191,793 research outputs found
Saggi glottologici e letterari di P. Merlo
No full textContén: v. 1: Saggi glottologice.-- v. 2: Saggi critici e letterar
Ch. Merlo et P. Vidaud, Unité des langues négro-africaines
No full textTornay Serge. Ch. Merlo et P. Vidaud, Unité des langues négro-africaines. In: L'Homme, 1970, tome 10 n°1. pp. 116-118
Identification and Estimation of Stochastic Bargaining Models, Third Version
No full textStochastic sequential bargaining models (Merlo and Wilson (1995, 1998)) have found wide applications in different fields including political economy and macroeconomics due to their flexibility in explaining delays in reaching an agreement. This paper presents new results in nonparametric identification and estimation of such models under different data scenarios.Nonparametric identification, non-cooperative bargaining, stochastic sequential bargaining, rationalizable counterfactual outcomes
Identification and Estimation of Stochastic Bargaining Models, Fourth Version
No full textStochastic sequential bargaining models (Merlo and Wilson (1995, 1998)) have found wide applications in different fields including political economy and macroeconomics due to their flexibility in explaining delays in reaching an agreement. This paper presents new results in nonparametric identification and estimation of such models under different data scenarios.Nonparametric identification and estimation, non-cooperative bargaining, stochastic sequential bargaining, rationalizable counterfactual outcomes
Merlo. Note de M. J. Martel.
No full textMartel Julien. Merlo. Note de M. J. Martel.. In: Revue Internationale d'Onomastique, 14e année N°2, juin 1962. p. 134
Money, Political Ambition, and the Career Decisions of Politicians, Second Version
No full textIn this paper we assess the impact of a variety of policies that may influence the career decisions of members of the U.S. Congress, using the empirical framework of Diermeier, Keane and Merlo (2005). These policies alter incentives to run for re-election, run for higher office or leave Congress, by altering wages, non-pecuniary rewards and career prospects (both in and out of Congress). We find that reducing the relative wage of politicians would substantially reduce the duration of congressional careers. Notably, however, the effect varies considerably across different types of politicians. A reduction in the congressional wage would disproportionately induce exit from Congress by “skilled” politicians, Democrats, and politicians who were relatively young when first elected. Interestingly, however, it would not cause the type of politicians who most value legislative accomplishments (“achievers”) to disproportionately exit Congress. Thus, wage reductions would not reduce the “quality” composition of Congress in this sense. Term limits also have similar effects on achievers and non-achievers. However, we find that term limits would disproportionately induce members of the majority party to exit Congress. This has the interesting implication that term limits make it more difficult to sustain substantial congressional majorities over time. We do find three types of policies that disproportionately induce non-achievers to leave Congress: (i) elimination of seniority as a determinant of key committee assignments, (ii) restricting private sector employment after leaving Congress, and (iii) reducing the seniority advantage in elections.politicians, political careers, monetary and non-monetary incentives, U.S. Congress
Money, Political Ambition, and the Career Decisions of Politicians
No full textIn this paper we assess the impact of a variety of policies that may influence the career decisions of members of the U.S. Congress, using the empirical framework of Diermeier, Keane and Merlo (2005). These policies alter incentives to run for re-election, run for higher office or leave Congress, by altering wages, nonpecuniary rewards and career prospects (both in and out of Congress). We find that reducing the relative wage of politicians would substantially reduce the duration of congressional careers. Notably, however, the effect varies considerably across different types of politicians. A reduction in the congressional wage would disproportionately induce exit from Congress by “skilled” politicians, Democrats, politicians who were relatively young when first elected, and those without pre-congressional political experience. Interestingly, however, it would not cause the type of politicians who most value legislative accomplishments (“achievers”) to disproportionately exit Congress. Thus, wage reductions would not reduce the “quality” composition of Congress in this sense. Term limits also have similar effects on achievers and non-achievers. However, we find that term limits would disproportionately induce members of the majority party to exit Congress. This has the interesting implication that term limits make it more difficult to sustain substantial congressional majorities over time. We do find three types of policies that disproportionately induce nonachievers to leave Congress: (i) elimination of seniority as a determinant of key committee assignments, (ii) restricting private sector employment after leaving Congress, and (iii) reducing the seniority advantage in elections.politicians, political careers, monetary and non-monetary incentives, U.S. Congress
Clemente Merlo, Grillotalpa vulgaris, 1906. (Extr. des Studj romanzi)
No full textTh. A. Clemente Merlo, Grillotalpa vulgaris, 1906. (Extr. des Studj romanzi). In: Romania, tome 38 n°149, 1909. p. 146
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