1,721,009 research outputs found
Institutions Matter: Financial Supervision Architecture, Central Bank and Path Dependence. General Trends and the South Eastern Europe Countries
No full textWe propose a path dependence approach to analyze the evolution of the financial supervisory architecture, focusing on the institutional role of the central bank, and then apply our framework to describe the institutional settings in a selected sample of countries. The policymaker who decides to maintain or reform the supervisory architecture is influenced by the existing institutional setting in a systematic way: the more the central bank is actually involved in supervision, the less likely a more concentrated supervisory regime will emerge, and vice versa (path dependence effect). We test the path dependence effect describing and evaluating the evolution and the present state of the architecture of six national supervisory regimes in South Eastern Europe (SEE): Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Serbia and Turkey. The study of the SEE countries confirms the postulated role of the central bank in the institutional setting. In five cases the high involvement of the central bank in supervision is correlated with a multi–authority regime, while in one case a high degree of financial supervision unification is related with low central bank involvement
Reforming Financial Supervision and the Role of The Central Banks: a review of global trends, causes ans effects (1998-2008)
No full textToday policymakers in all the countries, shaken by the financial crisis of the 2007-2008, are carefully
reconsidering the features of their supervisory architecture. Over the last ten years the financial supervision
architecture and the role of the central bank in supervision therein has undergone radical transformation. In
the wake of the 2007-08 financial crisis, more countries are considering reforms, while others, who went
through a round of reforms, are looking at the architecture once again. This paper reviews the insights
gained by the literature on this topic and, based on updated information on 102 countries for the period
1998-2008, addresses three questions: which are the main features of the supervisory architecture
reshaping? What explains the increasing diversity of the institutional settings? What are so far the effects of
the changing face of banking and financial supervisory regimes on the quality of regulation and supervision
Measuring Financial Supervision Architectures and the Role of Central Banks
No full textToday, policymakers in all countries, shocked by the financial crisis of 2007-2008, are reconsidering carefully the features of their supervisory regimes. This paper reviews the changing face of the financial supervisory regimes before and after the crisis, introducing new indicators to measure the level of consolidation in supervision and the degree of the involvement of the central bank
Reforming financial supervision and the role of central banks: a review of global trends, causes and effects (1998-2008)
No full textOver the last ten years the financial supervision architecture and the role of the central bank in supervision therein has undergone radical transformation. A new CEPR Policy Insight addresses three questions. Which are the main features of the supervisory architecture reshaping? What explains the increasing diversity of the institutional settings? What are so far the effects of the changing face of banking and financial supervisory regimes on the quality of regulation and supervision
Helping hand or grabbing hand? POliticians, supervisory regime, financial structure and Market view
No full textThe literature stresses the importance of financial market characteristics in determining the supervisory architectures. In the real world it is not always clear to what extent market features are taken into account. We present two complementary approaches to gain insights in the above relationship. First, an empirical test of two theories-the helping and the grabbing hand view of government-seems more consistent with the latter, presuming the market demonstrates a preference for consolidation of supervisory powers. Second, a survey among financial CEOs in Italy confirms a preference for a consolidated supervisory regime and reveals only weak consistency between the views of the policymakers and the market operators
HELPING HAND OR GRABBING HAND? POLITICIANS, SUPERVISION REGIME, FINANCIAL STRUCTURE AND MARKET VIEW
No full textAlmost all literature on the evolution of financial supervision architecture stresses the importance of
financial market characteristics in determining the recent trend toward more unification. In the real
world, however, it is not always clear to what extent market features are important. We present two
complementary approaches to gain insight into the above relationship, focusing on the political cost
and benefit analysis
The Evolution of Financial Supervision: the continuing Search for the Holy Grant
No full textNo abstract availabl
The Architecture of Securities Market Supervision before and after the Crisis
No full textNo abstract availabl
Helping Hand or Grabbing Hand? Supervisory Architecture, Financial Structure and Market View
No full textIn light of on-going global financial crises, the institutional structure of financial regulation is currently a subject of significant academic and practical interest. The financial crisis has called into question the adequacy of financial regulation at the national and supranational levels, and has instigated financial regulatory reforms in major markets overseas. This has included the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act in the US, and the programme to split the Financial Services Authority in the UK
The Architecture of Insurance Supervision: Global Trends Before and After the Financial Crisis
No full textThe recent financial crisis has provoked a broad spectrum of regulatory observations and possible responses. Currently most of these proposals have been quick solutions to politically pressing questions and often only address parts of regulatory systems, but not the whole. At times, the result has been more confusion than clarity. Although historically wide-ranging reshaping has been a common phenomenon after the severe failure of an existing financial infrastructure, there is an important difference this time – the global reach of today's markets and enterprises. Moreover, never before have so many reforms following a banking crisis not only affected the banking sector but also other parts of the financial services sector, such as insurance, the social systems and, of course, our real economy
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