
No full textWe provide an overview of the current debate on truth pluralism with a focus on the normatively of truth in inquiry
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