42 research outputs found
Collegiality in the European Commission : legal substance and institutional practice
No full textPublished: 07 December 2023Collegiality is a core legal principle of the European Commission's internal decision-making, acting as a safeguard to the Commission's supranational character and ensuring the Commission's independence from EU Member States. Despite collegiality's central role within the Commission, its legal and political implications have remained critically underexamined. Collegiality in the European Commission sheds light on this crucial aspect of the Commission's work for the first time. In this novel study on collegiality, Maria Patrin proposes an innovative framework for assessing the Commission's institutional role and power. The book's first part legally examines collegiality, retracing collegial procedures and actors in different layers of decision-making — from the Commission's services to the College of Commissioners. The second part of the book explores the implementation of collegiality through illustrative case studies, focusing on various Commission functions including legislative initiative, infringement proceedings, and economic governance. Partin's empirical analysis unveils a disconnect between the legal notion of collegiality and its concrete application in institutional practices. These variations raise normative questions on how to ensure the unity of the Commission as a collegial body despite the diversification of decision-making functions. They also invite a re-examination of the Commission's multifaceted role in the current EU institutional, legal, and political setting. Adopting an interdisciplinary approach that delves into both the legal substance and the political-institutional practice of collegiality, this book offers a unique, behind-the-scenes insight into the Commission's decision-making processes, furthering our understanding of the EU's institutional system.-- INTRODUCTION -- 1: The collegial governance of the European Commission -- PART I: The legal substance of the principle of collegiality -- 2: Origins and evolution of collegiality in the Commission -- 3: The legal sources of collegiality between legal rules and institutional practices -- 4: The legal nature of the principle of collegiality: what kind of principle? -- 5: Collegiality in the making: the actors on stage and behind the scenes -- PART II: The institutional practice of the principle of collegiality -- 6: Internal decision making and functional fragmentation -- 7: Legislative initiative: the revision of the posting of workers directive -- 8: Executive rulemaking: the approval of glyphosate -- 9: The Commission as the watchdog of EU law: competition and infringements -- 10: The Commission's Functions in economic governance -- CONCLUSIONS -- 11: Collegiality: the Commission's holy grail?Published version of EUI PhD thesis, 202
Recommended from our members
Collegiality in the European Commission ::legal substance and institutional practice /
No full textMaria Patrin's 'Collegiality in the European Commission' offers a critically needed examination of collegiality - the core legal principle governing the Commission's internal decision-making process. The novel study combines theory and empirical practice to advance an innovative framework for assessing the Commission's institutional role and power
Meroni Behind the Scenes: Uncovering the Actors and Context of a Landmark Judgment
No full text(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2021 6(1), 539-551 | Article | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. Meroni and the evolution of EU law. - II.1. Overview of the case. - II.2. The long and con-tested life of Meroni in EU law. - III. Actors and institutions behind the Meroni judgment. - III.1. Meroni: shed-ding light on the context and on the economic rationale. - III.2. The High Authority: the dynamic nature of the case. - III.3. The Court: an innovative judgment of a conservative Court? - IV. Concluding remarks. | (Abstract) Meroni is one of the most controversial cases in EU jurisprudence, one bearing profound consequences for the evolution of the EU legal and institutional system. For over sixty years the 1958 judgement has set the conditions for power delegation in the EU. It also first formulated the well-known principle of institutional balance. It remains very topical still today, as shown by the recent ESMA case, which raised again the issue of power delegation to external agencies. This Article looks behind Meroni's scenes, by analysing the recently released CJEU dossier de procédure. Through a "law in context" analysis, it provides innovative insights into the economic and social background of the dispute. It investigates the parties' submissions and their arguments, showing how actors and institutions shaped the Court's reasoning. Ultimately, the Article unveils the dynamic nature of the case, arguing that far from being a necessary outcome, the Court's judgment was crafted step by step upon the arguments of the parties, in an unexpected legal build-up leading from judicial protection, to power-delegation up to the principle of institutional balance
The European Commission Between Institutional Unity and Functional Diversification: The Case of Economic Governance
No full text(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2021 6(1), 269-292 | Article | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. The one and the many European Commission(s): institutional coherence and functional fragmentation. - III. Economic governance: a new double-edged function. - III.1. The Commission in the post-crisis reform: a patchwork of functions. - III.2. The super-Olli Procedure: an EMU super Commissioner? - III.3. The European Semester: independent ECFIN or inclusive decision-making? - III.4. Preliminary conclusions: technical assessment and discretionary choices in polyfunctional economic governance. - IV. Functional diversification, democratic legitimacy and the Commission's paradox. - V. Conclusions: the future of the European Commission (or the European Commission of the future). | (Abstract) The Commission performs legislative, executive and quasi-judicial functions at the same time. Over time these functions have multiplied, and their nature has become increasingly diverse and fragmented. In the field of economic governance, for instance, the Commission is fulfilling a new multi-faceted function, combining technical assessment with political decisions. Yet, art. 17 of the Treaties require collegial and consistent decision-making processes. Does functional diversification challenge the Commission's internal institutional unity and coherence? And what are the consequences for the Commission's role in the Union's institutional setting? This Article addresses these questions, by focusing on the functions in economic governance. The analysis unveils a paradox inherent in the Commission's multi-functionality. The Commission is often entrusted tasks of a political nature in virtue of its independent and impartial status, without however being endowed with the legitimacy basis that would go with it. Therefore, the Article warns against the dangers of too extended functional diversity, and contends that clarity as regards the functions fulfilled by the Commission is essential if the institution wants to act legitimately vis-à-vis the other EU institutions, the Member States and the European citizens at large
EP-EUI joint roundtable : the 1976 Electoral Act 40 years on : history and significance for European democracy today
No full textOn 7 December, the European Parliament (EP) and the European University Institute (EUI) held a joint history roundtable on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the 1976 Electoral Act, which introduced direct elections to the European Parliament. The event, organised by the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, took place in Florence, with a video-link to the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) in Brussels. It brought together policymakers and academics to discuss the impact of direct elections on the EU’s institutional system and recent proposals for reform of the Electoral Act
Book review : Anu Bradford, The Brussels effect : how the European Union rules the world (Oxford University Press 2020)
No full textPublished online: 09 June 2021Some years ago, when I was working in Brussels as a consultant on European affairs, I used to travel regularly to Japan to update Japanese manufacturers on the latest developments in European Union (EU) legislation. At the time I did not suspect that, in so doing, I was contributing to what Anu Bradford in her latest book calls the "Brussels Effect". The Brussels Effect refers to the phenomenon whereby, under specific conditions, the EU influences and shapes the global regulatory environment by unilaterally adopting stringent regulatory standards for its own internal market. In order to gain and maintain access to the large European consumer market, most multinational companies are pushed to comply with EU standards and often expand such compliance across their world-wide production. Thus, in many fields, the EU has established itself as a global regulatory hegemon. The EU determines the amount of chemicals present in toys made in China, the notices about cookies that we receive while surfing on the web, the safety devices installed in cars produced in Japan and whether or not two US companies can merge. In my own experience, our Japanese clients used information on EU rules and laws to adapt their future production to EU environmental and safety standards, internalising EU regulatory preferences in their own production planning
Spitzenkandidaten ed equilibri istituzionali: profili innovativi di una prassi in continua evoluzione
No full textEP-EUI joint roundtable : the 1976 Electoral Act 40 years on : history and significance for European democracy today
No full textWhen collegiality matters… or of Von der Leyen’s loneliness
No full textPublished online: 18 February 2021The European Commission’s handling of the coronavirus vaccine deployment has recently caused quite some turmoil. At the end of January, the Commission publicly displayed its frustration over AstraZeneca’s decision to unilaterally cut the supply of vaccines destined to the EU, thus contravening to the contract signed with the Commission earlier in 2020. AstraZeneca CEO’s declared that such contract merely obliged the company to make its “best effort” to supply the European Union (EU) with the agreed 400 million vaccines, but did not amount to a legal obligation. In reaction, the Commission put forward a proposal for an export control mechanism allowing the EU to monitor vaccines exports and to block international shipments in case the EU’s orders were not duly met. In this context the Commission initially proposed to trigger Article 16 of the Protocol on Ireland and Northern Ireland, an emergency provision allowing unilateral override of the Brexit Withdrawal Agreement (which had preserved the Good Friday Peace Agreement). The Commission thus effectively stood for the introduction of a customs border between Ireland and Northern Ireland, after years of negotiations to avoid precisely that. Understandably, such a move spurred a wave of lively protests from Ireland, the UK and many other national capitals, and led to harsh questioning from MEPs. The reference to Article 16 was quickly taken back. The Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen publicly apologised and acknowledged the mistake. Yet, the damage was done. Since then, one question hovers around Brussels and in the national capitals: How could such a huge diplomatic screw-up happen? Such a mistake would be bad enough for any governing coalition. For the Commission, which is a collegial institution, it is explosive. “If the Commission is collegiate, why didn’t the cabinets of the other Commissioners notice? Had they all taken an early weekend on Friday last?”, observes Senator Michael McDowell in an interview with the Irish Times (Irish Times, 3/2/2021). Apparently, and here lies the main problem, most cabinets, including the one of the Irish Commissioner, were neither informed of the decision nor involved in the decision-making process. The misstep is not only a naïve and clumsy mishandle of a very delicate political issue. It points to the shortcomings of a whole system of governance which may become inadequate to come to terms with the current situation. It let us glimpse behind the doors of the Commission’s decisions to observe that what used to be collegial decisions have become in fact exclusive prerogative of the Commission’s President
