1,721,005 research outputs found
A cognitive view of relevant implication
No full textRelevantlogicsprovideanalternativetoclassicalimplication that is capable of accounting for the relationship between the antecedent and the consequence of a valid implication. Relevant implication is usu- ally explained in terms of information required to assess a proposition. By doing so, relevant implication introduces a number of cognitively rel- evant aspects in the definition of logical operators. In this paper, we aim to take a closer look at the cognitive feature of relevant implication. For this purpose, we develop a cognitively-oriented interpretation of the semantics of relevant logics. In particular, we provide an interpretation of Routley-Meyer semantics in terms of conceptual spaces and we show that it meets the constraints of the algebraic semantics of relevant logic
Una semantica cognitiva per linguaggi predicativi
No full textl presente lavoro esplora una possibile via di conciliazione tra l'approccio logico-analitico e quello cognitivista basata sull'introduzione di una semantica formale fondata su teorie cognitive senza per questo rivoluzionare i fondamenti dell'approccio logico alla semantica. Da una parte, fornire un fondamento cognitivo alla logica può essere d'aiuto nel giustificare ed individuare alcune proprietà formali dei connettivi logici, nello sviluppo di logiche ‘cognitive
Understanding Predication in Conceptual Spaces
Full text linkWe argue that a cognitive semantics has to take into account the possibly
partial information that a cognitive agent has of the world. After discussing
Gärdenfors's view of objects in conceptual spaces, we offer a number of viable
treatments of partiality of information and we formalize them by means of alternative
predicative logics. Our analysis shows that understanding the nature of simple
predicative sentences is crucial for a cognitive semantics
Concept Combination in Weighted DL
No full textBuilding on previous work on Weighted Description Logic (WDL), we present and assess an algorithm for concept combination grounded in the experimental research in cognitive psychology. Starting from two WDL formulas representing concepts in a way similar to Prototype Theory and a knowledge base (KB) modelling background knowledge, the algorithm outputs a new WDL formula which represent the combination of the input concepts. First, we study the logical properties of the operator defined by our algorithm. Second, we collect data on the prototypical representation of concepts and their combinations and learn WDL formulas from them. Third, we evaluate our algorithm and the role of the KB by comparing the algorithm’s outputs with the learned WDL formulas
Design knowledge representation: An ontological perspective
No full textWe present a preliminary high-level formal theory, grounded on knowledge representation techniques and foundational ontologies, for the uniform and integrated representation of the different kinds of (qualitative and quantitative) knowledge involved in the designing process. We discuss the conceptual nature of engineering design by individuating and analyzing the involved notions. These notions are then formally characterized by extending the DOLCE foundational ontology. Our ultimate purpose is twofold: (i) to contribute to foundational issues of design; and (ii) to support the development of advanced modelling systems for (qualitative and quantitative) representation of design knowledge
Representing Concepts by Weighted Formulas
Full text linkA concept is traditionally defined via the necessary and sufficient conditions
that clearly determine its extension. By contrast, cognitive views of concepts
intend to account for empirical data that show that categorisation under a concept
presents typicality effects and a certain degree of indeterminacy. We propose a formal
language to compactly represent concepts by leveraging on weighted logical
formulas. In this way, we can model the possible synergies among the qualities that
are relevant for categorising an object under a concept. We show that our proposal
can account for a number of views of concepts such as the prototype theory and the
exemplar theory. Moreover, we show how the proposed model can overcome some
limitations of cognitive views
Old and new riddles on concept sharing
No full textWe ask whether social interaction demands sharing social concepts. We illustrate our point by depicting possible situations that emerge when two in- dividuals play chess. We formalize our hypothesis in First Order Logic and we show that the very idea of sharing social concepts poses an interesting challenge both from the standpoint of knowledge representation and of philosophical con- ceptual analysis. By endorsing a minimal notion of interaction, we conclude that sharing social concepts is not necessary for social interaction. Then, we relate our view to Wittgenstein’s and Kripke’s “Rule-following Considerations
Qualitative temporal representation and reasoning about points, intervals and durations
No full textRecently, an elegant framework called INDU has been proposed for representing qualitative information about time intervals and durations. INDU is a single network, therefore it avoids typical problems of bi-networks, and in addition it has interesting computational properties. In this paper we extend INDU in two directions: we enrich its expressive power introducing points and maintaining the same computational properties, and we provide it with an axiomatic theory able to handle qualitative temporal information about points, intervals and durations in a unified framework. This theory is based on general interval entities and two ratlins: general meets and not longer than
States, Events, and Truth-makers
Full text linkIn the last decade, the debate about the ontological foundations of reified temporal logics (RTLs) has been relatively quiet, even though we think some problems still exist. In this paper, we identify some of these problems and propose (partial) solutions to them in a FOL framework. States are here characterized (at the syntactic level) as truth-makers of propositions-they reify true propositions-and events are built from states. These choices make the event-state distinction much crisper than the one characterized in terms of the (meta-)predicates HOLDS vs. OCCURS, which are necessary in RTLs but not in our theory. We also offer some epistemological arguments in favor of this choice
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