1,720,972 research outputs found
Alcune note sulle relazioni tra incentivi economici, norme giuridiche e regole morali
No full textIl contributo discute il ritorno dei "sentimenti morali" negli studi economici (ricordando il titolo dell'opera di Adam Smith, "The theory of moral sentiments") e poi, negli elementi essenziali, i meccanismi di regolazione sociale delle condotte individuali, considerando specialmente le interdipendenze fra sistemi legali e incentivi morali ed etici. Una sezione del contributo presenta, sinteticamente, i contributi del volume curato dall'autore, "Regole, mercati e sentimenti morali"
Le Autorità di regolazione si meritano vertici migliori
No full textLe recenti nomine al vertice dell’Autorità di regolazione dei trasporti sono state decisamente discutibili. Non è un fatto isolato, anzi si colloca in una linea di progressivo peggioramento qualitativo. Come migliorare il processo di nomina
Autorità dei trasporti: qui comanda la politica
No full textIl processo di costituzione della nuova Autorità dei trasporti ha compiuto un passo decisivo, ma si sono riproposti i tradizionali metodi “all’italiana” nella designazione dei vertici delle autorità indipendenti; sono metodi poco idonei per ottimizzare le scelte, e che per questo andrebbero rivisti
Sulle nomine Agcom continua a comandare la politica
No full textLa politica continua a intervenire nelle nomine ai vertici delle Autorità di regolazione. Così le scelte non tengono conto dei criteri di indipendenza e competenza, come invece prevede la legge. Le nomine Agcom ne sono l’ultimo esempio
Regulation by Independent Agencies: Who Is the Principal, and What Does She Want
Full text linkAt the center of regulation, as performed by independent agencies, there are two primary principal-agent relationships: downstream, regulatory agencies act as principals vis-à-vis regulated firms; upstream, regulatory agencies themselves act as the agents of government (parliament and/or the executive). This paper looks at the second relationship, which is, of the two, both the more important (because of its position at the top of the decision-making chain) and the less structured (as governments usually do not have direct power, or control, over the agencies – hence the characterization of these as “independent”). In addition, this relationship is further complicated (and muddled) by the presence of a number of influential actors, consumers, firms, experts, the media and the courts. The paper focuses on the complexity of economic and political interests in this relationship to discuss how it affects regulation by independent agencies. The exposition will draw from the available theories of regulation (incentive, or contract, or public choice-based), and considers examples, mainly from transport regulation in Italy. This regulation has evolved considerably over time, and the shapes that it has taken offer evidence of different possibilities as to the operation of the principal-agent relationship, as well as the following regulatory outcomes
Nuova Alitalia, la discontinuità non decolla
No full textPer approvare il nuovo salvataggio di Alitalia, la Commissione richiede discontinuità rispetto al passato. Il ridimensionamento della struttura dell’azienda è significativo, ma su un reale cambio di passo in strategie e gestione ci sono poche garanzie
The Selection of Regulators, or, the Political Economy of Regulation in Italy
No full textThe selection of board members of independent agencies is an important instrument in the hands of governments (executives and parliaments) to influence the behavior and performance of such agencies (another important one is the setting of rules). However, such selection, as a subject of study, has been largely neglected. Very little is known on the characteristics of appointed regulators, and on how they compare with the prescriptions of normative theory as to their desirable characteristics. This paper aims to contribute to filling this gap. It looks to a subset of Italian independent agencies, namely the group of Italian independent regulatory agencies charged with the regulation of companies operating in utility industries showing monopoly features (energy, water, waste collection and environmental services, communications, transport). It offers, in the first place, by looking at the CVs of the appointed board members, an empirical overview of the selections which have been made, in the period since the establishment of the first independent regulatory agency, in 1996; in the second place, it reflects on the characteristics, determinants, and some (normative) implications of the empirical findings
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