383 research outputs found
Recent work in the theory of conceptual engineering
No full textKoch S, Löhr G, Pinder M. Recent work in the theory of conceptual engineering. Analysis . 2023
Kant's argumentation in the scholia to theorem VI in “Nova dilucidatio”: T. Pinder and J. Schmucker’s interpretations
No full textThis article considers Kant’s objection to the ontological argument in his early work “A New Elucidation of the First Principles of Metaphysical Cognition”. The alternative interpretations of Kant’s argumentation offered by T. Pinder and J. Schmucker are discussed. The author comes to the conclusion that none of these interpretations has advantages over the traditional one
Attitude Ascriptions and Acceptable Translations
No full textCritical notice of Mark Richard's "Context and the Attitudes"
Optimal search strategy for the definition of a dense non-aqueous phase liquid (DNAPL) source - abstract
No full text2009 annual AGU hydrology days was held at Colorado State University on March 25 - March 27, 2009.The 2009 Hydrology Days Award was presented to George F. Pinder. Included is the abstract for his award lecture "Optimal search strategy for the definition of a dense non-aqueous phase liquid (DNAPL) source" given on March 26, 2009
User needs for mobility improvement for people with functional limitations
No full textInfrastructures, Systems and ServicesTechnology, Policy and Managemen
The Explication Defence of Arguments from Reference
No full textIn a number of influential papers, Machery, Mallon, Nichols and Stich have presented a powerful critique of so-called arguments from reference, arguments that assume that a particular theory of reference is correct in order to establish a substantive conclusion. The critique is that, due to cross-cultural variation in semantic intuitions supposedly undermining the standard methodology for theorising about reference, the assumption that a theory of reference is correct is unjustified. I argue that the many extant responses to Machery et al.’s critique do little for the proponent of an argument from reference, as they do not show how to justify the problematic assumption. I then argue that it can in principle be justified by an appeal to Carnapian explication. I show how to apply the explication defence to arguments from reference given by Andreasen (for the biological reality of race) and by Churchland (against the existence of beliefs and desires)
How to find an attractive solution to the liar paradox
No full textThe general thesis of this paper is that metasemantic theories can play a central role in determining the correct solution to the liar paradox. I argue for the thesis by providing a specific example. I show how Lewis’s reference-magnetic metasemantic theory may decide between two of the most influential solutions to the liar paradox: Kripke’s minimal fixed point theory of truth and Gupta and Belnap’s revision theory of truth. In particular, I suggest that Lewis’s metasemantic theory favours Kripke’s solution to the paradox over Gupta and Belnap’s. I then sketch how other standard criteria for assessing solutions to the liar paradox, such as whether a solution faces a so-called revenge paradox, fit into this picture. While the discussion of the specific example is itself important, the underlying lesson is that we have an unused strategy for resolving one of the hardest problems in philosophy
Is Haslanger's ameliorative project a successful conceptual engineering project?
No full textSupporters of conceptual engineering often use Haslanger’s ameliorative project as a key example of their methodology. However, at face value, Haslanger’s project is no cause for optimism about conceptual engineering. If we interpret Haslanger as seeking to revise how people in general use and understand words such as ‘woman’, ‘man’, etc., then her project has been unsuccessful. And if we interpret her as seeking to reveal the meaning of those words, then her project does not involve conceptual engineering. I develop and defend an alternative interpretation of Haslanger’s project and argue that, so interpreted, it is a successful conceptual engineering project after all. In so doing, I develop what I call a particularist account of the success conditions for conceptual engineering
On Strawson's critique of explication as a method in philosophy
No full textIn the course of theorising, it can be appropriate to replace one concept—a folk concept, or one drawn from an earlier stage of theorising—with a more precise counterpart. The best-known account of concept replacement is Rudolf Carnap’s ‘explication’. P.F. Strawson famously critiqued explication as a method in philosophy. As the critique is standardly construed, it amounts to the objection that explication is ‘irrelevant’, fails to be ‘illuminating’, or simply ‘changes the subject’. In this paper, I argue that this is an unfair characterisation of Strawson’s critique, spelling out the critique in more detail and showing that, fully understood, it is not undermined by extant responses. In light of both the critique and extant responses, I close by making some substantive comments about what explication can, and cannot, be used to do in philosophy
Does Experimental Philosophy Have a Role to Play in Carnapian Explication?
No full textShepherd and Justus argue that experimental philosophy has an important role to play in the method of Carnapian explication, facilitating the preparatory stage during which the concept to be explicated is clarified. I raise concerns about their specific proposal, before sketching an alternative. In particular, I suggest that experimental philosophy can directly aid the construction of fruitful concepts. This provides a clear practical role for experimental philosophy, both within the sciences and theoretical inquiry more generally. In this respect, experimental philosophy may rightly be construed as one aspect of applied philosophy
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