1,720,976 research outputs found
Capital Structures theories and convergence towards optimal debt ratios: Explaining the speed of adjustement in majority-controlled firms
No full textIn a context characterized by high ownership concentration, separation between ownership and control, diffusion of family-controlled firms, and pyramidal groups, ownership structure variables are likely to be strongly linked to leverage differently from the Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen (1986) free cash flow effect and discipline of debt. The study shows that: (1) family firms are significantly more indebted than non-family counterparts, (2) separation between ownership and control leads to higher leverage ratios largely in family firms, (3) institutional investors acquire larger stakes in less leveraged firms. The results appear to be consistent with the use of debt as device to hold control and to exacerbate Type II agency issues. Family control affects both the target leverage and the speed of adjustment towards the optimal debt ratio. Family firms appear to be slower than non-family counterparts in converging on the target while firms significantly deviating from the optimal debt ratio show a faster reversal path
21 years of international acquisitions and joint ventures by italian medium sized firms: value creation or value destruction?
No full text
The Decision to Delist from the Stock Market. Theory and Empirical Evidence of Going Private
No full textIs family business beautiful? Evidence from Italian stock market
No full textFrom the agency perspective, literature studying links between investor protection and governance profiles argues that family is more disposed than other shareholders to divert private benefits in countries with a poor legal framework: the question is empirically puzzling. From the stewardship perspective, the degree of familiness affects the stewardship attitude of the firm. We do not find that family firms perform worse or better than non-family counterparts. Some evidence is found as regards the entrenchment effect: family CEOs seem to weaken firm performance. Stewardship attitude – not familiness – does matter: moderate levels of stewardship improve performance and increase risk-taking
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