169,826 research outputs found
MR2407444 (2009e:60101) Labuschagne, Coenraad C. A. Join-semilattices of integrable set-valued martingales. Thai J. Math. 5 (2007), no. 1, 53--69. (Reviewer: Valeria Marraffa)
Join-semilattices of integrable set-valued martingale
Self-Consciousness as a Construction All the Way Down
Contemporary mind and brain sciences provide theories and data that seem to confirm a hypothesis about human nature that we might formulate as follows. Human life is conditioned by a need that is no less important than elementary biological needs (such as survival and reproduction) or universal forms of social competition: the need to build and, indeed, defend a subjective identity whose solidity and clarity are the foundation of our intra- and inter-personal equilibrium and therefore of psychological well-being and mental health. In this article, distancing ourselves from a neo- Cartesian position still prevalent in the philosophy of mind and approaching instead the outcomes of contemporary cognitive sciences, we sketch the complex interweaving of the cognitive, emotional, and affective elements that are constitutive of subjective identity, with a focus on the role played in self-identity construction by Theory-of-Mind abilities. We will suggest that, at every stage of self-construction, individuals engage in processes of understanding others that have a largely innate basis. In this perspective, a mature self-awareness is somewhat secondary to the knowledge of others, an evolutionarily refined acquisition primarily serving as a defense mechanism
L'identità personale
Da sempre al centro della riflessione filosofica, il tema della conoscenza di sé e della formazione dell’identità personale è stato recentemente arricchito grazie all’apporto di una gran messe di risultati scientifici provenienti da diversi ambiti delle scienze psicologiche e, più in generale, dalle scienze cognitive. Il presente volume vuole contribuire al dibattito sull’interpretazione di questi risultati, esplorando la natura e la genesi dell’autocoscienza psicologica e dell’identità narrativa in una prospettiva di psicologia teorica (o di filosofia della mente orientata empiricamente)
La comprensione della dialettica fra biologia (individuale) e relazionalità (sociale) richiede una spiegazione su più livelli
La neuroscienza cognitiva clinica tra personale e subpersonale
The focus of our commentary will be on two of the four ways in
which philosophy can contribute to psychiatry: (i) an analysis of issues of explanation,
reduction and classification as these arise when we treat psychiatry
as a special science; and (ii) the proposal and evaluation of models of mental
disorders. Regarding the first point, we first explore the bleak implications of
Fodor’s pessimism about a computational psychology of central processing for
Murphy’s project of a clinical cognitive neuroscience; and then we identify the
Global Neuronal Workspace architecture as a promising solution to the problem
of central cognition. Concerning the second point, we regard Philip Gerrans’
hypothesis that delusions are narrative models that accommodate anomalous
experiences as a most welcome example of an explanatory framework that
interweaves mechanisms at personal and subpersonal levels
La mente sociale. Le basi cognitive della comunicazione (The Social Mind. The Cognitive Bases of Communication)
Ponendosi all’intersezione di scienza cognitiva e pragmatica, gli autori esplorano e compongono in un quadro unitario il rapporto tra mente, socializzazione e comunicazione.“Theory of Mind” is the branch of cognitive science that investigates the so-called “mindreading” abilities, i.e., the skills shared by almost all human beings beyond early childhood to treat the agents as the bearers of unobservable psychological states and processes, and to anticipate and explain their behavior in terms of such states and processes. These mentalistic abilities are also called “folk psychology” by philosophers, and “naïve (or intuitive) psychology” by cognitive scientists. According to the “theory theory”, mindreading depends on the deployment of a “theory” of the mental realm; and according to the modularist version of theory theory, that folk-psychological theory is a body of information specific to the domain of naïve psychology which is manipulated by a domain-specific algorithm. The psychologist Alan Leslie has postulated such a module (the Theory of Mind Mechanism), which receives as input information about the past and present behavior of other people and utilizes this information to compute their probable psychological states. This mechanism has been considered, contra Fodor, as one of the strongest candidates for central modularity; a claim that is the main subject of the book
The Developmental Psychology of Personal Identity. A Philosophical Perspective
By integrating contemporary philosophical theories inspired by John Locke and William James with empirical and neuropsychological research, the book explores the construction of personal identity.
Drawing on Chomsky-inspired developmental psychology, Jean Piaget's constructivism, Lev Vygotsky's sociocultural perspective on development, and John Bowlby's attachment theory, the book utilizes psychological data to reconstruct the trajectory of the self as a 'Lockean person' (i.e., a morally responsible agent). The book connects the emergence of self-consciousness through bodily experiences and emotions to the construction of a narrative self. The outcome of this constructive process of self-recognition is a fundamentally fragile individual, constantly vulnerable to threats of disintegration or regression. Overcoming these challenges requires the mobilization of significant cognitive and emotional resources, which are not always readily available to everyone.
The interdisciplinary approach integrating philosophy and cognitive sciences that is characteristic of the book opens up new avenues for understanding identity, self, autobiographical memory, and personality. Among the contemporary authors considered, all fully inscribed within the realm of philosophy and cognitive sciences, we find Peter Carruthers, Peter Fonagy, Gyorgy Gergely, Daniel Stern, Michael Tomasello, Dan Sperber, and Pierre Jacob
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