67 research outputs found
Henri Bergson and the philosophy of religion:God, freedom, and duration
No full textThis book connects the philosophy of Henri Bergson to contemporary debates in metaphysics and analytic philosophy of religion. More specifically, the book demonstrates how Bergson’s philosophy of time can respond to the problem of foreknowledge and free will. The question of how humans can be free if God knows everything has been a perennial issue of debate in analytic philosophy of religion. The solution to this problem relies heavily on what one thinks about time. The problem of time is central to Bergson’s philosophical system. In this book, the author offers a systematic application of Bergson’s thought to the freedom and foreknowledge problem. The first chapter presents a discussion of Bergson’s central concept of la durée (duration). The subsequent two chapters link la durée to the relation of time and space. Here the author provides a Bergsonian response to McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time and develops a novel theory of time connected to Bergson’s analysis of temporal experience. The last three chapters explore the relation between free will, determinism, and divine foreknowledge. The author reconstructs Bergson’s theory of freedom and shows how it undermines the underlying dogmas of contemporary free-will theories. The author then argues that Bergson’s philosophy can be used to resolve the free will and foreknowledge problem in philosophy of religion. The monograph concludes by opening avenues for new research into Bergson and analytic philosophy of religion, such as the philosophy of religious language, the relation between God and modality, or religious experience
Revealing the counterfactuals: Molinism, stubbornness, and deception
Full text linkThis paper argues that the possibility of revealing counterfactuals of creaturely freedom to agents in possible worlds forming part of God’s natural knowledge poses a new problem for Molinism. This problem best comes to light when considering the phenomenon of stubbornness, i.e., the conscious refusal of fulfilling the providential plan revealed to and intended for us by another agent. The reason why this problem has gone unnoticed is that the usual instances of prophecy dealt with by Molinists (especially the story of Peter’s denial) are highly specific cases. These cases are special for three reasons: (1) because the content of the revelations does not include the relevant counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, (2) because the specific revelation plays no causal role in the immediate circumstances of the action that the agent is performing, and (3) because the agent is not intent on consciously refusing the providential plan intended by the relevant counterfactual. I explore possible worlds where one or more of these three conditions do not obtain and demonstrate the consequences these possible worlds have for Molinists
Linguistic analysis and psychical research 1940-1960: the case of Casimir Lewy
Full text linkThis paper explores a hitherto overlooked chapter in the history of analytic philosophy, namely the role that psychical research (i.e. the study of phenomena like telepathy, clairvoyance, ghosts, or communication with spirits of the dead) played in British philosophy between 1940 and 1960. This paper focuses on Casimir Lewy’s (1919–1991) engagement with psychical research and demonstrates that Lewy’s early work constitutes a move towards sustained application of the linguistic method to psychical research between 1940 and 1960. I argue that paying attention to psychical research during this period is significant for two reasons. The first is that this period represents a unique chapter in the history of the analytic tradition, namely, a philosophical preoccupation with the meaning of the language used by psychical researchers. The second is that a foundational moment in the history of analytic philosophy of religion is inseparable from its origin in psychical research
Taking time seriously: the Bergsonism of Karin Costelloe-Stephen, Hilda Oakeley, and May Sinclair
Full text linkThis paper explores the influence of Henri Bergson’s (1859-1941) philosophy of time on three early twentieth-century British philosophers: Karin Costelloe-Stephen (1889-1953), Hilda Oakeley (1867-1950), and May Sinclair (1863-1946). I demonstrate that three central claims of Bergson’s account of temporal experience (novelty, memory, and indivisibility) were creatively incorporated into their accounts of time. All these philosophers place time at the centre of their philosophical systems, so this study of their views on time and temporality can deepen our understanding of their systems more broadly. Further, this study helps us appreciate the reception of Bergson’s thought in British philosophy after it came under ferocious attack at the hands of Bertrand Russell in 1912, and can provide more detailed contours on the joint fortunes of temporal experience and Bergson's thought in the history of twentieth-century philosophy. I conclude by emphasising reasons why contemporary philosophers should pay particular attention to the three figures' treatment of Bergson
A Philosophical Idea That Can Help Us Understand Why Time Is Moving Slowly During the Pandemic
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C. D. Broad on precognitions and John William Dunne
No full textC. D. Broad developed three different accounts of time over the course of his career. Emily Thomas (2019) has recently argued that the shift from the first to the second of these was motivated by his engagement with the philosophy of Samuel Alexander. In this paper, I argue that the shift from the second to the third was instigated by Broad’s engagement with precognitive dreams and with the thought of John William Dunne. Furthermore, I argue that fully appreciating Broad’s interest in psychic research in general, and precognitions in particular, is required for understanding the theory of time he defended in the second volume of Examination of McTaggart’s Philosophy. I also argue that interpreting the Examination in light of Broad’s engagement with Dunne can help remove the inconsistencies in Broad’s third account
C. D. Broad on precognitions and John William Dunne
Full text linkC. D. Broad developed three different accounts of time over the course of his career. Emily Thomas (2019) has recently argued that the shift from the first to the second of these was motivated by his engagement with the philosophy of Samuel Alexander. In this paper, I argue that the shift from the second to the third was instigated by Broad’s engagement with precognitive dreams and with the thought of John William Dunne. Furthermore, I argue that fully appreciating Broad’s interest in psychic research in general, and precognitions in particular, is required for understanding the theory of time he defended in the second volume of Examination of McTaggart’s Philosophy. I also argue that interpreting the Examination in light of Broad’s engagement with Dunne can help remove the inconsistencies in Broad’s third account.Peer reviewe
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