1,720,995 research outputs found

    Brentano and Hillebrand on Syllogism: Development and Reception of the ‘Idiogenetic’ Theory

    No full text
    "The seventh chapter presents Franz Brentano and Franz Hillebrand’s ‘idiogenetic theory’, a post-scholastic type of syllogistic theory involving acts of judging which were regarded as belonging as such to a special genus (idios genos) of psychical phenomena. The logical traits of the theory were first put forward by Brentano in his Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt (1874, first ed.) and then formally presented in Hillebrand’s Die neuen Theorien der kategorischen Schlüsse (1891). The most novel aspect of the theory was that all judgements were restated in existential form as single- membered assertions, or rejections, whose subject and predicate could be simpliciter converted. The proposal provoked numerous reactions. Particularly the last part of Hillebrand’s system, namely the extension about ‘double judgments’ (existential and predicative judgments bound together), was criticized by Husserl and Meinong, among others. But it also received active support from Brentano’s student Anton Marty. In his chapter, Matteo Cosci recalls the Leibnizian antecedent that showed the character of supposition of the existential import holding in the traditional square of oppositions. That assumption was a matter of concern for Brentano, who may have been aware of its formulation (possibly via Leibniz’s Difficultates Quaedam Logicae) in the process of developing his own reform of syllogistic on new, intentionalistic grounds. Aside from its intrinsic merits and originality, Brentano and Hillebrand’s ‘idiogenetic theory’ had a considerable impact in the fields of descriptive psychology, analytic philosophy and early phenomenology towards the end of the century – not to mention its relevance for the great current in logic inaugurated by Kazimierz Twardowski, prominent student of Brentano and the standard-bearer of his reform in Poland at the beginning of the twentieth century.", Introduction, p.

    Aristotle's Syllogism and the Creation of Modern Logic: Between Tradition and Innovation, 1820s-1930s

    No full text
    Offering a bold new vision on the history of modern logic, Lukas M. Verburgt and Matteo Cosci focus on the lasting impact of Aristotle's syllogism between the 1820s and 1930s. For over two millennia, deductive logic was the syllogism and syllogism was the yardstick of sound human reasoning. During the 19th century, this hegemony fell apart and logicians, including Boole, Frege and Peirce, took deductive logic far beyond its Aristotelian borders. However, contrary to common wisdom, reflections on syllogism were also instrumental to the creation of new logical developments, such as first-order logic and early set theory. This volume presents the period under discussion as one of both tradition and innovation, both continuity and discontinuity. Modern logic broke away from the syllogistic tradition, but without Aristotle's syllogism, modern logic would not have been born. A vital follow up to The Aftermath of Syllogism, this book traces the longue durée history of syllogism from Richard Whately's revival of formal logic in the 1820s through the work of David Hilbert and the Göttingen school up to the 1930s. Bringing together a group of major international experts, it sheds crucial new light on the emergence of modern logic and the roots of analytic philosophy in the 19th and early 20th centuries

    Introduction

    No full text
    Editorial introduction to the collected book "The Aftermath of Syllogism: Aristotelian Logical Argument from Avicenna to Hegel

    Philosophical Readings - Special Issue: Works in Progress in the History of Science

    No full text
    Philosophical Readings, online journal, vol. 16, n. 1 (2024): Works in Progress in the History of Science, Special issue edited by Matteo Cosci, with selected proceedings from the Interdisciplinary Workshop "Works in Progress in the History of Science: Challenges and Methodologies", held at the University Ca' Foscari Venice, 23-24 June 2023

    Introduction. History of Modern Logic in a New Key

    Full text link
    "We like to think of the aim of the book as doing for modern logic what John Corcoran did for the work of George Boole, namely to make sense of and do justice to the idea that Aristotelian syllogistic logic contributed to its creation. More specifically, the chapters show that the period between the nineteenth and early twentieth century saw a parallel development of modern logicians reshaping syllogism and reflections on syllogism shaping modern logic. This might sound odd as it stands in striking contrast to the standard narrative about the history of modern logic, which says that its creation and development happened in spite of, or in direct opposition to, the old logic. W. V. Quine, for one, wrote that Aristotelian logic is to modern logic what the ‘arithmetic of primitive tribes’ is to modern mathematics: not even a scientific predecessor but a ‘pre-scientific fragment’.", p. 1

    The Correspondence of Clavius, Dal Monte, Magini and other Italian astronomers on the Nova of 1604

    No full text
    From the preface of Patrick J. Boner (p.15): "In [this] contribution, Matteo Cosci surveys the many scholars in Italy who exchanged letters about the 'new stars' of 1604. While the scope of his study centers on Cristoph Clavius (1538-1612), Cosci examines the records of several other sources, including one of the earliest observers of the 'new star' whom he he identifies for the first time as Andrea Argoli (1570-1657). Cosci concludes with the work of Magini, another focal point in 'the sprawling network of scientific exchange' whose observations and planetary tables proved indispensable for Kepler.

    Éclairs. Esercizi di scrittura filosofica

    No full text
    Raccolta degli elaborati prodotti nel corso dell'attività sostitutiva di tirocinio 2021 "L'edizione del testo filosofico", con saggi integrativi

    Aristotle against Actual Infinity Regress

    No full text
    Thought experiments by ancient philosophers are often open to debate: in what sense did their reasoning really concern thought experimentation? For instance, in Plato’s Republic, Glaucon uses the myth of Gyges to demonstrate why people who practice justice do so unwillingly. A challenge, posed to Socrates and provided through some sort of thought experiment by imagining the effects of using the ring of invisibility, was intended to answer the question of human nature and our basis for the inclination towards justice or injustice. This collection expands the current, but rare, topic of whether it is possible to articulate a discussion about thought experiments and their arguments from the historical perspective of philosophy and science. It may sometimes seem that, in a loose sense, any philosophical reflection can already be interpreted as some form of thought experiment. Although the functions of it are very diverse and complex, and often closely linked to other cognitive tools, such as visualization, imagination or idealization, the contributions in this book provide new insights into how the concept of a thought experiment coincides with more modern perceptions. The purpose of the book is to show how philosophers, already in antiquity, began to use thought experiments and argumentation to convey theories in an accessible manner and how philosophical hypotheses, often being subjective and impossible to prove through empirical evidence, helped to promote scientific knowledge and discoveries. Different authors develop several lines of argumentation, claiming that philosophical thinking can be understood by comparing it to scientific experimenting, or vice versa: if empirical evidence is usually necessary for science, thought experiments may be used to develop a hypothesis or to prepare for experimentation. The analysis of historical examples of thought experiments might also contribute to a better understanding of philosophical endeavour in antiquity as a whole. In chapter 12, in particular, Matteo Cosci analyzes the infinite regress arguments that Aristotle addressed against the pretended existence of actual infinities as loose forms of thought experiments

    The Aftermath of Syllogism: Aristotelian Logical Argument from Avicenna to Hegel

    No full text
    Syllogism is a form of logical argument allowing one to deduce a consistent conclusion based on a pair of premises having a common term. Although Aristotle was the first to conceive and develop this way of reasoning, he left open a lot of conceptual space for further modifications, improvements and systematizations with regards to his original syllogistic theory. From its creation until modern times, syllogism has remained a powerful and compelling device of deduction and argument, used by a variety of figures and assuming a variety of forms throughout history. The Aftermath of Syllogism investigates the key developments in the history of this peculiar pattern of inference, from Avicenna to Hegel. Taking as its focus the longue durée of development between the Middle Ages and the nineteenth century, this book looks at the huge reworking scientific syllogism underwent over the centuries, as some of the finest philosophical minds brought it to an unprecedented height of logical sharpness and sophistication. Bringing together a group of major international experts in the Aristotelian tradition, The Aftermath of Syllogism provides a detailed, up to date and critical evaluation of the history of syllogistic deduction
    corecore