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Santykiai tarp kartų pagal žmogų ir valstybę
Paveldėjote iš senelio lopą žemės ir norėtumėte jame pasistatyti namą? Gali būti, kad būtent šioje žemėje ir būtent tokio namo statyti jums niekas neleis. Nusipirkote dulkių siurblį ar pakelį pieno? Kartu įpareigojote dulkių siurblio ar pieno gamintoją sutvarkyti šiek tiek elektros prietaisų ar gėrimų pakuočių atliekų. Gavote atlyginimą? Bent trečdalis to, ką gavote į rankas, buvo pervesta dabarties pensininkams su pažadu, kad ir jums senatvėje ateities dirbantieji mokės pensiją. Šiuos ir panašius draudimus ar įpareigojimus nustato valstybiniai reguliavimai, turintys vieną bendrą požymį – jų sąnaudas ir bendrą laukiamą naudą patiria skirtingų kartų žmonės. Šiame straipsnyje tokie reguliavimai vadinami targeneraciniais reguliavimais. Dabartinė karta moka mokesčius, kuriais finansuojamos vyresnės kartos pensijos ar jaunesnės kartos mokslai. Dabartinė karta riboja savo vartojimą ar skleidžiamą taršą, kad ateities kartos paveldėtų daugiau gamtos išteklių ir švaresnę aplinką. Šis straipsnis skirtas, viena vertus, paaiškinti, kas yra tarpgeneraciniai reguliavimai ir kokie jų tikslai, kita vertus, suabejoti jų veiksmingumu ir reikalingumu. Kritikuojama nuostata, kad galima veiksmingai suplanuoti kitų žmonių ateitį. Straipsnio autorius ieško atsakymo į tokį klausimą: galbūt nevaržydami kiekvieno žmogaus teisių puoselėti savo nuosavybę, kurti sutartines ir spontaniškas, o ne prievartines bendrabūvio formas, turėsime daugiau ir dabar, ir ateityje? Reikšminiai žodžiai: Darnus vystymasis; Karta; Motyvai; Pasekmės; Santykiai; Santykiai tarp kartų; Socialinis teisingumas; Tarpgeneraciniai reguliavimai; Tarpgeneracinio reguliavimo prielaidos; Valstybė; Žmogus; Generation; Intergenerational regulations; Man; Motives; Preconditions of intergenerational regulation; Relationship between the generations; Relationships; Results; Sustainable development, social justice; The StateYou have inherited a plot of land from your grandmother and you want to build a house on it? There is a possibility that you will not receive the required authorisation to build this particular house on this particular land. You have bought a vacuum cleaner or a package of milk? This way you have obliged the manufacturer of the vacuum cleaner or milk to manage certain amount of waste of electricity equipment or packaging. You have received your salary? At least third of your salary was transferred to pensioners under condition that you will be paid you pension by those working at that moment. These and other restrictions and obligations are established by state regulation having one thing in common – their costs or expected benefits are experienced by people of different generations. In this article these regulations are referred to as intergeneration regulations. The present generation pays taxes which finance pensions of the elder generation and studies of the younger generation. The present generation limits its consumption or pollution for future generations to have more natural resources and cleaner environment. On the one hand, this article is aimed at defining intergeneration regulation and its aims, and, on the other hand, it provokes certain doubts with regard to its efficiency and necessity. The opinion that it is possible to efficiently plan other people’s future is criticised. The author of the article seeks answer to the following question: maybe we would have more in the present and in the future, if we did not restrict every individual right to foster his or her property, create conventional and spontaneous, but not forced forms of communication
GERIAUSIO PAAIŠKINIMO IŠVEDIMAS. TARP DEDUKCIJOS, INDUKCIJOS IR ABDUKCIJOS
Geriausio paaiškinimo išvedimas (GPI) išskiriamas kaip pagrindinė mokslo hipotezes ir teorijas atrandanti ir pagrindžianti samprotavimo forma. Straipsnyje tiriamas GPI ir jo santykis su pagrindinėmis samprotavimo rūšimis: dedukcija, indukcija ir abdukcija. GPI pasižymi abdukcijos samprotavimo mechanizmu, tačiau, priešingai nei abdukcija, GPI teikia ne galimą, bet esą teisingą išvadą. GPI yra induktyvus plačiąja prasme samprotavimas, nes jis nepatenkina dedukcijos taisyklių ir jo išvadai nepakanka duomenų. Straipsnyje teigiama, jog nepaisant pastarųjų GPI ypatumų, kurie rodo, kad GPI nėra ir negali būti deduktyviu samprotavimu, GPI reiškia pretenzijas į savo išvados absoliutų teisingumą, t. y. tvirtinamas kone deduktyvus GPI išvados pagrįstumas.
Pagrindiniai žodžiai: geriausio paaiškinimo išvedimas, dedukcija, indukcija, abdukcija.
Inference to the Best Explanation. Among Deduction, Induction and Abduction
Adolfas Mackonis
Summary
Inference to the best explanation (IBE) is considered to be the main means of discovery and justification of scientific hypotheses and theories. The article investigates this inference and its relationship to the main kinds of inference: deduction, induction and abduction. IBE has an abductive inference mechanism, but, contrary to abduction, infers not a possible, but a true conclusion. IBE is an inductive inference, because it is underdetermined by the rules of deduction and by evidence. The article claims that despite its abductive and inductive features which demonstrate that it is not and cannot be deductive inference, IBE nevertheless makes pretense to an absolute truth of its inference, i.e. claims for an almost deductive validity.
Keywords: inference to the best explanation, deduction, induction, abduction.
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GERIAUSIO PAAIŠKINIMO IŠVEDIMO PSICHOLOGINIS ADEKVATUMAS IR ONTOLOGINIAI ĮSIPAREIGOJIMAI
Geriausio paaiškino išvedimas (GPI) dabartinėje analitinėje epistemologijoje ir mokslo filosofijoje yra plačiai tyrinėjama episteminė teorija, teigianti, kad hipotezės buvimas geriausiu paaiškinimu yra pakankama šios hipotezės teisingumo sąlyga. Straipsnyje teigiama, kad GPI analizuotina ne tik kaip episteminė, bet ir kaip psichologinė bei ontologinė teorija. Pirma, aptariami kognityviųjų mokslų tyrimai, kurie leidžia teigti, jog GPI teisingai aprašo žmonių samprotavimų praktiką: paaiškinimas suvokiamas kaip teisingumo požymis; teiginiai, kurie yra geresni paaiškinimai, priimami kaip labiau tikėtini; aiškinimo vertybės bei turimas žinojimas daro įtaką teiginių tikimybės vertinimui. Antra, straipsnyje aptariama, kokia turėtų būti pasaulio ontologija, kad GPI kaip episteminė teorija būtų teisinga. Realizmas apie išorinį pasaulį, gamtos vienodumas, turimo žinojimo teisingumas bei aiškinimo vertybių palankumas tiesai yra būtinos ir pakankamos sąlygos tam, kad GPI būtų teisinga.
Pagrindiniai žodžiai: geriausio paaiškinimo išvedimas, abdukcija, psichologija, ontologija, aiškinimo vertybės.
Psychological Adequacy and Ontological Commitments of Inference to the Best Explanation
Adolfas Mackonis
Summary
The article explicates psychological and ontological aspects of Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE). IBE is a psychological theory, because cognitive science studies support IBE as descriptively true and psychologically adequate theory, i.e., people perceive best explanations as true and follow the rule of IBE in their reasoning. Moreover, different features of IBE imply that conclusions of IBE can be true only in a world with a very particular ontological constitution. Realism about the external world, the uniformity of nature, the truth of background knowledge and the truth-conduciveness of explanatory virtues are necessary and sufficient for IBE to be truth-conducive. Therefore, IBE is an epistemic theory only because at the same time it is committed to a particular ontology.
Keywords: inference to the best explanation, abduction, psychology, ontology, explanatory virtues
MOKSLO ISTORIJOS IR FILOSOFIJOS TYRINĖJIMAI BALTIJOS EUROPOS STUDIJŲ ŽURNALE
History and Philosophy of Science in the Journal of Baltic European Studies
Adolfas Mackoni
Content of the concept of public interest: an individualistic analysis
Straipsnyje pateikiama konceptualinė viešojo intereso sąvokos apibrėžimo analizė. Teigiama, kad viešasis interesas negali prieštarauti individualiems visuomene sudarančių asmenų interesams ir turėtų su jais sutapti. Tačiau, remiantis Arrow teorema, toks viešasis interesas yra neįmanomas, jei norima, kad jis būtų sąžiningas ir racionalus. Kadangi negalima išpildyti visų su viešojo intereso turiniu sietinų intuicijų, maksimaliai įmanomai šias intuicijas patenkintų viešojo intereso sutapatinimas su asmens neliečiamumo principu, besiskleidžiančiu asmens gyvybės, laisvės ir nuosavybės neliečiamumo aspektais. Tai leistų koegzistuoti kuo įvairesniems interesams, niekam neprimetant jokio privalomo intereso. Reikšminiai žodžiai: Arrow teorema; Asmens neliečiamumo principas; Interesų santykis; Konstitucinė doktrina; Lošimo teorija; Viešasis interesas; Viešasis interesas teisėje ir politikoje; Viešojo intereso sąvoka; Arrow theorem; Constitutional doctrine; Game theory; Interest ratio; Of public interest law and policy; Principle of inviolability of the person; Public interest; The concept of public interestThe article entertains a conceptual analysis of the notion of public interest. It claims that the public interest not only cannot object to the individual interest of the members of society but it also has to accord to these interest. However, the Arrow impossibility theorem shows that public interest of this kind is impossible if one wants it to be fair and rational. In this kind of circumstances the remaining option to satisfy, at least to some extent, the aforementioned requirements is to adopt the principle of inviolability of the person, which unfolds as the inviolability of personal life, freedom and property. This notion of public interest would allow the coexistence of diversity of individual interests without imposing to anybody any compulsory interes
Scientific realism in contemporary philosophy.
Scientific realism is a philosophical approach that claims the literal truth of scientific theories. This approach would not be philosophically interesting if there were not ample philosophical, historical and sociological arguments that would argue against it. In this thesis we evaluate the arguments of Paul Feyerabend, Arthur Fine, Thomas S. Kuhn, Larry Laudan and Bas van Fraassen as well as the challenge of social constructivists. All the counterarguments are weighed against the most up-to-date arguments for scientific realism – notably, Philip Kitcher, Jarrett Leplin, Ilkka Niiniluoto, Stathis Psillos and others. We claim that scientific realism is a consistent and soundly substantiated account of scientific theories which best explains the empirical success of scientific theories and which, therefore, is justly believed to be a truthful theoretical attitude. Scientific realism is a consistent theoretical attitude because it starts from the two premises that there is a mind independent world of a particular structure (an ontological premise) and that science is able to know this world (an epistemic premise) and concludes with a semantic thesis that scientific theories represent what the world is like. Scientific realism is a sound and well substantiated theoretical attitude because the arguments against it do not succeed to refute it. It grounds its epistemic optimism in the denial to draw a rigid line between the observable and unobservable aspects of the world and in the use of abductive inference that is also known as an inference to the best explanation. The use of a two-dimensional causal-descriptive theory of reference allows scientific realism to respond to the claim that scientific theories are incommensurable. One can discriminate theoretical mechanisms and entities in contemporary scientific theories that were retained from the theories formerly successful, but now known to be false. This enables scientific realism to retort to the argument that the existence of successful but false theories confutes scientific realism. Moreover, scientific realism provides a more rationally compelling explanation of scientific theories than social constructivism, a distinct kind of critique against scientific realism, does. Finally, scientific realism is indeed the best explanation of the empirical success of science. No other available explanation of the success of science explains the success of a particular scientific theory. Moreover, these alternative explanations of the success of science usually entail the scientific realist explanation and thus are not genuine
Geriausio paaiškinimo išvedimo patikimumo ribos.
The dissertation analyses inference to the best explanation (IBE). Firstly, the thesis explicates the concept of IBE, it analyzes what does the concept of explanatory power stands for. Secondly, the thesis evaluates the tenability of the truth aspirations of IBE, it analyzes to what extent a hypothesis can be claimed to be true, given that it is the best explanation for some phenomenon of interest. IBE is explicated as a form of material inference that ascribes truth to the hypothesis that has the highest degree of explanatory virtues among its competitors: is the most consistent with approved background knowledge, unifies the most the relevant phenomena, is the deepest explanation and is the most simple explanation. Probabilistic approaches to IBE are criticized. Four basic ways of justification of the truth-conduciveness of IBE that can be discerned in the literature are described: reliabilist-coherentist, evolutionary, probabilistic and empirical-historical. The thesis concludes that while IBE could facilitate the determination of probability distributions and is a wide psychological practice, due to the bad lot argument, possible incommensurability of explanatory virtues, pessimistic induction and better safe than sorry beliefs all the four ways of justification of IBE in terms of truth-conduciveness cannot be taken for granted which leaves IBE only accidentally valid
Inference to the Best Explanation: The Limits of Truth-Conduciveness.
The dissertation analyses inference to the best explanation (IBE). Firstly, the thesis explicates the concept of IBE, it analyzes what does the concept of explanatory power stands for. Secondly, the thesis evaluates the tenability of the truth aspirations of IBE, it analyzes to what extent a hypothesis can be claimed to be true, given that it is the best explanation for some phenomenon of interest. IBE is explicated as a form of material inference that ascribes truth to the hypothesis that has the highest degree of explanatory virtues among its competitors: is the most consistent with approved background knowledge, unifies the most the relevant phenomena, is the deepest explanation and is the most simple explanation. Probabilistic approaches to IBE are criticized. Four basic ways of justification of the truth-conduciveness of IBE that can be discerned in the literature are described: reliabilist-coherentist, evolutionary, probabilistic and empirical-historical. The thesis concludes that while IBE could facilitate the determination of probability distributions and is a wide psychological practice, due to the bad lot argument, possible incommensurability of explanatory virtues, pessimistic induction and better safe than sorry beliefs all the four ways of justification of IBE in terms of truth-conduciveness cannot be taken for granted which leaves IBE only accidentally valid
EKONOMINIŲ LAIMĖS RODIKLIŲ PAGRĮSTUMO IR PATIKIMUMO PROBLEMA
Laimės ekonomika tiria laimės jausmą lemiančius ar su šiuo jausmu susijusius ekonominius ir socialinius veiksnius. Jos atradimais norima informuoti ekonominės ir socialinės politikos sprendimus. Šiame straipsnyje neigiamas ekonominių laimės rodiklių pagrįstumas ir patikimumas. Nepagrįstumas kyla iš subjektyvios vertės teorijos – laimės negalima išreikšti kardinalia matavimo skale ir negalima agreguoti tarpasmeninio laimės jausmo. Iš laimės kaip subjektyvaus dalyko kyla ir laimės rodiklių nepatikimumas. Straipsnyje taip pat teigiama, kad ekonominių laimės matavimų rezultatų taikymas politiniuose sprendimuose vertintinas kaip nemoralus
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