1,720,993 research outputs found

    Il family effect su performance e risk-taking dell'impresa negli ultimi dieci anni. Evidenza internazionale a confronto

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    The book provides a complete, insightful and fully detailed review of literature analyzing the relationship between family business and two firm characteristics: performance and risk. The study takes into account the most relevant studies published in highly ranked international journals largely in the last ten year

    Impresa familiare e performance: una verifica empirica sulle imprese italiane quotate

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    The paper studies how firm value is affected by family ownership and management in a sample of Italian listed firms. The study finds that family-managed firms generate a market-based performance significantly lower than both non-family counterparts and family firms managed by professional managers

    Factors in top executive turnover: An empirical analysis of Italian listed firms

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    This paper aims to study the existing link between CEOs turnover and several variables that could explain the exit of a CEO. The survey takes performance measures into account as main variables. Besides performance variables the study includes: ownership structure variables; variables that highlight personal features of a CEO and the composition of the board; firm variables. The number of sampled Italian companies ranges from 134 to 218 over the period 1996-2002. Accounting returns explain the turnover much better than market measures of performance; CEOs of state-owned firms change more frequently than others; the stake of minority shareholders is positively related to the turnover; the presence of syndicates negatively affects the turnover. In Italy, accounting returns count much more than market-based performances

    Firm leverage, ownership structure, and corporate governance: Evidence from majority-controlled firms

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    Frank and Goyal (2009) examine the importance of capital structure determinants of US firms from 1950 to 2003 and find that the most reliable factors are: median industry leverage, market-to-book ratio, tangibility, profits, log of assets, and expected inflation. Their survey tests both new variables and variables proposed by previous studies. However, it does not take into account the role played by factors directly related to the agency theory such as ownership structure and corporate governance factors. This gap is rather common in the literature but could represent a serious lack in countries where the ownership structures are concentrated and holding control takes on great relevance. In this scenario, it is arguable that capital structure choices are shaped in response to ownership and governance characteristics. I explore these issues in Italy, a context dominated by pyramidal groups, majority- and family-controlled firms. The results show that (1) family firms are more indebted than non-family counterparts and, within family firms, (2) founding-family-controlled ones are more reliant on debt; (3) family firms exploit control-enhancing devices along with long-term leverage; (4) higher cash flow rights are associated with a lower leverage; (5) institutional investors are more common in firms with a higher dependence on long-term debt; (6) decreasing trends of the long-term leverage over time seem to occur with upward paths of the votes-to-capital ratio
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