1,721,053 research outputs found
Election observation missions and election-day fraud: how to assess effectiveness?
No full textHow do international actors influence democratization in developing countries? Which actions do they undertake to support democratization processes? Are they successful? Are they cost-effective? Which unintended consequences do they provoke? In examining those questions, I would like to focus on one form of democracy promotion: international observation of elections. The study of election observation is one of the topics of the very large field of study on democratization and, more specifically, democracy-promotion and assistance. Specifically, the question to which I would like to answer is of the last type: Which unintended consequences does it cause? In fact, looking at the effect of international election observation on election-day fraud means trying to discover the influence of the simple presence of observers on the behaviour of candidates, electoral staff, and voters. Even if proponents of election observation promote this instrument claiming its potential to reduce fraud, that capability (that must first be proved) can be numbered among the “unintended consequences” of international election observation since the stated role of observers is simply to “observe and report” on an electoral process. Its potential to reassure the electorate that it is safe for them to vote (and to run for the election) and/or to deter fraud, while a fundamental element of the role of observers, is not technically part of the observers’ job: those are, as much as possible, some of the “positive” spill-over effects or unintended consequences, something that the mere presence of observers can provoke under certain circumstances without they explicitly mean to cause them. International actors now play a prominent role in domestic elections in democratizing countries: they pressure governments to hold democratic elections and they are directly involved in the electoral process by providing technical assistance, funding or by sending international observers. Is it true that electoral observation can bring cleaner elections, as proponents of this costly enterprise assert? The answer to this question is of fundamental importance to the evaluation of the efficiency of election observation. We want to know if we are spending well our limited resources (in term of time, money, staff, etc.), if our efforts in that direction are worth doing, if our actions bring the expected consequences
Do elections matter?
No full textThe United Nations have been involved in the field of electoral assistance since its founding in 1945. After the end of the Cold War, a number of other national and international, governmental and nongovernmental organizations gave rise to a flourishing industry in the democratization field. Countries which previously suffered decades of civil war began a peace process, and many one-party or military regimes were replaced by governments deriving their mandates from multi-party elections. Donor governments, international organizations and NGOs became involved in electoral assistance and sent thousands of elections observers to these countries. [1]
While scholars and policy makers admit how complex and multi-faceted the problem of democratization is (there are historical, cultural and institutional factors enabling democracy to prosper), in practice, policy measures were strongly focused on elections. Implicit in this emphasis on multi-party elections is the assumption that elections are pivotal for peace and democratization. As Benjamin Reilly said, the reason for this is clear: “elections provide an inescapable mean for jump-starting a new, post-conflict political order; for stimulating the development of democratic politics; for choosing representatives; for forming governments; and for conferring legitimacy upon the new political order”. [2]
Post-conflict elections are seen as the tool to advance two distinct but interrelated goals: war termination and democratization. In fact transitional elections are the expression of political change, the catalyst for international action, and the frame for evolving ideas on the nature of democracy. Peace and elections are interrelated elements of the democratization process: elections have to be peaceful, but in the same time elections can help to solve the conflict because political parties (former enemies) have to take part in a transition pact, a process that is useful to create public confidence and therefore a genuine democratization.
Analysts and policymakers interested in helping to foster a stable peace after elections have focused on such variable as elections freeness and fairness, different kinds of intervention, security problems and finally effects of the electoral formula. Surprisingly, very little work has been done to examine empirically whether peace is more likely to last in cases where elections are conducted properly: do elections matter? From the existing studies, it is not at all clear whether elections work. A closer look is clearly needed
When changing does not mean improving : Italian electoral systems
No full text.Italian electoral history has been shaped by political actors’ concerns to ensure their own dominance. The single member constituencies and limited franchise of the early liberal period safeguarded the predominance of local notables. But the expanding franchise and the rise of new mass parties undermined that system, leading to proportional representation.
Under Fascism the electoral system was engineered to provide the Fascist Party with a broad majority. After the war, an electoral system based on party-list proportional representation was introduced along with universal suffrage. Designed to safeguard the idea of party democracy, the system emphasized political fragmentation and lack of internal party cohesion. To improve government stability, several attempts to reform the system in a majoritarian sense have taken place, especially in the so called Second Republic. However, these attempts have only been partly successful, and the Constitutional Court has deemed the current law unconstitutional. Electoral reform remains a priority
European Union election observation missions: how to assess effectiveness?
No full textSince the end of the Cold War, a universal consensus has appeared on the desirability of pluralist democracy and this implied a heavy emphasis on multi-party elections to promote democratization. In the wake of this renewed enthusiasm, during the early 1990s several developing countries experienced numerous competitive multiparty elections that marked for various of them a transition from a long period of authoritarian, military or one-party rule to weak democratic governments.2 While countries that undertook later in the 1990s the political transition continued to hold founding elections, in countries that had experienced early regime change, the ending of electoral cycles originated a wave of “second” elections that started the possibility of a democratic consolidation.3
By the middle of the 1990s one of the most striking developments related to this wave of founding and second elections has been the flourishing of an international election observation industry: first in Africa, countries which had suffered decades of civil war started a peace process with multi-party elections and many one-party or military regimes were replaced by governments deriving their mandate from multi-party elections. Donor governments, international organizations and NGOs sent thousands of international elections observers to these countries.4
Their goals were roughly the same: promoting peace, fostering democracy, supporting human rights. According to the European Commission, for example, “Election observation expresses the EU’s interest and concern in promoting democratic elections within its wider policy of support for democracy, the rule of law and human rights”.5 “The purpose of an EU Election Observation Missions around the world is to provide support for the development of the country’s democratic institutions and procedures, and to assist partner countries in their objective to hold elections of a high standard. In this context the EU EOM [Electoral Observation Mission] will conduct a comprehensive analysis of the electoral process”.6 Analogous are the purposes of other international (such as the United Nation, the African Union, the Organization of American States, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe/Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, etc.) and governmental and non-governmental organizations (Carter Center, International IDEA, IFES, International Republican Institute, National Democratic Institute, etc.).7 Thus, the ultimate purpose of any observation mission is to support states in realizing their commitment to hold democratic elections with an eye to democratization.
While scholars and policy makers admit how complex and multi-faceted the problem of democratization is (there are historical, cultural and institutional factors enabling democracy to prosper), in practice, policy measures were strongly focused on elections. Implicit in this emphasis on multi-party elections is the assumption that elections are pivotal for democracy and democratization. Surprisingly, however, very little attention has been paid to the effectiveness of electoral observation missions and few empirical work has been done8 to discover whether electoral observation missions is effective in deterring and discovering election-day fraud. Therefore, this will be the focus of my research proposal. The question I will try to answer in this paper is: How can we assess international election observation effectiveness in deterring election-day fraud?
In the following pages I will first describe European Union election observation methodology, whit an eye also to the bureaucratic machine behind it. The reason why I decided to focus on EU’s work is twofold: first, the EU (as the OSCE/ODHIR) adopts a methodology that is particularly suitable for empirical quasi-experimental research, as we will see in the second part of this work; second, the EU, contrary to the OSCE/ODHIR focuses its work on Africa, the continent whose democratic processes I am interested in. In the second part, therefore, I will show the research design of the project I am presenting
Gli elettori di Milano dal centro alle periferie
No full textGli studi di Verba e colleghi hanno dimostrato l’esistenza di una relazione (positiva) tra status socio/economico e partecipazione politica. Non si può tuttavia affermare lo stesso per quanto riguarda la relazione tra status socio-economico e preferenze elettorali. Non sempre, cioè, le classi più disagiate votano per i partiti di sinistra (che si presuppone siano più vicini ai loro interessi) e le classi più avvantaggiate per i partiti di destra. Il paper si propone di indagare tale relazione analizzando il comportamento elettorale degli elettori milanesi. Utilizzando i dati al massimo livello di disaggregazione disponibile, si cercherà di mettere in relazione i principali indicatori socio-economici con il comportamento elettorale. Attraverso un’indagine ecologica, verrà messa alla prova l’ipotesi secondo la quale i ceti maggiormente disagiati abbiano progressivamente reindirizzato le proprie preferenze verso i (nuovi) partiti anti-establishment
Are international election observation missions able to deter election-day fraud?
No full textThe question I would like to answer relates to the “effect of international election observation on election-day fraud”. This means trying to discover the influence of the simple presence of observers on the behaviour of candidates, electoral staff, and voters. Even if proponents of election observation promote this instrument claiming its potential to reduce fraud, that capability (that must first be proved) can be classed among the “unintended consequences” of international election observation, since the stated role of observers is simply to “observe and report” on an electoral process. Its potential is to reassure the electorate that it is safe for them to vote and run for office and/or to deter fraud. While this is a fundamental element of the role of observers, it is not technically part of the observers’ job. They are some of the “positive” spill-over effects or unintended consequences, something that the mere presence of observers can provoke under certain circumstances without explicitly meaning t
Measuring election freeness and fairness
No full textWhat constitutes a “free and fair, competitive and recurrent” election? With respect to standards of freeness and fairness, there is still no agreement on suitable criteria. Particularly complex is the use of the expression “free and fair” as indicating a “measurable, verifiable, uniform, and well-established international standard”. Although criteria for declaring an election “free and fair” have been developed in various contexts, it is difficult to establish precise guidelines for assessing elections “quality” and it is even more difficult to translate such theoretical concepts into the reality of election evaluation. Through this paper I will try to remedy these difficulties.
Jørgen Elklit and Andrew Reynolds built a framework to identify levels of electoral governance performance. They find eleven principal areas of concern: legislative framework; electoral management; constituency and polling district demarcation; voter education; voter registration; access to and design of ballot paper (party and candidate nomination and registration); campaign regulation; polling; counting and tabulating the vote; resolving election related complaints, verification of final result and certification; post election procedures. They suggest to evaluate elections assigning a score to each indicator. Building on this framework, in this paper I will offer my own proposal for assessing the quality of an electoral process in cases of internationally observed founding elections, transitional elections, or post-conflict elections. I am interested in these elections because they can be the dividing line between disorder and order, between autocracy and democracy, between conflict and peace. In fact, while it is true that “elections and democracy are not synonymous” (because democracy also requires civil and political rights, an independent press and an active civil society, the rule of law, horizontal and vertical accountability, and civilian control over the military), elections remain an essential part of a democratic government, not only for choosing democratically between candidate running for offices, but as a necessary pre-requisite for strengthening democratic consolidation.
Robert Dahl has described a number of “institutional prerequisites” of democracy among which there are also free and fair, competitive and recurrent elections, but Dahl did not explain what “free and fair” means, he only stated that “elected officials are chosen in frequently and fairly conducted elections in which coercion is comparatively uncommon”. However, free and fair elections require the realization of a number of other preconditions of democracy, that Dahl spelled out: elections cannot be free and fair, competitive and recurrent if not all adult citizens have the right to vote and to run for office, if there is no freedom of speech, assembly, movement, campaign, information and press. In other words, free and fair elections require civil and political rights: without them no election can be called a democratic election. Therefore, guarantees of civil and political liberties in the pre- and post-election environment should take a part of the election observation package. The pre-election period is especially important because it is at this moment that observers should evaluate whether freedoms of voters, parties and candidates provided for in the electoral law and the constitution are guaranteed and whether electoral resources and media access are almost equally distributed among election competitors. The post-election period is also crucial since at this stage observers must assess whether electoral rules on counting and complaints are applied fairly, regularly and impartially. Unfortunately, elections per se, intended as polling-day practices, have become the focal point around which the attention of practitioners and policy-makers turns, gaining an excessive importance. A frequent misconception was that every country that holds elections without too many irregularities can be classified as democratic. This has brought to form a distorted imagine of the process of democratic transition. Yet, if the crucial purpose is to support development toward a well-functioning democracy, the prerequisites of democratic elections should not be overlooked
XXV Convegno Annuale SISP
No full textLa leadership è sicuramente nata prima dell’uomo. Che si tratti di mammut, lupi o ominidi, ovunque gli esseri viventi formino una società organizzata, lì si può trovare leadership. “It is universal, and inescapable. It exists everywhere — in small organizations and in large ones, in businesses and in churches, in trade unions and in charitable bodies, in tribes and in universities. It exists in informal bodies, in street gangs and in mass demonstrations. ... Leadership is, for all intents and purposes, the no. 1 feature of organizations. For leadership to exist, of course, there has to be a group: but wherever a group exists, there is always a form of leadership” (Blondel 1987, p.1)
Italian new voters: talis pater qualis filius? Mass media and politics in the passage to the adulthood
No full textThe final purpose of this project will be to analyze the relationship between parents’ and sons’ votes, controlling mainly for the interest in politics, the exposure to political information and the degree of exposure to family political discourse. The literature has pointed out a number of evidence for the finding that new voters tend to vote for the same party as their parents do. Nonetheless, my main concern is for finding some evidence that could support the hypothesis that not only there are some reasons that explain the tendency of new voters to vote for their parent’s party, but also that the same reasons can explain the voting behaviour of new voters that do not vote for their parent’s party. In other words, the question is: what percentage of new voters that vote for their parent’s party do it simply because their parents did, and what percentage can be explained on the same basis on which the “non-parental voters” are explained?
However, since I’ve just discovered by myself how difficult it is to collect data from the very beginning, I was not able to carry on all the analysis before the ECPR General Conference deadline. Therefore, I will present a first analysis of the data I collected showing how I will proceed. I hope the paper will still be of interest, at least for the data it will present
Women representation without gender quotas : Seventy years of Italian elections
No full textIn 1993 gender quota laws were adopted. Two years later, the Italian Constitutional Court declared these laws to be unconstitutional. The Constitution was subsequently reformed to enhance women's political representation. However, quota measures were adopted only for local, (some) regional, and European elections. The literature on gender representation deals mainly with three aspects: electoral quotas, party quotas and reserved seats. No one of these measures was ever systematically and uniformly adopted for Italian general elections. Only the centre-left coalition decided to adopt gender double preference voting in their primaries for 2013 general elections. This paper deals with gender representation under three electoral systems. I will first show the consequences of the preferential voting during the so called “First republic” and the June 1991 referendum on gender representation. I will then analyse how the single-member districts impacted on women presence as candidates and in parliament also comparing it with the proportional quota of the Mattarellum itself. Finally, I will show if and how Porcellum closed lists had an impact on women representation
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