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Egizi e cittadinanza romana
No full textIn the 1st century AD, the Egyptians, in contrast to the vast majority of the peregrini who inhabited the other provinces of the Empire, were only admitted in exceptional cases to Alexandrian or Roman citizenship (see Pli. Epp. 10.5, 10.6, 10.7 and 10.10, Josephus' Contra Apionem 2.40-41, but also 2.28 and 2.2.72) and the § 55 of the Gnomon of the Idios Logos). After Hadrian the Egyptians institutional pattern enderwent a deep change. Between the 2nd and the 3rd century its institutions conformed to those of the other provinces. In 200 AD the administrative structure of the Egyptian metropoleis changed fundaametally when Severus ordered the creation of a boulé, or town council, in the capital of each name. It is therefore likely that in 212 AD the Egyptians as well benefited from the "divine gift". Yet neither the restrictions concerning their status nor the social structure of Egypt underwent essential changes
Cronaca del Convegno sulla didattica della Storia del diritto Romano. Firenze, 29-31 ottobre 1991
No full textrc. Arezzo nell’Antichità, a cura di Giovannangelo Camporeale e Giulio Firpo, Accademia Petrarca di Lettere Arti e Scienze – Arezzo, Giorgio Breschneider Editore, Roma, 2009
No full textArezzo nell'antichità, con particolare riguardo alla storia delle sue istituzion
Cronaca della presentazione scientifica della Storia di Roma Einaudi, Ferrara 9 dicembre 1988
No full text
Eclissi del pensiero giuridico e letteratura giurisprudenziale nella seconda metà del III secolo d.C.
No full textDoppia cittadinanza e pluralità degli ordinamenti. La Tabula Banasitana e le linee 7-9 del Papiro di Giessen 40 col I
No full textIf the Tabula Banasitana text on the Giessen papyrus, in particular on the clause introduced by ménontos, had not been available from the start of the 1960s, it would have made sense to practice the so-called ars ignorandi and agree with Gino Segré’s conclusions dating back to 1925. However, this epigraphic document highlights a new factor that decidedly influenced the subsequent debate. Of fundamental importance are several lines of the third part, which coincide with an extract from the commentarius civitate Romana donatorum, the register kept in Rome containing the name, age and the origo of the cives who had gained that status by viritane grant. These lines (ll. 35-37 ... his civitatem Romanam dedimus, salvo iure gentis et sine deminutione tributorum et vectigalium populi et fisci) perhaps fill in the gaps from lines 8 and 9 of the P. Giessen with a radically different theory from that set forth beginning with the 1910 editio princeps. It is necessary to ask oneself if the addition of [de]deitikíōn in P. Giessen 40 is the only one possible in the safeguarding clause of Papyrus Giessen. Another hypothesis is equally, if not more, convincing in light of a comparison with the Tabula Banasitana. Line 9 could be completed with [ad]deitikíōn – a transliteration from the neuter additicia rather than with [de]deitikíōn. Therefore, the clause introduced by ménontos would not define those groups excluded from the benefit of citizenship or the safeguarding of their own legal order; rather, it would confirm all the obligations that existed for the civitates and the other communities of the Roman world (which in turn were obliged to provide certain services to the provincial administration), recognizing the addeitíkia – that is, those supplementary regulations, at times favorable (in the case of the immunity granted to certain categories of veterans), at times unfavorable. A safeguarding clause conceived of in this manner explains why, after 212, the pro capite tax (laographía). was still imposed on those who once were Egyptians. Moreover, before the constitutio Antoniniana, the new Roman citizens couldn’t comply with the body of rules governing, in their pólis or in their civitas, family and inheritance law, but had to conform to the Roman Law
Saluto introduttivo: una riflessione sull'idea di naturae veritas
No full textI giuristi romani non hanno mai immaginato alcuna relazione gerarchica tra diritto naturale e diritto civile. La natura era unicamente un artificio al servizio della produzione di artifici, uno strumento liberamente impiegato per trasformare l'ordine delle cose anteriormente istituite
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