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Third party intervention and strategic militarization
Get PDFCodified at the 2005 United Nations World Summit, the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect articulates an ideal of international interventions motivated by compassion for victims and a desire to bring stability to hot-spots around the world. Despite this consensus, practitioners and scholars have debated the importance of unintended consequences stemming from the expectation of third-party intervention. We analyze how third-party intervention shapes the incentives to arm, negotiate settlements, and fight wars in a parsimonious game theoretic model. Among the unintended consequences we find: interventions that indiscriminately lower the destructiveness of war increase the probability of conflict and increasing the cost of arming makes destructive wars more likely. Other interventions, however, can have much more beneficial effects and our analysis highlights peace-enhancing forms of third-party intervention. From a welfare perspective, most interventions do not change the ex-ante loss from war, but do have distributional effects on the terms of peace. As a result R2P principles are hard to implement because natural forms of intervention create incentives that make them largely self-defeating
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Dispute resolution institutions and strategic militarization
Get PDFEngagement in a costly and destructive war can be understood as the punishment for entering into a dispute. Institutions that reduce the chance that disputes lead to war make this punishment less severe. This may incentivize hawkish political choices like militarization, and potentially offset the benefits of peace-brokering institutions. We analyze a simple model in which unmediated peace talks are effective at improving the chances of peace for a given distribution of military strength. But, once the effects on militarization are considered the presence of unmediated talks leads to a higher incidence of war. Not all conflict resolution institutions suffer from this drawback. We identify a form of third-party mediation, inspired by the work of Myerson, and show that it can effectively broker peace in disputes once they emerge, and also minimize the level of equilibrium militarization
Shared Resource Extraction in Disputed Territories: A Game Theoretic Approach to and Analysis of the East China Sea Dispute
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The Effect of Manipulation on Experimental Markets and Deliberative Groups: How Prediction Markets Improve Information Aggregation in Intelligence Agencies
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