1,721,023 research outputs found
Replication Data for: "Welfare Activation and Youth Crime"
No full textBratsberg, Bernt, Hernæs, Øystein, Markussen, Simen, Raaum, Oddbjørn and Røed, Knut, (2019) "Welfare Activation and Youth Crime." Review of Economics and Statistics 101:4, 561-574
Closing the gates? Evidence from a natural experiment on physicians' sickness certification
Get PDFThis paper exploits a Norwegian physician directed reform aimed to reduce sick-leave. Physicians were required to consider part-time sick-leave as the default treatment and - in the case of long lasting full-time sick-leave - to file a report documenting why the worker was unable to perform any work related activities. The reform had a large impact, reducing sick-leave by 18.8 percent. The main effect came from reduced spell duration - which can be directly linked to the extended documentation requirement laid on physicians within the first 8 weeks of a sick-leave spell. Physician-directed policies may be an (cost-) effective way of reducing sick-leave
Closing the Gates? Evidence from a Natural Experiment on Physicians' Sickness Certification
No full textThis paper exploits a Norwegian physician directed reform aimed to reduce sick-leave. Physicians were required to consider part-time sick-leave as the default treatment and – in the case of long lasting full-time sick-leave – to file a report documenting why the worker was unable to perform any work related activities. The reform had a large impact, reducing sick-leave by 18.8 percent. The main effect came from reduced spell duration – which can be directly linked to the extended documentation requirement laid on physicians within the first 8 weeks of a sick-leave spell. Physician-directed policies may be an (cost-) effective way of reducing sick-leave.Labor market policies; sick-leave; physicians’ gate keeping
Trade-offs between health and absenteeism in welfare states: Striking the balance
Get PDFWorkers’absenteeism due to illness represents a major concern in several countries. Absenteeism are however not very well understood in economics. This paper presents a model where absenteeism is understood in relation to health. Its main predictions are (i) intermediate welfare state generosity lead to the lowest absence rates as (ii) generous regimes results in excess long-term absenteeism and (iii) strict regimes lead to excess short-term absenteeism. (iv) Maximizing health is not the same as minimizing absenteeism. Finally, these predictions are supported by aggre- gate data for 12 OECD countries
How the left prospers from prosperity
No full textThis paper investigates the relationship between fluctuations in economic growth, unemployment, and voting along a left-right axis. I estimate a model that explains how political fluctuations are caused by economic fluctuations in the OECD countries. I find that higher economic growth causes a shift to the left of policy sentiments. I hold the provision of social insurance by the welfare state to be the key to understanding this relationship. I also find that the relationship changes over the sample period. I hold the tax increase needed to finance the expansion of the welfare state to be the reason for this.
The Effects of Sick-Leaves on Earnings
No full textThis paper assesses the causal effect of sick-leaves on subsequent earnings using an administrative dataset for Norway linking individual earnings, sick-leave records and primary care physicians. The leniency of a worker's physician - certifying sickness absence - is used as instrument for sick-leaves. Sick-leaves have a substantial impact on future earnings, reducing earnings by .3 percent per day of absence. When conditioning on full-time employment also two years after sickness the effect is .06 percent per day of absence. These effects are persistent over time and work mainly through wages not hours.sickness absence; wage formation; IV estimation; wage regression
Trade-offs between health and absenteeism in welfare states: striking the balance
No full textWorkers’absenteeism due to illness represents a major concern in several countries. Absenteeism are however not very well understood in economics. This paper presents a model where absenteeism is understood in relation to health. Its main predictions are (i) intermediate welfare state generosity lead to the lowest absence rates as (ii) generous regimes results in excess long-term absenteeism and (iii) strict regimes lead to excess short-term absenteeism. (iv) Maximizing health is not the same as minimizing absenteeism. Finally, these predictions are supported by aggre- gate data for 12 OECD countries.Absenteeism; Health; Dynamic programming; Welfare state policies
The impact of macroeconomic fluctuations on voting behavior
No full textPolitics have an impact on the economy. But has the state of the economy any impact on politics? Can economic fluctuations explain fluctuations in voters’ policy demand? Can the outcome of elections be traced back to changes in growth and unemployment?
In the classical explanation of voting behavior, factors such as class, religion, and structure of the society are used as determinants for policy preferences . The aim of my thesis is to explain short-run fluctuations in policy preferences with short-run fluctuations in the economy. A synthesis can be made of these two approaches. “Short-run” economic variables can explain fluctuations in policy demand from election to election within a country. Trends in policy demand are more often the result of by “long-run” sociological variables, that change slowly over time.
Using a dataset for 23 OECD countries and their elections between 1960 and 1995, I have investigated whether such a model can explain changes in policy sentiments. The results indicate that a high unemployment rate makes the median voter vote more conservative (right). High economic growth makes the median voter vote more radical (left). The sociological variables explain a large part of the political variation between countries.
I argue that the key to understanding these fluctuations is social insurance. The middle class, who constitutes the main segment of the voters in OECD countries, rely on social insurance provided by the welfare state. Their demand for insurance depends on their perception of their future income and job security.
Insurance is considered a normal good – something you want more if your income rises. If the economy prospers, your expected income increases. Consequently, you would like to buy more social insurance. Left parties are known to increase budgets and provide more social insurance – at the price of higher tax payments.
At the day of election, voters cast their vote to signal what kind of public policies they prefer in the forthcoming period. In this way, the vote can be seen as a signal to politicians of how much insurance the public wants.
This helps explain why the median voter seems to vote more radical when economic growth is high, which also has strong support in the data.
The need for insurance is, however, not only influenced by the willingness to pay for it. The risk of needing it is just as important. I argue that voters, at the beginning of a recession, fear for their jobs and thus buy more insurance. Consequently, I expect voters to vote more radical if the unemployment rate rises at the time of the election. At this point in time, the welfare state functions as insurance for the middle class. They know that the recession will remove jobs but not whose jobs that is to be lost.
At the bottom of the recession, when the unemployment rate peaks, voters no longer need to fear for their jobs. They have either kept it or lost it. The uncertainty that made voters prefer more insurance is gone. At this point one should expect voters to be less willing to pay taxes since the tax payments will cover the unemployment benefits of the few that lost their job – paid by the many that kept theirs. Consequently, one should expect the median voter to demand more right policies when the unemployment rate is high. The latter prediction has strong support in the data analysis. The prediction that an increase in the unemployment rate prior to the election leads to more radical voting has only some support in the data.
Just as politics influence the economy does the state of the economy influence politics. Voters’ policy demand seems to be influenced by both economic growth and the unemployment rate
The effects of sick-leaves on erarnings
Get PDFThis paper assesses the causal effect of sick-leaves on subsequent earnings using an administrative dataset for Norway linking individual earnings, sick-leave records and primary care physicians. The leniency of a worker's physician - certifying sickness absence - is used as instrument for sick-leaves. Sick-leaves have a substantial impact on future earnings, reducing earnings by .3 percent per day of absence. When conditioning on full-time employment also two years after sickness the effect is .06 percent per day of absence. These effects are persistent over time and work mainly through wages not hours
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