377 research outputs found
Corcoran Reviews the 4 Volumes of Tarski’s Collected Papers
No full textCORCORAN REVIEWS THE 4 VOLUMES OF TARSKI’S COLLECTED PAPERS Alfred Tarski (1901--1983) is widely regarded as one of the two giants of twentieth-century logic and also as one of the four greatest logicians of all time (Aristotle, Frege and Gödel being the other three). Of the four, Tarski was the most prolific as a logician. The four volumes of his collected papers, which exclude most of his 19 monographs, span over 2500 pages. Aristotle's writings are comparable in volume, but most of the Aristotelian corpus is not about logic, whereas virtually everything written by Tarski concerns logic more or less directly. There is no doubt that Tarski wrote more on logic than any other author; he started publishing on logic in 1921 at the age of 20 and continued until his death at the age of 82
Setting the agenda for parking research in other cities
No full textThe chapter reflects on the 12 case studies discussed in the book and considers their implications for future research. At the end of the chapter, a new agenda for parking research in large cities is set out.Green Open Access added to TU Delft Institutional Repository 'You share, we take care!' - Taverne project https://www.openaccess.nl/en/you-share-we-take-care Otherwise as indicated in the copyright section: the publisher is the copyright holder of this work and the author uses the Dutch legislation to make this work public.Spatial Planning and Strateg
Corcoran recommends Hambourger on the Frege-Russell number definition
No full textIt is widely agreed by philosophers that the so-called “Frege-Russell definition of natural number” is actually an assertion concerning the nature of the numbers and that it cannot be regarded as a definition in the ordinary mathematical sense. On the basis of the reasoning in this paper it is clear that the Frege-Russell definition contradicts the following three principles (taken together): (1) each number is the same entity in each possible world, (2) each number exists in each possible world, (3) some entities existing in the actual world do not exist in every possible world. Since these principles seem to be true, the paper is a refutation of the Frege-Russell definition. The paper does more. It shows that the contradictory of the Frege-Russell definition follows even when principles 2 and 3 are replaced by one considerably weaker principle. The ideas contained in the paper are related to two earlier objections to the definition. The first, sometimes attributed to the mathematician, C. S. Keyser, is that existence of the numbers as defined implies the existence of infinitely many particulars in each possible world. The second is, in effect, an idea which is said to have led Whitehead to reject the definition of number to which he had subscribed in Principia Mathematica. Whitehead is supposed to have said that he could not believe that the number two changes every “time twins are born”. The mathematician H. Jeffreys expressed similar ideas [Philos. of Sci. 5 (1938), 434–451]. One of the merits of the author’s work is that it refutes the Frege-Russell definition without the need to take sides on controversial points presupposed by the Keyser and Whitehead objections. The objections made by the author are therefore not to be identified with the Keyser and Whitehead objections. Even if the author’s work is to be regarded as a refinement and integration of previous ideas, it is nevertheless a contribution—not only because the basic points are well worth repeating but also because the refinements are logically significant improvements and because the author has stated them clearly and concisely in the idiom of contemporary philosophy
Disbelief Logic Complements Belief Logic
No full textJOHN CORCORAN AND WAGNER SANZ, Disbelief Logic Complements Belief Logic. Philosophy, University at Buffalo, Buffalo, NY 14260-4150 USA E-mail: [email protected] Filosofia, Universidade Federal de Goiás, Goiás, GO 74001-970 Brazil E-mail: [email protected] Consider two doxastic states belief and disbelief. Belief is taking a proposition to be true and disbelief taking it to be false. Judging also dichotomizes: accepting a proposition results in belief and rejecting in disbelief. Stating follows suit: asserting a proposition conveys belief and denying conveys disbelief. Traditional logic implicitly focused on logical relations and processes needed in expanding and organizing systems of beliefs. Deducing a conclusion from beliefs results in belief of the conclusion. Deduction presupposes consequence: one proposition is a consequence of a set of a propositions if the latter logically implies the former. The role of consequence depends on its being truth-preserving: every consequence of a set of truths is true. This paper, which builds on previous work by the second author, explores roles of logic in expanding and organizing systems of disbeliefs. Aducing a conclusion from disbeliefs results in disbelief of the conclusion. Aduction presupposes contrequence: one proposition is a contrequence of a set of propositions if the set of negations or contradictory opposites of the latter logically implies that of the former. The role of contrequence depends on its being falsity-preserving: every contrequence of a set of falsehoods is false. A system of aductions that includes, for every contrequence of a given set, an aduction of the contrequence from the set is said to be complete. Historical and philosophical discussion is illustrated and enriched by presenting complete systems of aductions constructed by the second author. One such, a natural aduction system for Aristotelian categorical propositions, is based on a natural deduction system attributed to Aristotle by the first author and others. ADDED NOTE: Wagner Sanz reconstructed Aristotle’s logic the way it would have been had Aristole focused on constructing “anti-sciences” instead of sciences: more generally, on systems of disbeliefs
‘The Umbrage of Green Shade’: Kelvin Corcoran and the Landscape Beyond the Landscape.
No full textpublication-status: Published© 2014 Jos Smith (the author). Permission to deposit granted in writing by the publisher, Shearsman Books.
Review of WILLARD QUINE, Philosophy of logic, Harvard, 1970/1986
No full textThis book is best regarded as a concise essay developing the personal views of a major philosopher of logic and as such it is to be welcomed by scholars in the field. It is not (and does not purport to be) a treatment of a significant portion of those philosophical problems generally thought to be germane to logic. It would be easy to list many popular topics in philosophy of logic which it does not mention. Even its "definition" of logic-"the systematic study of logical truth"-is peculiar to the author and would be regarded as inappropriately restrictive by many logicians There are several standard ways of defining truth using sequences. Quine’s discussions in the 1970 first printing of Philosophy of logic and in previous lectures were vitiated by mixing two. Quine’s logical Two-Method Error, which eluded Quine’s colleagues, was corrected in the 1978 sixth printing. But Quine never explicitly acknowledged, described, or even mentioned the error in print although in correspondence he did thank Corcoran for bringing it to his attention. In regard to style one may note that the book is rich in metaphorical and sometimes even cryptic passages one of the more remarkable of which occurs in the Preface and seems to imply that deductive logic does not warrant distinctive philosophical treatment. Moreover, the author's sesquipedalian performances sometimes subvert perspicuity
A thermal-fluid analysis of piping dead-legs in high purity water systems
No full textPurified water forms an integral part of pharmaceutical production. The consistency of water quality produced by purrficatron processes and distributed to points-of-use is of utmost importance Tee-sectlons Installed in distribution loops are commonly used to divert fluid flow at take-off points. However fluid flow restriction at teesection branches can cause piping dead-legs.
Dead-legs consist of reglons of stagnant fluid where harmful organisms can proliferate unaffected by the scounng effects of distribution loop flow. This thesis presents a thermo-fluld analysis focusmg upon the fluid dynamics and heat transfer mechanisms occurrmg wthin dead-leg branches A literature review of high purity water system designed etails sanitization methods currently employed in industry with reference to the detrimental effects of dead-legs.
Experimentation was performed using a single-loop fluid rig complete with capped 90' tee-section representmg a piplng dead-leg. Analysis of the thermal conditions for various dead-leg configurations was performed mcludmg variations of branch length and diameter. The effect of varying loop velocity was also investigated. The application of non-intrusive analysis techniques was considered. Infrared thermography and surface-mounted thermocouples were used to map surface temperature distribution across a dead-leg branch.
Increased temperatures were noted at the base of the dead-leg branch for increasing loop velocities. Comparison of reduced and equal diameter dead-legs for varying branch lengths suggested dead-leg temperature is strongly related to mlet loop velocity. Acceptable thermal responses were noted m 4d dead-legs for loop velocity > 0.94m/s, 2d reduced diameter dead-legs at 1 50m/s and in 2d equal diameter deadlegs throughout the examined velocity range.
Although all dead-leg configurations used in analysis adhered to industry recommendations; unsatisfactory thermo-fluid conditions recorded for remalnlng dead-legs suggests revision of accepted regulations. Non-intrusive analyses illustrated greater temperatures at branch md-pomnt compared with base measurements. However the application of techniques was deemed limited due to pipe wall conduction effects
Review of Macbeth, D. Diagrammatic reasoning in Frege's Begriffsschrift. Synthese 186 (2012), no. 1, 289–314
No full textA Mathematical Review by John Corcoran, SUNY/Buffalo Macbeth, Danielle Diagrammatic reasoning in Frege's Begriffsschrift. Synthese 186 (2012), no. 1, 289–314. ABSTRACT This review begins with two quotations from the paper: its abstract and the first paragraph of the conclusion. The point of the quotations is to make clear by the “give-them-enough-rope” strategy how murky, incompetent, and badly written the paper is. I know I am asking a lot, but I have to ask you to read the quoted passages—aloud if possible. Don’t miss the silly attempt to recycle Kant’s quip “Concepts without intuitions are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind”. What the paper was aiming at includes the absurdity: “Proofs without definitions are empty; definitions without proofs are, if not blind, then dumb.” But the author even bollixed this. The editor didn’t even notice. The copy-editor missed it. And the author’s proof-reading did not catch it. In order not to torment you I will quote the sentence as it appears: “In a slogan: proofs without definitions are empty, merely the aimless manipulation of signs according to rules; and definitions without proofs are, if no blind, then dumb.”[sic] The rest of my review discusses the paper’s astounding misattribution to contemporary logicians of the information-theoretic approach. This approach was cruelly trashed by Quine in his 1970 Philosophy of Logic, and thereafter ignored by every text I know of. The paper under review attributes generally to modern philosophers and logicians views that were never espoused by any of the prominent logicians—such as Hilbert, Gödel, Tarski, Church, and Quine—apparently in an attempt to distance them from Frege: the focus of the article. On page 310 we find the following paragraph. “In our logics it is assumed that inference potential is given by truth-conditions. Hence, we think, deduction can be nothing more than a matter of making explicit information that is already contained in one’s premises. If the deduction is valid then the information contained in the conclusion must be contained already in the premises; if that information is not contained already in the premises […], then the argument cannot be valid.” Although the paper is meticulous in citing supporting literature for less questionable points, no references are given for this. In fact, the view that deduction is the making explicit of information that is only implicit in premises has not been espoused by any standard symbolic logic books. It has only recently been articulated by a small number of philosophical logicians from a younger generation, for example, in the prize-winning essay by J. Sagüillo, Methodological practice and complementary concepts of logical consequence: Tarski’s model-theoretic consequence and Corcoran’s information-theoretic consequence, History and Philosophy of Logic, 30 (2009), pp. 21–48. The paper omits definitions of key terms including ‘ampliative’, ‘explicatory’, ‘inference potential’, ‘truth-condition’, and ‘information’. The definition of prime number on page 292 is as follows: “To say that a number is prime is to say that it is not divisible without remainder by another number”. This would make one be the only prime number. The paper being reviewed had the benefit of two anonymous referees who contributed “very helpful comments on an earlier draft”. Could these anonymous referees have read the paper? J. Corcoran, U of Buffalo, SUNY PS By the way, if anyone has a paper that has been turned down by other journals, any journal that would publish something like this might be worth trying
The Nature and Origin of the Central Constant Emission Component of Eta Carinae
No full textThe campaign observations of the evolved super massive binary system, η Car, revealed an apparently non-variable X-ray emission component, which was observable only around periastron when the wind-wind colliding (WWC) X-ray emission from the binary system dropped. This central constant emission (CCE) component originates from hot thermal plasma at >50 million degrees Kelvin confined within ∼0.2′′ (∼460 AU at 2.3 kpc) of the binary system. The emission suffers weak X-ray absorption at NH∼3 − 5 × 1022 cm−2, so that the plasma should be in front of the binary system. These results suggest that the CCE plasma is thermalized by collision of the secondary wind with the primary wind shell ejected a few orbital cycles before and that it fills the foreground cavity carved by the wind of the secondary star. An apparent change of the line of sight absorption between 2003 and 2009 may suggest a change of the mass loss rate of the primary star around that time
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