1,721,093 research outputs found

    Trust, Contracting, and Adaptation in Agri‐Food HybridStructures

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    The paper considers the relationship between trust and governance structure from a Transaction Cost Economics perspective. The role of trust in the coordinating decisions is variously conceptualized according to the theoretical view adopted by the scholars. The present study adopt the three‐level schema introduced by Williamson (1996) and suggest that determinants of trust may operate both at institutional and governance structure level. The analytical framework depicted maintains that trust may determine a reduction of ex post transaction cost in the adaptation of hybrid structure. As a consequence trust appears to be able to extend the range of existence of the hybrids. The empirical part of the study is dedicated to a case study which illustrates the emerging of conditional trust (Fritz et al., 2008) and the role of trust in the adaptation process

    Contractual Choice and Food safety strategy: some empirical findings in Italian poultry sector

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    Analysis of contract choice is related here to the contracting nature of hybrid governance structures. First, recent research results on the organization of food safety supply are summarized and some remarks about contracting are proposed, providing the theoretical premises of the study. The approach of empirical analysis is concerned with transactions between farmers and processors in Italian poultry supply chains. The contract arrangement is classified as a hybrid structure, and growers' preferences regarding contract terms are analysed by a choice experiment. Final remarks take into account the role of contract attributes in ensuring the degree of food safety, and give a tentative organizational explanation of the degree of safety supplied. Potential lines of future research are mentioned

    Productive process innovation as sequential adjustment of thehybrid governance structure: the case of the poultry sector

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    The paper concerns production process innovation in an existing hybrid governance form. Adopting a Transaction Cost Economics perspective, we consider process innovation here in the conceptual context of the organization of production and technological change. It is assumed that the determinants of innovation act as emerging disturbances, and it is argued that innovation is achieved via adaptive, sequential adaptation based on specific, costly contractual rules. To support this thesis, the analytical framework introduces hypotheses to be tested by evidence. First, it is conjectured that the parties to a hybrid adopt flexibility techniques (MacNeil, 1978) to cope with the necessity of future process innovation. This hypothesis is compared with a competitive one, focusing the interests of the parties explicitly with regard to collaboration. Second, further hypotheses are tested that concern the influence of asset specificity, behavioral uncertainty and the allocation of resources to the costs of the contractual rules supporting innovation. A two-step method is proposed to test the hypothesis and to estimate the transaction costs associated with the contractual rules. The empirical results corroborate the analytical framework. Although this paper addresses a very specific issue, its main contribution relates to how hybrid governance forms organize production activities

    Interessi moratori e punitivi tra risarcimento e sanzione

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    Recenti normative, anche di derivazione comunitaria, hanno disciplinato le conseguenze dell’inadempimento delle obbligazioni pecuniarie nell’ambito dei rapporti tra imprese ed imprese e Pubbliche Amministrazioni, sul presupposto che i ritardati pagamenti “rappresentano un intralcio sempre più grave per il successo del mercato unico” e che, pertanto, “occorre invertire la tendenza e far sì che un ritardato pagamento abbia conseguenze dissuasive”. Tali normative speciali hanno introdotto una nuova tipologia di interessi, i quali sono stati definiti punitivi: essi, infatti, oltre che a risarcire il danno, tendono a sanzionare il comportamento del debitore che non paga tempestivamente. Si pone dunque il problema del rapporto tra gli interessi punitivi e quelli disciplinati dal codice civile, che sono tradizionalmente distinti – secondo una definizione invero contestata – come corrispettivi, compensativi e moratori. Invero, l’esistenza di norme, che tendenzialmente comprendono la totalità o la maggior parte dei rapporti di diritto privato delle imprese e della Pubblica Amministrazione, sembra riproporre, nell’ambito delle obbligazioni pecuniarie e degli interessi, la ben nota ed antica distinzione fra atti civili ed atti commerciali, con proprie norme e principi tendenzialmente autonomi. Il libro, pertanto, si propone di esaminare, in parte qua, il codice civile e la disciplina speciale, per evidenziare in che misura quest’ultima si discosti dai principi generali e concludere, di conseguenza, se esistano differenti statuti dell’inadempimento dell’obbligazione o se, al contrario, il sistema possa essere comunque ricondotto ad unità

    The individual contribution to income inequality: conceptual analysis and empirical investigation

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    The paper aims to study individual contributions to income inequality. The role of individual positions in the analysis of inequality is considered at various levels. The utility of inequality analysis in analysing the variation across a given income distribution is also recognised. The paper elaborates on this perspective and proposes a definition of individual contributions to inequality within a given income distribution. The concept of such an individual contribution is proposed, and its properties are discussed. The paper presents and tests the hypothesis that given the concept of individual contributions, patterns of influence associated with the determinants of inequality can be identified across a given income distribution. An empirical method of investigation and testing is proposed based on the Survey on Household Income and Wealth carried out by the Bank of Italy. The results support the hypothesis and show that the patterns identified are useful in the analysis of inequality
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