1,721,006 research outputs found
Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium and quasi harmonic games
No full textSecurity solutions for two stage games, where the second stage consists of a strategic form noncooperative game, are not reachable in many problems. The aim of this paper is to investigate such solutions. Mixed extension for the second stage game is considered and existence results for approximate mixed security solutions, together with the convergences of values, are given and illustrated by significative examples. The results apply to the class of quasi harmonic games
Game Theoretic Foundations of the Gately Power Measure for Directed Networks
No full textWe introduce a new network centrality measure founded on the Gately value for cooperative games with transferable utilities. A directed network is interpreted as representing control or authority relations between players—constituting a hierarchical network. The power distribution embedded within a hierarchical network can be represented through appropriate TU-games. We investigate the properties of these TU-representations and investigate the Gately value of the TU-representation resulting in the Gately power measure. We establish when the Gately measure is a core power gauge, investigate the relationship of the Gately with the (Formula presented.) -measure, and construct an axiomatisation of the Gately measure
Preface: Special Issue on Recent Advances in Variational Calculus: Principles, Tools and Applications
No full textApproximate Equilibria for Bayesian Games
No full textIn this paper the problem of the existence of approximate equilibria in mixed strategies is central. Sufficient conditions are given
under which approximate equilibria exist for non-finite Bayesian games. Further one possible approach is suggested to the problem
of the existence of approximate equilibria for the class of multicriteria Bayesian games
Cooperative Games in Networks Under Uncertainty on the Costs
No full textIn this chapter, the multi-commodity network flow problem is faced within a cooperative game theoretical approach. The shipping of a commodity generates a certain return for each player, but the cost to build the network may be uncertain. Taking care of this uncertainty of the costs, a cooperative game model is presented and the existence of core solutions is investigated
Locating network trees by a bilevel scheme
Full text linkIn this paper we investigate how to choose an optimal position of a specific facility that is constrained to a network tree connecting some given demand points in a given area. A bilevel formulation is provided and existence results are given together with some properties when a density describes the construction cost of the networks in the area. This includes the presence of an obstacle or of free regions. To prove existence of a solution of the bilevel problem, that is framed in Euclidean spaces, a lower semicontinuity property is required. This is obtained proving an extension of Golab's theorem in the general setting of metric spaces, which allows for considering a density function
A network design model under uncertainty
No full textIn this paper we present a cooperative game theoretical model for the well known problem of network design. There is a multi-commodity network flow problem for each subset of players, who optimize the design of the network. Each player receives a return for shipping his commodity and we consider the possibility to have uncertainty in this return. A cooperative game under interval uncertainty is presented for the model and the existence of core solutions and approximate core solutions is investigated
Some Aspects of the Stackelberg Leader/Follower Model
No full textThe paper presents different aspects of the Stackelberg Leader/Follower model. Generalizations of the model introduced by von Stackelberg (Marktform und Gleichgewicht, Julius Springer, Vienna, 1934) are discussed, and some related open questions are enlightened
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