1,721,098 research outputs found
EU trade secrets law and algorithmic transparency
1. Introduction. – 2. Algorithms in the data economy. – 3. The reasons to stand for algorithmic transparency. – 4. Algorithms can be protected as trade secrets. – 5. No al-gorithmic transparency by default. – 6. When EU Trade Secret Law admits algorithmic transparency. – 6.1. The place to decide about algorithmic transparency lies outside the boundaries of the Directive. – 6.2. Algorithmic transparency resulting from the activi-ties of some individuals. – 7. Concluding remarks
Indeterminate antitrust concepts and Artificial Intelligence: the case of plausibility
Legal texts are replete with indeterminate concepts, i.e. words to which it
is challenging to assign a definitive meaning. The interpretation of these terms,
including the determination of their meaning, is thus an integral part of the work
undertaken by legal experts. This paper seeks to investigate the potential for artificial intelligence (AI) to support or even supplant human effort in the realm of legal interpretation. Specifically, the paper examines this possibility through the lens of the concept of plausibility in antitrust law. The rationale for this focus is twofold. First, within antitrust discourse, the concept of plausibility is pertinent to both substantive and procedural law, which calls for various needs that interpreters—even artificial ones—should meet. Second, the influence of economic thought on antitrust law enables the interpretation of plausibility not only based on legal precedents and judges’ understanding of the ordinary world, but also on economic principles, which enables the development of two models of AI: one running on data, one informed to principles
Standard probatori: alcuni spunti di riflessione per e da il diritto della concorrenza
Nell'articolo si cerca di alimentare il dialogo in materia di standard probatori tra il diritto della concorrenza, il diritto processuale e la teoria del diritt
The Tercas case, state aid, and antitrust: are there holes in the warp?
In order to guarantee the existence of competition in the internal market, the rules on State aid and the antitrust provisions are supposed to act in a complementary way, as if the latter were to cover the behaviours that the former do not capture and vice versa. Conversely, taking its cue from the recent Tercas case, the article shows that neither State aid nor competition law covers one case: that of solidarity-laden activities carried out by private agents with the intention of keeping failing firms in the internal market. The article discusses the reasons for this gap and its sustainability
Antitrust law and the right to settle: the case of pay-for-delay settlements
In the spring of 2021, pay-for-delay settlements took over the legal scene on the both sides of the Atlantic. In March, following the line of reasoning it had elaborated in Generics, the Court of Justice
of the European Union (CJEU) decided Lundbeck. It dismissed the appeals brought against the homonymous decision of the European Commission (EC), which had fined a number of patent
settlements in which brand-name drug manufactures had paid generic drug producers to delay their entry in the market of citalopram-based antidepressant medications. A few weeks later, in the US, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided Impax. It affirmed the decision of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which, in its first post-Actavis patent settlement case, had fined a generic drug producer for having accepted payments to delay the entry in the market of an opioid named oxymorphone. Meanwhile, some House representatives introduced a new bill on pay-for-delay settlements which has not yet passed.
At first glance, one might be tempted to place these settlements at the heart of the interface between antitrust and patent law. The aforementioned rulings – which, in the United States and the European Union are not anomalous but follow a recent case law – have instead used the case of pay-for-delay settlements to establish when antitrust law should limit firms’ right to settle.
The paper discusses such a shift in perspective
Il potere deterrente dei sistemi sanzionatori comunitario e nazionale e le riduzioni delle sanzioni antitrust, in Concorrenza e Mercato
Nell'articolo si analizzano e commentano le sanzioni inflitte dall'autorità garante della concorrenza e dalla commissione europea, confrontandole con quelle comminate dagli organi di controllo giurisdizionale
Le intese lesive della concorrenza
Si tratta di una rassegna ragionata e commentata dei provvedimenti dell'AGCM in materia di intes
Novità nell’applicazione della disciplina in materia di intese lesive della concorrenza
Si tratta di una rassegna ragionata e commentata dei provvedimenti dell'AGCM in materia di intese e delle ultime pertinenti novità legislativ
Il progetto di regolamento comunitario in materia di procedure di applicazione degli artt. 81 e 82, in Concorrenza e Mercato
L'articolo esamina la proposta di regolamento 1/2003, poi approvato
When an ice cream case provides antitrust experts with food for thought: Unilever Italia
The preliminary ruling in Unilever Italia Mkt. Operations offers several
valuable lessons. Firstly, it serves as a reminder that, despite the current focus
on digital markets and tech giants, competition threats may still occur even in
the most traditional markets, such as the market for industrial single-wrapped
impulse ice creams. Secondly, it deals with two seminal issues: the
imputability theories that the European Commission and national competition
authorities can use in antitrust cases involving dealer networks, and the
possibility for dominant firms to apply the as-efficient-competitor test
(hereinafter, also the “AEC test”) in their defence, in order to exclude their
liability. In doing so, however, the Court of Justice of the European Union
leaves certain questions unresolved, thereby offering abundant material for
contemplation and future scholarly exploration, especially in light of the new
Guidance of the European Commission on its enforcement priorities in
applying Article 102 TFEU to exclusionary practices
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