1,395,450 research outputs found
Regulatory Uncertainty and Inefficiency for the Development of Merchant Lines in Europe
Full text linkThis paper evaluates regulatory uncertainty and inefficiency that may prevent merchant transmission investors from committing in Europe, in particular when they are dominant generators. We argue that market players may perceive regulatory uncertainty to acquire exemption on merchant line mainly because of the discretion given for the application of Art. 7 of the Regulation 1228/2003 on cross-border exchanges. However we show that an emerging strategy of the European Commission for granting exemption on merchant transmission line can be eventually derived from recent legal and regulatory proceedings. It mainly consists in relying on TSOs to build merchant lines. We demonstrate that this strategy is neither a first best nor a second best given imperfect unbundling and the current flows in the allocation of regulatory powers. Indeed, it prevents merchant line investment by dominant generators with low generation cost while they have currently more incentive than TSOs to build merchant lines. Since unregulated merchant transmission investment by generators would be problematic, we show eventually that the current strategy of the application of Regulation can easily be fine-tuned to reach this second-best optimum.Regulatory Uncertainty and Inefficiency for the Development of Merchant Lines in Europe
Letter from Alexander Merchant, Department of State, Division of the American Republics, to DCR-W, November 9, 1943
No full textIn this letter, the author expresses his favorable opinion of Mr. Emmerson's report on the Japanese of Peru. Merchant praises his "extensive use of Japanese-language," and Spanish language materials as well.Collection of notes, articles, correspondence, photographs, and term papers collected by Yukio Mochizuki, a student at CSU Dominguez Hills, while researching Japanese American incarceration and Japanese Peruvian internment during World War II
Regulated and merchant interconnectors in Australia: SNI and Murraylink revisited
Full text linkThis paper examines the history of the various actual and proposed interconnectors between New South Wales and Victoria into South Australia. It covers the period from the earliest proposal for a regulated interconnector to the recent Victoria Supreme Court review and the latest ministerial proposals. It finds, inter alia, that the Supreme Court decision is likely to have strengthened, in a beneficial way, the regulatory regime for dealing with merchant interconnectors and the obligations on incumbent transmission companies. It finds that none of the proposals for regulated interconnectors did or would have passed the regulatory tests as formulated in terms of aggregate benefits to all market participants. It finds that neither of the merchant interconnectors (into South Australia and Queensland) are likely to have been profitable. It sees a possible explanation for the construction of regulated interconnectors in terms of the benefits to customers, or in terms of bringing about a single competitive market. Above all, it illustrates the political context in which decisions on interconnectors have been made, and the need to take account of such motivations when comparing the likely effects of regulated interconnectors versus merchant interconnectorsmerchant investment, interconnectors, electricity, regulation, transmission
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Regulated and merchant interconnectors in Australia: SNI and Murraylink revisited
Full text linkThis paper examines the history of the various actual and proposed interconnectors between New South Wales and Victoria into South Australia. It covers the period from the earliest proposal for a regulated interconnector to the recent Victoria Supreme Court review and the latest ministerial proposals. It finds, inter alia, that the Supreme Court decision is likely to have strengthened, in a beneficial way, the regulatory regime for dealing with merchant interconnectors and the obligations on incumbent transmission companies. It finds that none of the proposals for regulated interconnectors did or would have passed the regulatory tests as formulated in terms of aggregate benefits to all market participants. It finds that neither of the merchant interconnectors (into South Australia and Queensland) are likely to have been profitable. It sees a possible explanation for the construction of regulated interconnectors in terms of the benefits to customers, or in terms of bringing about a single competitive market. Above all, it illustrates the political context in which decisions on interconnectors have been made, and the need to take account of such motivations when comparing the likely effects of regulated interconnectors versus merchant interconnector
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Merchant and Regulated Transmission: Theory, Evidence and Policy
Full text linkEconomists acknowledge the problems of regulated transmission but
take different views about the likely efficiency of merchant transmission.
This paper examines the evidence on alleged market failure and
regulatory failure as experienced in practice in Australia and Argentina.
In these examples, merchant transmission (broadly defined to include
private initiatives) has generally not exhibited the standard examples of
market failure but regulated transmission generally has exhibited the
standard examples of regulatory failure. Imperfect information – more
specifically, in the form of lack of coordination – has often been a
challenge whatever the approach. Policy should therefore seek to
improve the regulatory framework and to remove barriers to merchant
transmission and private initiatives. An important role for regulation is to
facilitate coordination between potential providers and users of
transmission lines
Merchant Electricity Transmission Expansion: A European Case Study
Full text linkWe apply a merchant transmission model to the trilateral market coupling (TLC) arrangement among the Netherlands, Belgium and France as a generic example, and note that it can be applied to any general market splitting or coupling of Europe's different national power markets. In this merchant framework; the system operator allocates financial transmission rights (FTRs) to investors in transmission expansion based upon their preferences, and revenue adequacy. The independent system operator (ISO) preserves some proxy FTRs to deal with potential negative externalities due to an expansion project. This scheme proves to be capable in providing incentives for investment in transmission expansion projects within TLC areas.transmission expansion, trilateral market coupling, Europe, financial transmission rights, congestion management
Debates in AI Symposium: Brian Merchant, What\u27s Work Got to Do With It?
No full textBrian Merchant, a technology journalist and former tech columnist at the LA Times, is widely recognized for his insightful analysis of automation, labor and technology’s environmental impact. Merchant is author of the bestselling The One Device (Little, Brown and Company, 2017) and most recently Blood in the Machine: The Origins of the Rebellion Against Big Tech (Little, Brown and Company, 2023). This new book explores the Luddites’ misunderstood uprising and the modern implications of tech deployment. In addition to writing for prominent publications, Merchant founded Terraform, VICE’s speculative fiction site. He shares updates and discussions on technology’s societal impact through his newsletter, offering a critical perspective on who technology serves and its broader consequences
Monthly investment review Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank
No full textA copy of monthly investment review of Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank was given to prof Ungku Azi
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Should Merchant Transmission Investment be Subject to a Must-offer Provision?
Full text linkMerchant electricity transmission investment is a practically relevant example of an unregulated investment with monopoly properties. However, while leaving the investment decision to the market, the regulator may decide to prohibit capacity withholding with a must-offer provision. This paper examines the welfare effects of a must-offer provision prior to the capacity choice, given three reasons for capacity withholding: uncertainty, demand growth and pre-emptive investment. A must-offer provision will decrease welfare in the first two cases, and can enhance welfare only in the last case. In the presence of importer market power, a regulatory test might be needed
Merchant interconnector projects by generators in the EU: Effects on profitability and allocation of capacity
Full text linkWhen building a cross-border transmission line (a so-called interconnector) as a for-profit (merchant) project, where the regulator has required that capacity allocation be done non-discriminatorily by explicit auction, the identity of the investor can affect the profitability of the interconnector project and, once operational, the resulting allocation of its capacity. Specifically, when the investor is a generator (hereafter the integrated generator) who also can use the interconnector to export its electricity to a distant location, then, once operational, the integrated generator will bid more aggressively in the allocation auctions to increase the auction revenue and thus its profits. As a result, the integrated generator is more likely to win the auction and the capacity is sold for a higher price. This lowers the allocative efficiency of the auction, but it increases the expected ex-ante profitability of the merchant interconnector project. Unaffiliated, independent generators, however, are less likely to win the auction and, in any case, pay a higher price, which dramatically lowers their revenues from exporting electricity over this interconnector.electricity markets; regulation; cross-border electricity transmissions; vertical integration; asymmetric auctions; bidding behavior
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