27,833 research outputs found
Politically Acceptable Trade Compromises Between The EC and The US: A Game Theory Approach
No full textA model is developed to quantify the special status of agriculture in the US and the EC trade negotiations. The role of special interests are measured by a policy goals function (PGF) whose weights are estimated for each special interest group. The analysis searches for mutually acceptable, mutually advantageous trade agreements between the US and the EC using a partial equilibrium world trade model coupled with game theory. Results suggest that it is in the best interest of the US (resp. EC) 'for the EC (resp. US) to liberalize whi1e the other follows the status quo policies of 1986. Mutual gains in PGF values to both countries pursuing "large" liberalizations are unlikely to exist, although "small" liberalizations may give rise to "small" mutual gains. Altering each country's action space, and permitting compensatory payments to the most influencial groups yields trade liberalization, but free trade does not result.game theory, trade liberalization, trade negotiations, International Relations/Trade,
EC agricultural trade policies towards developing countries
No full textApart from demand and supply conditions, todays EC trade in agricultural products is determined not only by classical trade policy instruments, e.g. customs or quotas, but in addition by numerous internal instruments influencing consumption, production and storage. The protective character originates from specific sectoral policy goals having a long tradition in most of the six founding members of the EC. With the first and second enlargement of the EC the protective effects on third countries (trade diversion) aggravated not only because of the geographical extension, but because more and more products had been included in the protective system, respectively protection rates for some products had been increased due to demands of new member countries. During this process conflicts in objectives between internal producer demands and that of trade partners, being not members of the EC, became apparent. They were tackled in different ways, depending on the commodities and countries involved. Trade relations with developed countries, competing on markets for basic food commodities, e.g. grains, sugar, beef and milk products became increasingly impaired and the first serious attempt for a general reduction of trade barriers is only now undertaken in the GATT-Uruguay Round. Trade policy towards DCs was characterized by more cooperative approaches. The reasons are twofold. First, and most importantly, agricultural commodities produced in DCs are substitutes to EC-produced goods only to a small extent, either in production or in consumption. Secondly, there are some political commitments towards DCs in general or with respect to specific country groups such as the former colonies of France and the UK (now ACP-countries) or the mediterranean countries, where in the latter case geopolitical objectives are on the background of trade concessions.
The impact of EC-92 on developing countries'trade : a dissenting view
No full textMost benefits of the European Community (EC-92) program will probably not come from marginal changes in trade flows. Those changes are important to European policymakers, but are of remote interest to developing countries. The main threats to developing countries are the diversion of investment funds to EC countries and continued external barriers, especially nontariff barriers. The EC expects higher growth and lower prices as a result of EC-92. The net effect on developing countries of the removal of internal trade barriers depends on the country's income and price elasticities with the EC. Current estimates suggest the effect will be small. If new external barriers emerge, or if EC-wide barriers replace national barriers, EC firms may collaborate more with large US or Japanese firms. None of these developments will improve developing countries'trade in manufactures and services. Investment in EC countries may increase to meet the extra demand, growth, or trade diversion resulting from EC-92. This could lead to increased investments in developing countries but given heavy indebtedness in developing countries, is more likely to divert investment funds, thus limiting their future production and growth. Technical standards in EC-92 may also be tougher than national standards in member countries, which could hurt developing country exporters. Is"Fortress Europe"likely? The EC Commission says no, but the Community's record is not good.Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,TF054105-DONOR FUNDED OPERATION ADMINISTRATION FEE INCOME AND EXPENSE ACCOUNT,Trade and Regional Integration,Trade Policy
The Singer or the Song? Developments in Performers' Rights from the Perspective of a Cultural Economist
No full textOver the last century, performers gradually acquired statutory protection of their economic and moral
rights. These rights are not copyright in the legal sense but neighboring rights and until recently, they
were mainly remuneration rights that are collectively administered. With the WPPT (WIPO
Performers and Phonograms Treaty), performers now have individual exclusive rights for digital
performances; this leads to the question: what has motivated this change – is it a change in the
perception of the value of performer or a change brought about by the changing technology of copying or,
indeed, a change that reflects different economic costs and benefits? The paper discusses the role of
copyright law as an incentive to performers and asks if the economic role of the performer is so different
from that of the author. The conclusion is that a complex interaction of the legal regulations, economic
conditions and institutional arrangements for administering these new rights will determine the outcome
martin-rauber/sunset-calc:
No full textPeak integration and file splitter tool for Sunset OC/EC analyzer file
EC Bananarama 1992 : the sequel - the EC Commission proposal
No full textSome European Community (EC) countries give preferred market access and high prices to bananas from selected developing countries or EC regional suppliers. This preferential status is regarded as a form of aid to these countries, most of which are developing small island economies. EC marketers of bananas from these preferred suppliers also benefit because of the high retail prices. Nonpreferred suppliers - mainly developing countries of Latin America - are hurt by the policies because access is denied or restricted and the lower demand depresses the world price for bananas. The Community's commitment to establish a single unified EC banana market on December 31, 1992 provides a timely opportunity to reform existing distortionary trade policies. The recently announced proposal of the Commission of ECs to regulate banana trade within a unified market relies on quotas to control imports. The proposal is extremely complicated. It is designed to severely restrict competition and to maintain the advantages of selected groups. The authors update their earlier analysis of world banana trade to reflect the market in 1993. They evaluate the implications of the Commission's proposal alongside existing and alternative policies. They find that current policies cost EC consumers about 0.3 billion a year to preferred suppliers. So, it costs EC consumers about 1.00 of aid toselect developing countries or regions. Additionally, every dollar of aid reaching preferred suppliers costs other developing country suppliers 5.30 cost to EC consumers, over 1.00 is lost in outright waste. Several plausible versions of the Commission's proposal are modelled. At best they are found to be slightly less costly than existing policies and at worst, considerably more costly. A 3.5 percent reduction in the quota allocation is estimated to lead to a 30 percent increase in the cost of the proposal. The authors conclude that the Commission's proposal for a unified EC banana policy appears to be little more than a way of replacing existing distortionary national policies with an almost equally distortionary single policy and market. The only difference: the costs would be borne by consumers in all EC countries rather than consumers in only some countries. Worse still, costs could increase. Markets that now gain the benefits of mostly open and competitive marketing such as Germany would face closed and uncompetitive conditions. For developing countries exporting bananas, the proposal offers little. At best conditions may be no worse than they are now. At worst the policy could hurt Latin American suppliers even more than current policies and introduce considerable confusion about the level of support to preferred suppliers. Under the proposed quota system aid will not be well targeted. A more efficient way of achieving the EC's aid commitment is through a small tariff of about 17 percent, used to fund a system of well-targeted deficiency payments or direct aid. The only reason for choosing the Commission's proposal over simpler, tariff-based options seems to be to maintain the vested interests of protected EC markteters. But this is contrary to the objectives of unification, which are to seek gains from increased competition and trade.Environmental Economics&Policies,Access to Markets,Markets and Market Access,Economic Theory&Research,Consumption
Distribution. Volcan San Martin, Veracruz (EC Mexico). in Soricidae
No full textDistribution. Volcan San Martin, Veracruz (EC Mexico).Published as part of Russell A. Mittermeier & Don E. Wilson, 2018, Soricidae, pp. 332-551 in Handbook of the Mammals of the World – Volume 8 Insectivores, Sloths and Colugos, Barcelona :Lynx Edicions on page 427, DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.687084
Interactive EC control of synthesized timbre
No full textPerhaps the biggest limitation of interactive EC is the fitness evaluation bottleneck, caused by slow user evaluation and leading to small populations and user fatigue. In this study these problems are addressed through the proposal of new user interface techniques for interactive EC, which allow faster evaluation of large numbers of indi- viduals and the combination of interactive with noninteractive evaluation. For the first time in the interactive EC literature a set of rigorous usability experiments compares these techniques with existing interactive EC and non-EC interfaces, for the application domain of sound synthesis. The results show that a new user interface for interactive EC improves performance, and further experiments lead to refinement of its design. The experimental protocol shows, again for the first time, that formal usability ex- periments are useful in the interactive EC setting. Statistically significant results are obtained on clearly-defined performance metrics, and the protocol is general enough to be of potential interest to all interactive EC researchers.Irish Research Council for Science, Engineering and Technologyau, ti, ke OR 26/10/1
Characterising EC regulation: emulation, innovation, re-regulation
No full textThe thesis characterises European Community (EC) regulation in terms of three levels of ideas, namely that: (a) the EC regulatory process is best understood by particular styles or processes of regulation that the thesis terms emulation, innovation and re-regulation; (b) there are particular determinants or causes of regulation that are best understood as regulatory competition, consensus and co-operation; and (c) a hypothesis can be derived from the review of associated literature to the effect that diffusion of ideas and policy learning leading to consensus and co-operation are often of greater significance than regulatory competition in the EC regulatory process. To this end, taking as a frame of reference the characterisation of styles or processes of regulation as emulation, innovation and re-regulation, the thesis challenges the assumption, prevalent in much of the literature, that the main determinant or cause of EC regulation is regulatory competition among member states seeking to enhance their own competitive position in the European market and reduce the costs associated with legal adjustment. Using evidence from case study material relating to EC regulation of insurance services and drinking water quality the thesis tests the hypothesis that, although the literature has stressed regulatory competition as the main determinant or cause of EC regulation, in practice diffusion of ideas and policy learning are likely to occur, leading to co-operation between actors in a manner that ensures the emergence of a broad consensus on the preferred EC regulatory approach without recourse to regulatory competition at all. The thesis finds that regulatory competition is not, in fact, the only determinant or cause of EC regulation. Instead, diffusion of ideas and policy learning leading to consensus and co-operation are of crucial importance and should be accorded greater significance in the literature than has been the case in the past
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