1,720,977 research outputs found
Conditional regulatory independence: the determinants of the European Commission's decisions on state aid
No full textTo what extent does European Commission regulate state aid policy independently of member states’ preferences? The present analysis investigates to what extent and under which circumstances member states are able to affect the Commission decisions on state aid. According to the European rules on state aid policy, I present a straightforward game that highlights how member states strategically interact with the Commission. Hence, I derive four testable hypotheses on the impact of member states through threats of non-compliance and the appointment of the most influent commissioners on state aid policy. Employing data on the 3249 decisions on state aid that the Commission has taken from the 22nd of March 1999, when the current regulation on state aid came in force, until 31/12/2009, I find that supranational decisions have been influenced by member states. On the whole, they seem to take advantages both from the weaknesses of state aid control and the appointment of the commissioner on regional policy
Delegating Powers to National Authorities: the Determinants of EU Commission Decisions on Mergers (2004-2012)
No full textWhy does the EU Commission delegate the assessment of mergers to national authorities? According to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the Commission evaluates mergers in order to prohibit the creation of a dominant player in the common market. Where a merger threatens to affect the competition in a domestic market, the Commission can decide to refer the assessment to the member state concerned. The present work argues that the referral to national authorities is influenced not only by the threats to domestic competition, but also the uncertainty of Commission about the consequences of its decisions on merger regulation. Moving from the assumption that the level of uncertainty depends on the experienced gained from past assessments, the analysis investigates the determinants of delegation to national authorities between 2004, when the reform of merger regulation consolidated the mechanisms of referral, to 2012. Preliminary results show that the referrals depend on the possible threats to domestic markets as well as the experience gained from past assessments. The analysis controls for other relevant factors such as, some specific economic sector, the involvement of countries outside European Union, the different commissioners on competition and the level of workload
Independent regulatory agencies under political constraints: the determinants of the EC’s decisions on state aid
No full textTo what extent does European Commission regulate state aid independently of member states’ preferences? To what extent are member states able to affect the Commission’s decisions on state aid policy? State aid is a government measure supporting a company that thereby obtains an advantage over its competitors. Formally, the European Commission regulates state aid policy independently of member states. In real fact, state aid is such a contested issue that the member states would have to gain from constraining the Commission’s authority in order to play a leading role in the domestic economy.
The present analysis investigates to what extent the conflict between national and supranational institutions affects the Commission’s decisions on state aid. The conflict between the member states and the Commission concerns the discretionary power of the latter. Such discretion derives from the ambiguity of the Treaty provisions and the Commission takes the opportunity to follow its own policy preferences. Since national and supranational preferences do not necessarily fit, I analyse to what extent member states affect the Commission’s decisions both setting procedural constraints on the regulation and by means of threats of non-compliance.
The present analysis considers 3249 decisions on state aid that the Commission has taken from the 22nd of March 1999, when Regulation 659/1999 came into in force, until 31st of December 2009. The dataset covers all the state aid applications managed by the general directorate on competition
When rotten apples spoil the ballot : The conditional effect of corruption charges on parties vote shares
No full textThe impact of corruption charges on the electoral performance of parties is conditioned by specific institutional factors. This article shows the extent to which the effects of political corruption depend on the control that party leaders exercise over the ballot. It is argued that voters might abstain or support other lists if they cannot select individual candidates to revitalize the reputation of the political party. Employing data on judicial investigations in Italy from 1983 to 2013, we provide evidence of the role of electoral rules and intra-party xcandidate selection in shaping the relationship between corruption and voters’ behaviour. Parties implicated in corruption or related crimes experience a loss of votes when they compete under a closed list formula or when the candidate selection process is strongly centralized
Toga Party: the political basis of judicial investigations against MPs in Italy (1983–2013)
No full textScholars agree that ideology affects judicial decision-making. We demonstrate that this
proposition holds true even when the judiciary is independent of political control.
Focusing on Italy (1983–2013), where the politicisation of the judiciary was an issue well
before the entry of Berlusconi into politics, we estimate judicial orientations according to
the support for factions within the National Judiciary Association. The results show that
ideology affects trial court activity against deputies. As the support for left-wing factions
increases, prosecutors are more likely to investigate right-wing parties. Conversely, as the
share of right-leaning factions grows, investigations of moderate or rightist parties
decrease
Electoral Institutions and Distributive Policies in Parliamentary Systems : an Application to State Aid Measures in EU Countries
No full textElectoral institutions should systematically affect the propensity of a country to rely and spend on distributive measures. Supporting evidence is however still rare because of the difficulty in finding comparable cross-national data, the employment of dummy variables to account for the electoral systems, and the failure to recognise the interacting effects of different electoral rules on policy outcomes. Employing national data on state aid expenditure and a number of measures across European Union countries, the article provides evidence that legislators elected in higher magnitude districts spend less. More interestingly, it shows the interlocking policy effects of electoral institutions. Where high district magnitude is combined with ballot control, party-based voting and pooling, these rules conjunctly dampen politicians’ incentives to cultivate a personal vote and lead to lower spending on, and use of, distributive measures. Where high district magnitude is not combined with these rules, results are inconclusive. With one exception though, if leaders do not have control over the ballot rank, higher magnitude increases reliance on distributive measures. Results are robust to several alternative political-economy explanations of fiscal policy outcomes
Toga Party : the Political Basis of Judicial Investigations against MPs in Italy (1983-2013)
No full textWhy do judges prosecute the deputies of some parties more than others? According to a straightforward game of judicial activity, we argue that judges' investigations depend on two factors: the interactions between judiciary and parliament, and the political preferences of judges. Hence, we expect that judges decide to prosecute a member of the parliament when the parliament is more likely to approve the proceedings, and the judges' political orientations diverge from the political position of the deputy under investigation. We focus on judicial activity in Italy, where over the decades we can notice a large number of charges and prosecutions against members of the parliament. We provide a quantitative analysis concerning the Italian Chamber of Deputies from 1983 to 2013. Investigations are measured looking at the requests to lift parliamentary immunity that judges have to send to the parliament before proceeding with a prosecution. The political orientations of judges are estimated according the support to the different factions within ANM (the National Judiciary Association). The preliminary results show that judges' political preferences and the number of seats of opponent parties have a significant impact on the decisions to prosecute rather some parties than others
The Electoral Foundations of Non-compliance: Evidence of the EU Policy on State Aid Control
No full textWe investigate the electoral foundations to non-compliance in European Union (EU). Since electoral institutions affect the propensity of a country to rely on distributive policies, we analyse whether they also influence compliance with the procedure to notify state aid measures to the European Commission. In particular, we argue that, where electoral systems create incentives for politicians to provide distributive measures, governments are also more inclined to violate EU rules that constrain the implementation of these measures. Employing data on state aid from 2000 to 2012, we show that compliance increases with higher district magnitude, especially if party leaders have control over the ballot rank. On the other hand, it decreases with higher district magnitude in the presence of other electoral rules strengthening the incentives to cultivate a personal vote
Distributive Policies in Parliamentary Systems : the Interplay between Electoral and Fiscal Institutions
Full text linkWhy do some countries spend more on and make more use of distributive measures than
others? Which institutions systematically shape spending on and frequency of use of these measures? Cross-country longitudinal tests of theories that emphasize the institutional determinants of distributive policies are rare. We test a battery of competing hypotheses on spending and frequency using data on state aid expenditure by EU member states between 1992 and 2009 and on applications logged by such states between 1999 and 2009. We find that higher district magnitude lowers spending
on and use of distributive measures if party leaders control access to the ballot rank. More measures are adopted if an increase in magnitude is associated with lack of ballot control. In case of single party majority or cohesive coalition governments, greater reliance on delegation rather than contract fiscal institutions lowers spending
State aid in the European Union : an overview, 1999-2009
No full textDespite the increased interest in government measures designed to contain the negative consequences of economic downturns, state aid policy remains an under researched
area in comparative political economy. We provide an overview of the 6460 applications to grant state aid processed by the European Commission and adopted by the member states of the European Union between 1999 and 2009. We discuss the intensity and frequency of state intervention, its main beneficiaries, its objectives and instruments, the decisions and the patterns of delay and compliance of the EU policy on state aid control. We illustrate the differences in the
patterns of intervention in the domestic economy and of compliance with EU law across
countries and across time. Although most of the measures concern old member states, new
members intervene more intensively and are more compliant with EU law. Additionally, we
highlight how the recent crisis has had significant consequences for the intensity of intervention, its main beneficiaries, its objectives and the decision-making process of this policy
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