286 research outputs found
Between looters and private collectors: The tragic fate of Lebanese antiquities
No full text[No abstract available][Anonymous], 1991, ARCHEOLOGIA JUL; [Anonymous], 1999, CULTURE MEDIA SPORT, V1; Atwood R., 2008, ARCHEOLOGICAL I AM; Boardman J, 2009, WHOSE CULTURE: THE PROMISE OF MUSEUMS AND THE DEBATE OVER ANTIQUITIES, P107; Chehab M., 1955, B MUSEE BEYROUTH, V12, P47; Chehab M., 1937, B MUSEE BEYROUTH, V1, P1; COGGINS C, 1972, SCIENCE, V175, P263, DOI 10.1126-science.175.4019.263; Coggins C. C., 2006, WHO OWNS PAST CULTUR, P221; Contenau G., 1920, SYRIA, V1, P16; Cuno J, 2008, WHO OWNS ANTIQUITY: MUSEUMS AND THE BATTLE OVER OUR ANCIENT HERITAGE, P1; Cuno J, 2009, WHOSE CULTURE: THE PROMISE OF MUSEUMS AND THE DEBATE OVER ANTIQUITIES, P1; De Luynes A., 1856, MEMOIRE SARCOPHAGE I; Doumet-Serhal C., 1992, SCEAUXT CYLINDRES OR, V9; Dunand M., 1941, B MUSEE BEYROUTH, V5, P87; Dunand M., 1942, B MUSEE BEYROUTH, V6, P81; Dunand M., 1940, B MUSEE BEYROUTH, V4, P117; Elia R. J, 1997, NONRENEWABLE RESOURC, V6.2, P87; Fisk R., 1991, BERYTUS ARCHAEOLOGIC, V39, P243; Fisk R., 1991, INDEPENDENT 0730; Gibbon K. F., 2006, WHO OWNS PAST CULTUR, P3; Gibbon K. F., 2006, WHO OWNS PAST CULTUR, P179; Gibbon K. F., 2006, WHO OWNS PAST CULTUR; Gosden C., 2006, WHO OWNS OBJECTS ETH; Hakimian S., 1991, BERYTUS ARCHAEOLOGIC, V39, P253; Hakimian S., 1987, BERYTUS, V35, P199; Hamdy Bey O., 1892, NECROPOLE ROYALE SID; Hanssen J., 1998, BAALBEK IMAGE MONUME, V69, P157; Jidejian N., 2006, SIDON AGES; Jidejian N., 1998, LIBAN AUTRE RIVE; Jidejian N, LEBANON GREEK WORLD; Kozloff A., 2006, WHO OWNS PAST CULTUR, P183; Lawler A, 2003, SCIENCE, V302, P974, DOI 10.1126-science.302.5647.974; Makdisi U., 1998, BAALBEK IMAGE MONUME, V69, P137; Matsuda D., 2006, WHO OWNS PAST CULTUR, P255; Norman N., 2005, AM J ARCHAEOL, V109, P2; Owen DI, 2009, WHOSE CULTURE: THE PROMISE OF MUSEUMS AND THE DEBATE OVER ANTIQUITIES, P125; Papal Sokal M, 2002, ILLICIT ANTIQUITIES; Renan Ernest, 1864, MISSION PHENICIE; Renfrew Colin, 2000, LOOT LEGITIMACY OWNE; Sader H., 2001, CRISIS MEMORY ISLAMI, V77, P217; Saidah R., 1967, B MUSEE BEYROUTH, V20, P155; Seeden H., 1991, BERYTUS, V39, P390
Tell el-Burak: A new Middle Bronze Age Site from Lebanon
No full text[No abstract available]Akkermans P.M.M.G., 2003, ARCHAEOLOGY SYRIA CO; Bagg A., 2007, LEVANTE 1; Borger Rykle, 1956, ARCH ORIENTFORSCHUNG; CORNELIUS I, 2004, GOTTER KULTE UGARIT; Doumet-Serhal C., 2006, EARLY BRONZE AGE SID; Doumet-Serhal C, 2010, NEAR EAST ARCHAEOL, V73, P114; Dunand M., 1958, FOUILLES BYBLOS, V2; Einwag B., 2002, MIDDLE BRONZE AGE LE, P143; FINKBEINER U., 1997, B ARCHEOLOGIE ARCHIT, V2, P114; FINKBEINER U., 2001, B ARCHEOLOGIE ARCHIT, V5, P173; Helck W., 1994, BIBLO CITTA SUA CULT, P105; Kamel D., 2005, THESIS AM U BEIRUT; KAMLAH J., 2003, B ARCHEOLOGIE ARCHIT, V7, P145; Kamlah J, 2004, Z DEUT PALASTINA-VER, V120, P123; Kamlah J., 2005, B ARCHEOLOG IN PRESS, V12; KEMPINSKI A, 1991, ISRAEL EXPLOR J, V41, P188; Kenyon K. M., 1960, EXCAVATIONS JERICHO, V1; Kohlmeyer K., 1982, LAND BAAL SYRIEN FOR; LIEBOWITZ HA, 1977, ISRAEL EXPLOR J, V27, P89; Margueron J.-C., 1990, MARI ANN RECHERCHES, V6, P5; Margueron J.-C., 1985, MARI ANN RECHERCHES, V3, P7; Montet P., 1928, BYBLOS EGYPTE QUATRE; Pedersen R., B ARCHEOLOG IN PRESS; Peltenburg E. J., 2008, NITOVIKLA TELL EL BU, P145; Pfalzner P., 2008, FUNDSTELLEN GESAMMEL, P95; Pritchard J. B., 1963, BRONZE AGE CEMETERY; Sader H., 1997, SADI LABN ALLIK BEIT, P363; Saidah R., 1967, B MUSEE BEYROUTH, V20, P155; Saidah R., 1979, BERYTUS, V27, P29; Shedid A. G., 1994, FELSGRABER BENI HASS; Shehadeh L., 2005, THESIS AM U BEIRUT; Stager L. E., 2002, MIDDLE BRONZE AGE LE, P353; Stager Lawrence, 1991, BIBLICAL ARCHAEOLOGY, V17, P26; TARAQJI A. F., 1999, B SOC FRANCAISE EGYP, V144, P27; von Ruden C., 2006, THESIS U FREIBURG; WAPNISH P, 1993, BIBLIC ARCHAEOL, V56, P55, DOI 10.2307-321025041
Japanese foreign direct investment : recent trends, determinants, and prospects
No full textIn the late 1980s, Japan became the biggest source of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the world. The main beneficiaries of the rapid increase in investment flows were industrial countries, but the developing world (especially East Asia and Latin America) also received substantial inflows. In East Asia, the newly industrial economies (NIEs) of Hong Kong, Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan (China) were, at first, production bases for Japanese manufacturing in the 1970s and early 1980s. But in the late 1980s, these countries became new, expanding consumer markets, attracting huge Japanese investments in the tertiary (service) sector, while investments in manufacturing shrank rapidly because of rising labor costs. The Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN) and China became Japan's new production base. In Latin America (mostly small Caribbean countries) Japan's focus is almost exclusively on tax havens. Globally, Japan's investments in the secondary (manufacturing) and service sectors of the major Latin American nations are only marginal. Japanese investment flows declined drastically after 1989, mostly because of the depressed global and domestic economy, after rapid asset price deflation in Japan. Hardest hit by the decline were the United States and Europe. Japanese FDI flows to developing countries also declined, but less. The biggest losers were the NIEs and the Caribbean tax havens. The biggest losers were the NIEs and the Caribbean tax havens. Japanese investments continued to grow in other Latin American countries and, even more, in the ASEAN and China. Japanese investors sharply reduced tertiary sector investments, primarily geared to maintaining or expanding markets. Investments in the secondary sector, making use of low-cost production, continued to expand. This trend is expected to continue in the near future, with FDI flows declining further, albeit more slowly. Low-wage production countries such as China and Indonesia will attract an increasing share. Investment to expand markets in the industrial countries and the NIEs are likely to decline. But medium-term prospects for Japanese FDI in developing countries are brighter, as economic recovery and continuing current account surpluses in Japan will lead to a resumption of active foreign investment by Japanese multinational corporations.Foreign Direct Investment,Environmental Economics&Policies,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Economic Theory&Research,Trade and Regional Integration
Privatization and foreign investment in the developing world, 1988-92
No full textForeign direct investment in the developing world has grown rapidly in recent years, making it one of the most important sources of financing to developing countries. The author presents a database on about 1,100 global privatization transactions from 1988 through 1992. Between 1988 and 1992, developing country governments earned almost US$62 billion in revenues from the sale of state-owned assets. About a third of those revenues came from foreign sources. Privatization in Latin America represents about 66 percent of privatization in the developing world. Privatization in Europe, including Eastern Europe, accounts for 17 percent, and privatization in East Asia, 13 percent. The heaviest foreign participation is in Eastern Europe, primarily for lack of domestic financing. Foreign investors'general participation in privatization programs was strong, providing developing countries with substantial amounts offoreign exchange. The relative size of the privatization program and the degree of openness to foreigners are important determinants of foreign direct investment. Each dollar in privatization revenue generates an additional 35 cents in new foreign direct investment inflows, and a 1 percent increase in foreign participation adds another 50 cents. In addition to the direct inflow of funds through the sale of assets, many developing countries also increasingly attracted foreign investment outside of their privatization programs. Privatization of infrastructure and the financial sector especially seem to have sent important signals to foreign investors, indicating an improved economic environment and possibly the eventual elimination of bottlenecks. Improved expectations about the profitability of investment projects render these countries more attractive to foreign investors.Banks&Banking Reform,Municipal Financial Management,Environmental Economics&Policies,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Economic Theory&Research
Den användarskapade elden Risker och möjligheter med kriskommunikation i sociala online-nätverk
No full textTitle The User Created Fire – Risks and Opportunities with Crisis Communication in Social Network Sites
Author Charbel Sader
Course Master Thesis in Media‐ and Communication Studies, Department of Journalism and Communication, University of Gothenburg
Semester Spring semester of 2013
Tutor Nicklas Håkansson
Number
of pages 75
Purpose To find a deeper understanding of the digital media’s role in Swedish society in relation to crisis communication.
Method Qualitative approach using focus group interviews
Material Semi structured focus group interviews with a total of 18 participants in five groups. The focus group sessions were made during February, March and April 2012.
Main results The main findings in this study are that users expect the communication flow in social network sites (SNS) during a crisis is to be a shortcut to information without a detour through organizations or traditional media. Although we find personal gratification, like interpersonal communication, quick information and sharing feelings and experience with others by using SNS during a crisis, users also tend to be hesitant about the credibility of the shared information. Alongside the user created content, we look to professional media experts and organizations as a guarantee for the veracity of the shared information. Users are at the same time increasingly disappointed when mainstream media in several cases has used social network sites as the main source for their news about various crisis situations conveying false images and rumors rathe
How adverse selection affects the health insurance market
No full textAdverse selection can be defined as strategic behavior by the more informed partner in a contract against the interest of the less informed partner(s). In the health insurance field, this manifests itself through healthy people choosing managed care and less healthy people choosing more generous plans. Drawing on theoretical literature on the problem of adverse selection in the health insurance market, the author synthesizes concepts developed piecemeal over more than 20 years, using two examples and revisiting the classical contribution of Rothschild and Stiglitz. He highlights key insights, especially from the literature on"equilibrium refinements"and on the theory of"second best."The government can correct spontaneous market dynamics in the health insurance market by directly subsidizing insurance or through regulation; the two forms of intervention provide different results. Providing partial public insurance, even supplemented by the possibility of opting out, can lead to second-best equilibria. The same result holds as long as the government can subsidize contracts with higher-than-average premium-benefit ratios and can tax contracts with lower-than-average premium-benefit ratios. The author analyzes the following policy options relating to the public provision of insurance: a) Full public insurance. b) Partial public insurance with or without the possibility of acquiring supplementary insurance and with or without the possibility of opting out. In recent plans implemented in Germany and the Netherlands, where competition among several health funds and insurance companies was promoted, a public fund was created to discourage risk screening practices by providing the necessary compensation across riks groups. But only"objective"risk adjusters (such as age, gender, and region) were used to decide which contracts to subsidize. Those criteria alone cannot correct the effects of adverse selection. Regulation can exacerbate the problem of adverse selection and lead to chronic market instability, so certain steps must be taken to prevent risk screening and preserve competition for the market. The author considers the following three policy options for regulating the private insurance market: 1) A standard contract with full coverage. 2) Imposition of a minimum insurance requirement. 3) Imposition of premium rate restrictions.Health Economics&Finance,Environmental Economics&Policies,Insurance&Risk Mitigation,Insurance Law,Financial Intermediation
Parents studying medicine : the dichotomy of studying with a family
No full textIntroduction: In this article the personal study and life situation of parents who are also medical students at the Medical School of the Goethe University Frankfurt am Main is discussed. There is a special focus on the topics "studying with children" and "family-friendly university", which have been present in discussions about university development and in the daily life of academics, especially during the last decade. The workgroup "Individual Student Services" at the medical faculty at the Goethe University tries to meet the necessities of the individual study courses and to support the study success with a new counselling and student service concept.
Methods: The experience of parents studying medicine was recorded in semi-structured interviews (Date: April 2010), which were held as part of the sponsored pilot project on part-time medical studies ("Pilot Project Part-time Medical Studies"). Additionally, study results from the Medical School of the Goethe University Frankfurt am Main were integrated as well as a literature analysis.
Results: It was found that the teaching demands and support services, which have been suggested and needed for years now, have been partially implemented and are without sufficient support at the faculty level to date. Thus the current situation of medical students with children is still difficult and seems a big challenge for everyone involved.
Solution: As part of the "Individual Student Services" a new pilot project on part-time medical studies was established in November 2009. Only the use of new, unconventional and innovative ideas allows universities to adequately support the changing and heterogeneous student population and support them to successfully completing their medical studies
Decentralizing the provision of health services : an incomplete contracts approach
No full textThe author studies the allocation-between a central government and a local authority--of responsibility for planning, financing, and operations for the delivery of health services, in the context of an incomplete contracts model. In this model, inputs are required of both the central government and local authorities but they are unable to write down, and commit to, a complete and binding contract describing the actions both should take. The model is meant to capture the tradeoff between central and local authority in decisions about both financing and the provision of services. Each party provides a specific input--for example, the central government establishes a drug procurement system while the local authority designs and implements an incentive scheme to get doctors to carry out their responsibilities appropriately. The responsibility for delivery of services is identified with the ownership of essential infrastructure, such as the clinic or hospital. The author finds that to maximize the joint surplus of the two public bodies: Ownership of the facility should be given to the party that most values the well-being of local residents. (This way, if ex post bargaining breaks down, each still enjoys some benefits from the other's actions.) Financing authority and responsibility for delivering services should be negatively correlated. Generally it is optimal to allocate tax authority to the party that values the residents'well-being less--in other words, separate spending responsibility (ownership) from financing authority. A heavier financing burden (access to a small and inefficient tax base) has the same incentive effect as asset ownership: It increases the return to effort. If transferring ownership of the physical asset is costly (because the party that builds the asset has an inherent advantage in operating it-that is, there is some human capital embodiment), it may be optimal for the party with the higher construction costs to have planning authority. Somewhat paradoxically, the greater the costs of transferring assets from one party to the other, the more likely that ownership of the facilities and their provision should be separated.International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Decentralization,Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,Labor Policies,Economic Theory&Research,National Governance,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Banks&Banking Reform,Environmental Economics&Policies
Voucher privatization with investment funds : an institutional analysis
No full textCommon wisdom among post-socialist reformers has beento use voucher investment funds to provide the corporate governance needed to restructure newly privatized enterprises after mass privatization efforts. The idea has been that mass privatization would spread the ownership too wide and make corporate governance difficult. The author examines the likely institutional behavior of voucher funds and the possible effects of their development on a transition economy. Since most policy advice has been in favor of voucher privatization with investment funds, the author can be seen as playing the devil's advocate, but his argument is institutional, not statistical. Policymaking requires insight and foresight into how institutions will tend to function. He concludes that voucher funds will introduce a bias in the economy away from the real industrial sector toward an ersatz"financial sector"that will have little if any positive financial role but will be well-protected by friendly regulators. One long-term consequence of voucher privatization with investment funds, according to this view, is a de facto"industrial policy"of real sector decapitalization in favor of short-term rent-seeking by fund managers through board sinecures and lucrative side deals with portfolio companies and through financial market manipulation and paper entrepreneurship in the"financial sector."Without strong corporate governance from the funds and without stable ownership of their own, many enterprise managers will exploit the post-socialist version of the"separation of ownership and control"to grab what they can in the form of salaries, bonuses, perquisites, and side deals. The most likely results of the strategy of voucher privatization with investment funds may be a two-sided grab fest by fund managers and enterprise managers -- together with the accompanying drift, stagnation, and decapitalization of the privatized industrial sector.Economic Adjustment and Lending,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Economic Theory&Research,Banks&Banking Reform,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Banks&Banking Reform,Economic Adjustment and Lending,Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research
Tradable water rights : a property rights approach to resolving water shortages and promoting investment
No full textIn most countries, the state owns the water and hydraulic infrastructure, and public officials decide who gets water rights, how the water is to be used, and how much will be charged for its use. The authors of this paper compare administered systems of water allocation with a system of tradable water rights, and argue that water allocation by administrative edict has resulted in costly, large-scale inefficiencies in the supply and use of water, even withan adequate institutional framework. Secure property rights, on the other hand, have been shown to have a powerful positive effect on investment and efficiency, although only a few countries have tried to take advantage of the allocative efficiencies of a market to assign water resources among users. The authors argue that in order to ensure implementation of an effective water market system, attention should be paid to: (i) ensuring stakeholder participation in designing and implementing the new legislation; (ii) deciding on new rules for the initial allocation of rights and for how new rights should be allocated; (iii) establishing a public registry and block titling; (iv) setting up or strengthening water user associations; (v) protecting against the development of potential monopolies; (vi) ensuring that trades do not infringe on the water rights of existing users; and (vii) establishing appropriate environmental laws.Water Resources Law,Water and Industry,Water Supply and Systems,Environmental Economics&Policies,Water Conservation,Water Supply and Sanitation Governance and Institutions,Town Water Supply and Sanitation,Water Conservation,Water and Industry,Water Use
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