1,721,739 research outputs found
Problems for Wright's entitlement theory
No full textCrispin Wright’s entitlement theory holds that we have non-evidential justification for accepting propositions of a general type—which Wright calls “cornerstones”—that enables us to acquire justification for believing other propositions—those that we take to be true on the grounds of ordinary evidence. Entitlement theory is meant by Wright to deliver a forceful response to the sceptic who argues that we cannot justify ordinary beliefs. In the following, I initially focus on strategic entitlement, which is one of
the types of entitlement that Wright has described in more detail. Against Wright, I submit that it is dubious that we are strategically entitled to accept cornerstones. For we are strategically entitled to do so only if a longstanding and apparently plausible view about the ultimate epistemic goal—veritic dual goal monism—is false. After this, I focus on entitlement in general. I contend that non-evidential justification for accepting cornerstones in important cases cannot secure evidential justification for believing ordinary propositions. My argument rests on probabilistic regimentation of the so-called “leaching problem.” This criticism potentially strikes all forms of epistemic entitlement introduced by Wright at once, as each of them is supposed to be a type of nonevidential justification
Phenomenal conservatism and the problem of reflective awareness
No full textThis paper criticizes phenomenal conservatism––the influential view according to which a subject S’s seeming that P provides S with defeasible justification for believing P. I argue that phenomenal conservatism, if true at all, has a significant limitation: seeming-based justification is elusive because S can easily lose it by just reflecting on her seemings and speculating about their causes––I call this the problem of reflective awareness. Because of this limitation, phenomenal conservatism doesn’t have all the epistemic merits attributed to it by its advocates. If true, phenomenal conservatism would constitute a unified theory of epistemic justification capable of giving everyday epistemic practices a rationale, but it wouldn’t afford us the means of an effective response to the sceptic. Furthermore, phenomenal conservatism couldn’t form the general basis for foundationalism
Moretti, Luca. "Patrick Greenough and Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge, Oxford: OUP (2009)". Mind 121(484), pp. 1069-1073.
No full textDummett and the problem of the vanishing past
No full textDummett has recently presented his most mature and sophisticated version of justificationism, i.e. the view that meaning and truth are to be analysed in terms of justifiability. In this paper, I argue that this conception does not resolve a difficulty that also affected Dummett’s earlier version of justificationism: the problem that large tracts of the past continuously vanish as their traces in the present dissipate. Since Dummett’s justificationism is essentially based on the assumption that the speaker has limited (i.e. non-idealized) cognitive powers, no further refinement of this position is likely to settle the problem of the vanishing pas
Grimes on the tacking by disjunction problem". Disputatio 1(17) (November), pp. 16-20.
No full textIn this paper, I focus on the so-called ‘tacking by disjunction problem'. Namely, the problem to the effect that, if a hypothesis h is confirmed by a statement e, h is confirmed by the disjunction e ∨ f, for whatever statement f. I show that the attempt to settle this difficulty made by Grimes 1990, in a paper apparently forgotten by today methodologists, is irremediably faulty
Mizrahi's argument against phenomenal conservatism
No full textI show that Mizrahi’s argument against Phenomenal Conservatism is fallacious
Wright, Okasha and Chandler on transmission failure
No full textCrispin Wright has given an explanation of how a first time warrant can fall short of transmitting across a known entailment. Formal epistemologists have struggled to turn Wright’s informal explanation into cogent Bayesian reasoning. In this paper, I analyse two Bayesian models of Wright’s account respectively proposed by Samir Okasha and Jake Chandler. I argue that both formalizations are unsatisfactory for different reasons, and I lay down a third Bayesian model that appears to me to capture the valid kernel of Wright’s explanation. After this, I consider a recent development in Wright’s account of transmission failure. Wright suggests that his condition sufficient for transmission failure of first time warrant also suffices for transmission failure of supplementary warrant. I propose an interpretation of Wright’s suggestion that shields it from objections. I then lay down a fourth Bayesian framework that provides a simplified model of the unified explanation of transmission failure envisaged by Wright
Tal and Comesaña on evidence of evidence
No full textR. Feldman defends a general principle about evidence the slogan form of which says that ‘evidence of evidence is evidence’. B. Fitelson considers three renditions of this principle and contends they are all falsified by counterexamples. Against both Feldman and Fitelson, J. Comesaña and E. Tal show that the third rendition––the one actually endorsed by Feldman––isn’t affected by Fitelson’s counterexamples, but only because it is trivially true and thus uninteresting. Tal and Comesaña defend a fourth version of Feldman’s principle, which––they claim––has not yet been shown false. Against Tal and Comesaña I show that this new version of Feldman’s principle is false
Entitlement, epistemic risk and scepticism
No full textCrispin Wright maintains that the architecture of perceptual justification is such that we can acquire justification for our perceptual beliefs only if we have antecedent justification for ruling out any sceptical alternative. Wright contends that this principle doesn’t elicit scepticism, for we are non-evidentially entitled to accept the negation of any sceptical alternative. Sebastiano Moruzzi has challenged Wright’s contention by arguing that since our non-evidential entitlements don’t remove the epistemic risk of our perceptual beliefs, they don’t actually enable us to acquire justification for these beliefs. In this paper I show that Wright’s responses to Moruzzi are ineffective and that Moruzzi’s argument is validated by probabilistic reasoning. I also suggest that Wright cannot answer Moruzzi’s challenge without weakening the support available for his conception of the architecture of perceptual justification
Tal and Comesaña on evidence of evidence
No full textR. Feldman defends a general principle about evidence the slogan form of which says that ‘evidence of evidence is evidence’. B. Fitelson considers three renditions of this principle and contends they are all falsified by counterexamples. Against both Feldman and Fitelson, J. Comesaña and E. Tal show that the third rendition––the one actually endorsed by Feldman––isn’t affected by Fitelson’s counterexamples, but only because it is trivially true and thus uninteresting. Tal and Comesaña defend a fourth version of Feldman’s principle, which––they claim––has not yet been shown false. Against Tal and Comesaña I show that this new version of Feldman’s principle is false
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