13,876 research outputs found
Fees, subsidies and the market for higher education. by Mark Harrison
No full texttag=1 data=Fees, subsidies and the market for higher education. by Mark Harrison
tag=2 data=Harrison, Mark
tag=3 data=Policy,
tag=4 data=9
tag=5 data=3
tag=6 data=Spring 1993
tag=7 data=28-32.
tag=8 data=EDUCATION-TERTIARY
tag=10 data=Despite major reforms since 1988, the continuing absence of price signals and market incentives prevents the emergence of an efficient and responsive higher-education sector in Australia.
tag=11 data=1994/6/1
tag=12 data=94/0092
tag=13 data=CABDespite major reforms since 1988, the continuing absence of price signals and market incentives prevents the emergence of an efficient and responsive higher-education sector in Australia
INFORMATION AND COMMAND
No full textInformation adds value to transactions in three ways: it supports reputations, permits customisation, and provides yardsticks. In the Soviet economy such information was frequently not produced; if produced, it was often concealed; whether concealed or not, it was often of poor quality. In short, the Soviet command system forced economic growth on the basis of a relatively low–value information stock. This may help explain aspects of Soviet postwar economic growth and slowdown, the collapse of the command system, and the persistence of low output after the collapse.
Information and command
No full textInformation adds value to transactions in three ways: it supports reputations, permits customisation, and provides yardsticks. In the Soviet economy such information was frequently not produced; if produced, it was often concealed; whether concealed or not, it was often of poor quality. In short, the Soviet command system forced economic growth on the basis of a relatively low–value information stock. This may help explain aspects of Soviet postwar economic growth and slowdown, the collapse of the command system, and the persistence of low output after the collapse
Quantity versus quality in the Soviet market for weapons
No full textMilitary market places display obvious inefficiencies under most arrangements, but the Soviet defense market was unusual for its degree of monopoly, exclusive relationships, intensely scrutinized (in its formative years) by a harsh dictator. This provided the setting for quality versus quantity in the delivery of weapons to the government. The paper discusses the power of the industrial contractor over the defense buyer in terms of a hold-up problem. The typical use that the contractor made of this power was to default on quality. The defense ministry’s counter-action took the form of deploying agents through industry with the authority to verify quality and reject substandard goods. The final compromise restored quality at the expense of quantity. Being illicit, it had to be hidden from the dictator
Accounting for secrets
No full textThe Soviet state counted people, resources – and secret papers. The need to account for secrets was a transaction cost of autocratic government. This paper finds archival evidence of significant costs, multiplied by secrecy’s recursive aspect: the system of accounting for secrets was also secret and so had to account for itself. The evidence suggests that most Soviet officials complied most of the time. Numerous instances also imply that careless handling could take root and spread locally until higher authorities intervened. The paper uses the case of a small regional bureaucracy, the Lithuania KGB, to estimate the aggregate costs of handling secret paperwork. Over the period from 1954 to 1982, accounting for secrets makes up around one third of this organization’s archived records. This figure is surprisingly large, and is the main new fact contributed by the paper. There is much time variation, some of it not easily explained
Harrison, Mark
No full textThe Mark Harrison Vertical File Collection was donated to the MSRC in July of 2002. The collection contains speeches, pamphlets, photos, press releases, news clippings and other documents related to Cuba, Grenada, the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa and the presidential campaigns of Jessie Jackson. The years of the collection span primarily 1970s-1990s and the collection totals about four cubic feet
Accounting for Secrets
No full textThe Soviet state counted people, resources – and secret papers. The need to account for secrets was a transaction cost of autocratic government. This paper finds archival evidence of significant costs, multiplied by secrecy’s recursive aspect: the system of accounting for secrets was also secret and so had to account for itself. The evidence suggests that most Soviet officials complied most of the time. Numerous instances also imply that careless handling could take root and spread locally until higher authorities intervened. The paper uses the case of a small regional bureaucracy, the Lithuania KGB, to estimate the aggregate costs of handling secret paperwork. Over the period from 1954 to 1982, accounting for secrets makes up around one third of this organization’s archived records. This figure is surprisingly large, and is the main new fact contributed by the paper. There is much time variation, some of it not easily explained.Accounting; Dictatorship; Norms; Secrecy; Soviet Union; Transaction Costs
Quantity Versus Quality in the Soviet Market for Weapons
No full textMilitary market places display obvious inefficiencies under most arrangements, but the Soviet defense market was unusual for its degree of monopoly, exclusive relationships, and intense scrutiny (in its formative years) by a harsh dictator. This provided the setting for quality versus quantity in the delivery of weapons to the government. The paper discusses the power of the industrial contractor over the defense buyer in terms of a hold-up problem. The typical use that the contractor made of this power was to default on quality. The defense ministry’s counter-action took the form of deploying agents through industry with the authority to verify quality and reject substandard goods. The final compromise restored quality at the expense of quantity. Being illicit, it had to be hidden from the dictator.Contracts, Dictatorship, Hold-Up Problem, Soviet Economy
051. Mark 1:4-11
No full textChapel Sermon by Matthew Harrison from Mark 1:4-11 on Wednesday, January 11, 2012
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