11,110 research outputs found
Recherches égyptologiques : Pierre Grandet, Le Papyrus Harris I {=BiEtud CIX/I et CIX/II)
No full textMenu Bernadette. Recherches égyptologiques : Pierre Grandet, Le Papyrus Harris I {=BiEtud CIX/I et CIX/II). In: Dialogues d'histoire ancienne, vol. 22, n°2, 1996. pp. 291-298
Are buybacks back? Menu-driven debt-reduction schemes with heterogenous creditors
No full textThere is always some price that is low enough so that a debtor country gains by buying back some of its debts. Similarly, there is always some price that is high enough so that creditors gain by selling their debt claims. What is needed is a mechanism that allows trades to take place at some price within this range. One mechanism, the market buyback, has been called a boondoggle. However, market buybacks are too expensive from the debtor's point of view and faced with a buyback bid, each creditor has incentives to hold onto its claim unless the bid is larger than the value of debt after the deal. Concerted debt-reduction agreements can overcome this type of coordination failure, but they may be difficult to reach in practice because of the heterogeneity of creditors. The authors argue that the menu approach to debt reduction retains the advantages but not the inconvenience of buybacks and concerted agreements. They introduce a model of bank asset pricing in the presence of tax incentives and deposit insurance. They then derive the equilibrium level of exit and new money for a distributionof creditors facing a given menu program. They show that the optimal menu includes some positive level of debt repurchase in almost all cases - challenging the argument that buybacks are undesirable. The authors conclude that the menu program dominates the standard buyback and new money approaches.Banks&Banking Reform,Economic Theory&Research,Financial Intermediation,Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring,Municipal Financial Management
Les stratégies de prise en charge des pathologies traumatiques de la sportive sont-elles différentes de celles des sportifs ?
No full textDemarais Yves, Menu Pierre. Les stratégies de prise en charge des pathologies traumatiques de la sportive sont-elles différentes de celles des sportifs ?. In: Les Cahiers de l'INSEP, n°40, 2008. Sport de haut niveau au féminin. Tome 3. Entretiens de l'INSEP 11, 12, 13 décembre 2007. pp. 135-136
Bronzes camerounais anciens
No full textLebeuf Jean-Paul, Hurtel Loïc-Pierre, Menu Michel. Bronzes camerounais anciens. In: Bulletin de la Société préhistorique française, tome 82, n°8, 1985. pp. 251-256
Rhapsode : système expert en archéologie
No full textMenu M., Mohen Jean Pierre, Ganascia J.-G. Rhapsode : système expert en archéologie. In: Bulletin de la Société préhistorique française, tome 83, n°10, 1986. Numéro spécial d'Études et Travaux. pp. 363-371
Inventories, Markups, and Real Rigidities in Menu Cost Models
No full textReal rigidities that limit the responsiveness of real marginal cost to output are a key ingredient of sticky price models necessary to account for the dynamics of output and inflation. We argue here, in the spirit of Bils and Kahn (2000), that the behavior of marginal cost over the cycle is directly related to that of inventories, data on which is readily available.We study a menu cost economy in which firms hold inventories in order to avoid stockouts and to economize on fixed ordering costs. We find that, for low rates of depreciation similar to those in the data, inventories are highly sensitive to changes in the cost of holding and acquiring them over the cycle. This implies that the model requires an elasticity of real marginal cost to output approximately equal to the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in order to account for the countercyclical inventory-to-sales ratio in the data. Stronger real rigidities lower the cost of acquiring and holding inventories during booms and counterfactually predict a procyclical inventory-to-sales ratio.Business fluctuations and cycles; Transmission of monetary policy
Creusets pour la fonte des alliages à base de cuivre du Bronze Final au Fort-Harrouard à Sorel-Moussel (Eure-et-Loir)
No full textQueixalos Inocencia, Menu Michel, Mohen Jean-Pierre. Creusets pour la fonte des alliages à base de cuivre du Bronze Final au Fort-Harrouard à Sorel-Moussel (Eure-et-Loir). In: Bulletin de la Société préhistorique française, tome 84, n°1, 1987. pp. 23-32
Inventories, Markups, and Real Rigidities in Menu Cost Models
No full textReal rigidities that limit the responsiveness of real marginal cost to output are a key ingredient of sticky price models necessary to account for the dynamics of output and inflation. We argue here, in the spirit of Bils and Kahn (2000), that the behavior of marginal cost over the cycle is directly related to that of inventories, data on which is readily available. We study a menu cost economy in which firms hold inventories in order to avoid stockouts and to economize on fixed ordering costs. We find that, for low rates of depreciation similar to those in the data, inventories are highly sensitive to changes in the cost of holding and acquiring them over the cycle. This implies that the model requires an elasticity of real marginal cost to output approximately equal to the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in order to account for the countercyclical inventory-to-sales ratio in the data. Stronger real rigidities lower the cost of acquiring and holding inventories during booms and counterfactually predict a procyclical inventory-to-sales ratio.
La stèle dite de l'Apanage
No full textMenu Bernadette. La stèle dite de l'Apanage. In: Mélanges Pierre Lévêque. Tome 2 : Anthropologie et société. Besançon : Université de Franche-Comté, 1989. pp. 337-357. (Annales littéraires de l'Université de Besançon, 377
Active Courts and Menu Contracts
No full textWe describe and analyze a contractual environment that allows a role for an active court. The model we analyze is the same as in Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite (2006). An active court can improve on the outcome that the parties would achieve without it. The institutional role of the court is to maximize the parties’ welfare under a veil of ignorance. In Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite (2006) the possibility of “menu contracts” between the informed buyer and the uninformed seller is described but not analyzed. Here, we fully analyze this case. We find that if we maintain the assumption that one of the potential objects of trade is not contractible ex-ante, the results of Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite (2006) survive intact. If however we let all “widgets” be contractible ex-ante, then multiple equilibria obtain. In this case the role for an active court is to ensure the inefficient pooling equilibria do not exist alongside the superior ones in which separation occurs.optimal courts, informational externalities, ex-ante welfare, informed principal, menu contracts
- …
