175,823 research outputs found
The California lumber merchant.
No full textPublisher varies: California Lumber Merchant, Inc., -Aug. 1966.Description based on: Vol. 24, no. 13 (Jan. 1, 1946); title from cover.Vol. 41 complete in 18 no.sMode of access: Internet
Regulatory Uncertainty and Inefficiency for the Development of Merchant Lines in Europe
No full textThis paper evaluates regulatory uncertainty and inefficiency that may prevent merchant transmission investors from committing in Europe, in particular when they are dominant generators. We argue that market players may perceive regulatory uncertainty to acquire exemption on merchant line mainly because of the discretion given for the application of Art. 7 of the Regulation 1228/2003 on cross-border exchanges. However we show that an emerging strategy of the European Commission for granting exemption on merchant transmission line can be eventually derived from recent legal and regulatory proceedings. It mainly consists in relying on TSOs to build merchant lines. We demonstrate that this strategy is neither a first best nor a second best given imperfect unbundling and the current flows in the allocation of regulatory powers. Indeed, it prevents merchant line investment by dominant generators with low generation cost while they have currently more incentive than TSOs to build merchant lines. Since unregulated merchant transmission investment by generators would be problematic, we show eventually that the current strategy of the application of Regulation can easily be fine-tuned to reach this second-best optimum.Regulatory Uncertainty and Inefficiency for the Development of Merchant Lines in Europe
Regulated and merchant interconnectors in Australia: SNI and Murraylink revisited
No full textThis paper examines the history of the various actual and proposed interconnectors between New South Wales and Victoria into South Australia. It covers the period from the earliest proposal for a regulated interconnector to the recent Victoria Supreme Court review and the latest ministerial proposals. It finds, inter alia, that the Supreme Court decision is likely to have strengthened, in a beneficial way, the regulatory regime for dealing with merchant interconnectors and the obligations on incumbent transmission companies. It finds that none of the proposals for regulated interconnectors did or would have passed the regulatory tests as formulated in terms of aggregate benefits to all market participants. It finds that neither of the merchant interconnectors (into South Australia and Queensland) are likely to have been profitable. It sees a possible explanation for the construction of regulated interconnectors in terms of the benefits to customers, or in terms of bringing about a single competitive market. Above all, it illustrates the political context in which decisions on interconnectors have been made, and the need to take account of such motivations when comparing the likely effects of regulated interconnectors versus merchant interconnectorsmerchant investment, interconnectors, electricity, regulation, transmission
Recommended from our members
Regulated and merchant interconnectors in Australia: SNI and Murraylink revisited
No full textThis paper examines the history of the various actual and proposed interconnectors between New South Wales and Victoria into South Australia. It covers the period from the earliest proposal for a regulated interconnector to the recent Victoria Supreme Court review and the latest ministerial proposals. It finds, inter alia, that the Supreme Court decision is likely to have strengthened, in a beneficial way, the regulatory regime for dealing with merchant interconnectors and the obligations on incumbent transmission companies. It finds that none of the proposals for regulated interconnectors did or would have passed the regulatory tests as formulated in terms of aggregate benefits to all market participants. It finds that neither of the merchant interconnectors (into South Australia and Queensland) are likely to have been profitable. It sees a possible explanation for the construction of regulated interconnectors in terms of the benefits to customers, or in terms of bringing about a single competitive market. Above all, it illustrates the political context in which decisions on interconnectors have been made, and the need to take account of such motivations when comparing the likely effects of regulated interconnectors versus merchant interconnector
Recommended from our members
Merchant and Regulated Transmission: Theory, Evidence and Policy
No full textEconomists acknowledge the problems of regulated transmission but
take different views about the likely efficiency of merchant transmission.
This paper examines the evidence on alleged market failure and
regulatory failure as experienced in practice in Australia and Argentina.
In these examples, merchant transmission (broadly defined to include
private initiatives) has generally not exhibited the standard examples of
market failure but regulated transmission generally has exhibited the
standard examples of regulatory failure. Imperfect information – more
specifically, in the form of lack of coordination – has often been a
challenge whatever the approach. Policy should therefore seek to
improve the regulatory framework and to remove barriers to merchant
transmission and private initiatives. An important role for regulation is to
facilitate coordination between potential providers and users of
transmission lines
Banks venture into new territory
No full textFinancial modernization legislation passed in 1999 allows banking organizations to directly invest in any type of company. This merchant banking authority gives banks greater opportunities to provide venture capital to start-up companies and later-stage equity financing to more mature firms. Kenneth Robinson examines how banks have pursued their new merchant banking powers. Robinson finds evidence that organizations that engage in merchant banking tend to be larger than those that do not. His findings are also consistent with the hypothesis that banks may be attempting to lower their average costs by combining merchant banking with other nonbank activities. Allowing banking organizations to pursue this new activity will provide them with an additional source of earnings and greater diversification opportunities and will likely increase private equity financing, which has been a vital component of economic activity.Banks and banking
Merchant Electricity Transmission Expansion: A European Case Study
No full textWe apply a merchant transmission model to the trilateral market coupling (TLC) arrangement among the Netherlands, Belgium and France as a generic example, and note that it can be applied to any general market splitting or coupling of Europe's different national power markets. In this merchant framework; the system operator allocates financial transmission rights (FTRs) to investors in transmission expansion based upon their preferences, and revenue adequacy. The independent system operator (ISO) preserves some proxy FTRs to deal with potential negative externalities due to an expansion project. This scheme proves to be capable in providing incentives for investment in transmission expansion projects within TLC areas.transmission expansion, trilateral market coupling, Europe, financial transmission rights, congestion management
Merchant interconnector projects by generators in the EU: Effects on profitability and allocation of capacity
No full textWhen building a cross-border transmission line (a so-called interconnector) as a for-profit (merchant) project, where the regulator has required that capacity allocation be done non-discriminatorily by explicit auction, the identity of the investor can affect the profitability of the interconnector project and, once operational, the resulting allocation of its capacity. Specifically, when the investor is a generator (hereafter the integrated generator) who also can use the interconnector to export its electricity to a distant location, then, once operational, the integrated generator will bid more aggressively in the allocation auctions to increase the auction revenue and thus its profits. As a result, the integrated generator is more likely to win the auction and the capacity is sold for a higher price. This lowers the allocative efficiency of the auction, but it increases the expected ex-ante profitability of the merchant interconnector project. Unaffiliated, independent generators, however, are less likely to win the auction and, in any case, pay a higher price, which dramatically lowers their revenues from exporting electricity over this interconnector.electricity markets; regulation; cross-border electricity transmissions; vertical integration; asymmetric auctions; bidding behavior
Recommended from our members
Should Merchant Transmission Investment be Subject to a Must-offer Provision?
No full textMerchant electricity transmission investment is a practically relevant example of an unregulated investment with monopoly properties. However, while leaving the investment decision to the market, the regulator may decide to prohibit capacity withholding with a must-offer provision. This paper examines the welfare effects of a must-offer provision prior to the capacity choice, given three reasons for capacity withholding: uncertainty, demand growth and pre-emptive investment. A must-offer provision will decrease welfare in the first two cases, and can enhance welfare only in the last case. In the presence of importer market power, a regulatory test might be needed
Review of "The Wise Merchant" by Michael J. Redmond.
No full textCaspar Barlaeus. The Wise Merchant. Ed. with intro. by Anna-Luna Post. Tr. with notes by Corinna Vermeulen. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2019. 134 pp. + 7 illus. ���29.99/$37.50. Review by Michael J. Redmond, University of Palermo
- …
