161,107 research outputs found
Is family business beautiful? Evidence from Italian stock market
From the agency perspective, literature studying links between investor protection and governance profiles argues that family is more disposed than other shareholders to divert private benefits in countries with a poor legal framework: the question is empirically puzzling. From the stewardship perspective, the degree of familiness affects the stewardship attitude of the firm. We do not find that family firms perform worse or better than non-family counterparts. Some evidence is found as regards the entrenchment effect: family CEOs seem to weaken firm performance. Stewardship attitude – not familiness – does matter: moderate levels of stewardship improve performance and increase risk-taking
Is family business beautiful? Una verifica empirica sulle imprese italiane quotate delle ipotesi dell’agenzia e della stewardship theory
Size and value anomalies in European bank stocks
The Fama-French three-factor model (Fama and French, 1993) has been subject to extensive testing on samples of US and European nonfinancial firms over several time windows. The most accepted evidence is that size premium (SMB) and value premium (HML) other than the market risk premium help explain cross-section and time-series changes in stock returns. However, scholars have always paid little attention to the financial industry because of the intrinsic differences between financial and nonfinancial firms. The few studies that tested the model on financial firms found mixed evidence on the role of size and book-to-market ratio (B/M) in explaining stock returns. This paper tries to bridge the gap by testing the model on a sample of European financial firms. We find that size and B/M factors seem to be sources of undiversifiable risks and should therefore be included as risk premiums for estimating expected returns of financial firms. Small and high-B/M firms show higher returns that are not explained by market risk and the inclusion of SMB and HML helps improve the regression models’ goodness-of-fit
Capital Structures theories and convergence towards optimal debt ratios: Explaining the speed of adjustement in majority-controlled firms
In a context characterized by high ownership concentration, separation between ownership and control, diffusion of family-controlled firms, and pyramidal groups, ownership structure variables are likely to be strongly linked to leverage differently from the Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen (1986) free cash flow effect and discipline of debt. The study shows that: (1) family firms are significantly more indebted than non-family counterparts, (2) separation between ownership and control leads to higher leverage ratios largely in family firms, (3) institutional investors acquire larger stakes in less leveraged firms. The results appear to be consistent with the use of debt as device to hold control and to exacerbate Type II agency issues. Family control affects both the target leverage and the speed of adjustment towards the optimal debt ratio. Family firms appear to be slower than non-family counterparts in converging on the target while firms significantly deviating from the optimal debt ratio show a faster reversal path
21 years of international acquisitions and joint ventures by italian medium sized firms: value creation or value destruction?
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