204,825 research outputs found
Regulatory Uncertainty and Inefficiency for the Development of Merchant Lines in Europe
This paper evaluates regulatory uncertainty and inefficiency that may prevent merchant transmission investors from committing in Europe, in particular when they are dominant generators. We argue that market players may perceive regulatory uncertainty to acquire exemption on merchant line mainly because of the discretion given for the application of Art. 7 of the Regulation 1228/2003 on cross-border exchanges. However we show that an emerging strategy of the European Commission for granting exemption on merchant transmission line can be eventually derived from recent legal and regulatory proceedings. It mainly consists in relying on TSOs to build merchant lines. We demonstrate that this strategy is neither a first best nor a second best given imperfect unbundling and the current flows in the allocation of regulatory powers. Indeed, it prevents merchant line investment by dominant generators with low generation cost while they have currently more incentive than TSOs to build merchant lines. Since unregulated merchant transmission investment by generators would be problematic, we show eventually that the current strategy of the application of Regulation can easily be fine-tuned to reach this second-best optimum.Regulatory Uncertainty and Inefficiency for the Development of Merchant Lines in Europe
Regulated and merchant interconnectors in Australia: SNI and Murraylink revisited
This paper examines the history of the various actual and proposed interconnectors between New South Wales and Victoria into South Australia. It covers the period from the earliest proposal for a regulated interconnector to the recent Victoria Supreme Court review and the latest ministerial proposals. It finds, inter alia, that the Supreme Court decision is likely to have strengthened, in a beneficial way, the regulatory regime for dealing with merchant interconnectors and the obligations on incumbent transmission companies. It finds that none of the proposals for regulated interconnectors did or would have passed the regulatory tests as formulated in terms of aggregate benefits to all market participants. It finds that neither of the merchant interconnectors (into South Australia and Queensland) are likely to have been profitable. It sees a possible explanation for the construction of regulated interconnectors in terms of the benefits to customers, or in terms of bringing about a single competitive market. Above all, it illustrates the political context in which decisions on interconnectors have been made, and the need to take account of such motivations when comparing the likely effects of regulated interconnectors versus merchant interconnectorsmerchant investment, interconnectors, electricity, regulation, transmission
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Regulated and merchant interconnectors in Australia: SNI and Murraylink revisited
This paper examines the history of the various actual and proposed interconnectors between New South Wales and Victoria into South Australia. It covers the period from the earliest proposal for a regulated interconnector to the recent Victoria Supreme Court review and the latest ministerial proposals. It finds, inter alia, that the Supreme Court decision is likely to have strengthened, in a beneficial way, the regulatory regime for dealing with merchant interconnectors and the obligations on incumbent transmission companies. It finds that none of the proposals for regulated interconnectors did or would have passed the regulatory tests as formulated in terms of aggregate benefits to all market participants. It finds that neither of the merchant interconnectors (into South Australia and Queensland) are likely to have been profitable. It sees a possible explanation for the construction of regulated interconnectors in terms of the benefits to customers, or in terms of bringing about a single competitive market. Above all, it illustrates the political context in which decisions on interconnectors have been made, and the need to take account of such motivations when comparing the likely effects of regulated interconnectors versus merchant interconnector
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Merchant and Regulated Transmission: Theory, Evidence and Policy
Economists acknowledge the problems of regulated transmission but
take different views about the likely efficiency of merchant transmission.
This paper examines the evidence on alleged market failure and
regulatory failure as experienced in practice in Australia and Argentina.
In these examples, merchant transmission (broadly defined to include
private initiatives) has generally not exhibited the standard examples of
market failure but regulated transmission generally has exhibited the
standard examples of regulatory failure. Imperfect information – more
specifically, in the form of lack of coordination – has often been a
challenge whatever the approach. Policy should therefore seek to
improve the regulatory framework and to remove barriers to merchant
transmission and private initiatives. An important role for regulation is to
facilitate coordination between potential providers and users of
transmission lines
The Cantelowe Accounts - Multilingual merchant records from Tuscany, 1450-1451
The Cantelowe Accounts appear to offer the earliest evidence of an English merchant using Italian as a second language. They were written by John Balmayn, an unknown Londoner, who travelled to Tuscany to oversee the sale of a valuable wool shipment in 1450-51 on behalf of his master - the Mercer, Sir William Cantelowe. The author uses an intriguing mix of four languages, combining Middle English, Latin and Anglo-French with the administrative Tuscan that he has learnt working alongside Florentine partners, such as the Salviati company. Two other striking features of the text are the extensive use of Arabic numerals, unparalleled in fifteenth-century English accounting, and the unusually detailed descriptions of merchant marks that were used to identify the woolsacks. Overall, the accounts are unique amongst multilingual medieval sources and will interest economic historians and historical linguists alike
The Matter of Merchant Paper
Around 1608, Peter Paul Rubens produced an oil sketch of the face of a Black man, a head study that the Flemish artist would ultimately mobilize in a large painting of the Adoration of the Magi. To make the initial sketch, he reached for a sheet of merchant paper scrawled with a list of transactions—sums exchanged for goods received and shipped. It would be easy to wave this away as a case of simple, frugal reuse: the artist reached for what was at hand, readily and cheaply available. This paper (a chapter of a book in progress) argues, instead, that the sheet mattered quite a bit more and shaped not only Rubens’s aesthetic choices but also the thematic resonances that accreted around a figure that would play a large role in the artist’s career and pictorial imaginar
Merchant Electricity Transmission Expansion: A European Case Study
We apply a merchant transmission model to the trilateral market coupling (TLC) arrangement among the Netherlands, Belgium and France as a generic example, and note that it can be applied to any general market splitting or coupling of Europe's different national power markets. In this merchant framework; the system operator allocates financial transmission rights (FTRs) to investors in transmission expansion based upon their preferences, and revenue adequacy. The independent system operator (ISO) preserves some proxy FTRs to deal with potential negative externalities due to an expansion project. This scheme proves to be capable in providing incentives for investment in transmission expansion projects within TLC areas.transmission expansion, trilateral market coupling, Europe, financial transmission rights, congestion management
Albert M. and Nancy Merchant Allee on their homestead near Victoria Springs, Custer County, Nebraska.
The child seated on her mother's lap is Fora M. Allee (b. 7 September 1889)
Merchant interconnector projects by generators in the EU: Effects on profitability and allocation of capacity
When building a cross-border transmission line (a so-called interconnector) as a for-profit (merchant) project, where the regulator has required that capacity allocation be done non-discriminatorily by explicit auction, the identity of the investor can affect the profitability of the interconnector project and, once operational, the resulting allocation of its capacity. Specifically, when the investor is a generator (hereafter the integrated generator) who also can use the interconnector to export its electricity to a distant location, then, once operational, the integrated generator will bid more aggressively in the allocation auctions to increase the auction revenue and thus its profits. As a result, the integrated generator is more likely to win the auction and the capacity is sold for a higher price. This lowers the allocative efficiency of the auction, but it increases the expected ex-ante profitability of the merchant interconnector project. Unaffiliated, independent generators, however, are less likely to win the auction and, in any case, pay a higher price, which dramatically lowers their revenues from exporting electricity over this interconnector.electricity markets; regulation; cross-border electricity transmissions; vertical integration; asymmetric auctions; bidding behavior
"Variations on the Merchant of Venice" di Charles Marowitz. Un collage 'epico'
Analisi di "Variations on The Merchant of Venice" (1977) di Charles Marowitz
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