33 research outputs found
Warfare, Taxation, and Political Change: Evidence from the Italian Risorgimento
We examine the relationships between warfare, taxation, and political change in the context of the political unification of the Italian peninsula. Using a comprehensive new database, we argue that external and internal threat environments had significant implications for the demand for military strength, which in turn had important ramifications for fiscal policy and the likelihood of constitutional reform and related improvements in the provision of non-military public services. Our analytic narrative complements recent theoretical and econometric works about state capacity. By emphasizing public finances, we also uncover novel insights about the forces underlying state formation in Italy
Is Africa Different? Historical Conflict and State Development
We show new evidence that the consequences of historical warfare for state development differ for Sub-Saharan Africa. We identify the locations of more than 1,600 conflicts in Africa, Asia, and Europe from 1400 to 1799. We find that historical warfare predicts common-interest states defined by high fiscal capacity and low civil conflict across much of the Old World. For Sub-Saharan Africa, historical warfare predicts special-interest states defined by high fiscal capacity and high civil conflict. Our results offer new evidence about where and when ‘war makes states’
Window of Opportunity: War and the Origins of Parliament
Two important puzzles characterize the development of pre-modern Eurasian polities. First, most rulers convened councils of nobles, but only European monarchs expanded them to create parliaments. Second, war was common throughout Eurasia, but only in Europe did it correlate with the formation of parliaments. We advance a new argument about the emergence of parliaments that accounts for both stylized facts while integrating the literature highlighting the rulers' need to finance wars with that emphasizing the importance of the medieval communal revolution. Using novel data, we document a 'no communes, no parliaments' rule: monarchs established parliaments only after they had fostered the creation of self-governing towns (aka communes). We also show that war was a significant predictor of parliamentary births across medieval Europe - but only during a window of opportunity that opened after a polity had experienced the communal revolution
Political Regimes and Sovereign Credit Risk in Europe, 1750-1913
This article uses a new panel data set to perform a statistical analysis of political regimes and sovereign credit risk in Europe from 1750 to 1913. Old Regime polities typically suffered from fiscal fragmentation and absolutist rule. By the start of World War I, however, many such countries had centralized institutions and limited government. Panel regressions indicate that centralized and?or limited regimes were associated with significant improvements in credit risk relative to fragmented and absolutist ones. Structural break tests also reveal close relationships between major turning points in yield series and political transformations
Warfare, Fiscal Capacity, and Performance
We exploit differences in casualties sustained in pre-modern wars to estimate the impact of fiscal capacity on economic performance. In the past, states fought different amounts of external conflicts, of various lengths and magnitudes. To raise the revenues to wage wars, states made fiscal innovations, which persisted and helped to shape current fiscal institutions. Economic historians claim that greater fiscal capacity was the key long-run institutional change brought about by historical conflicts. Using casualties sustained in pre-modern wars to instrument for current fiscal institutions, we estimate substantial impacts of fiscal capacity on GDP per worker. The results are robust to a broad range of specifications, controls, and sub-samples
Fiscal Centralization, Limited Government, and Public Revenues in Europe, 1650-1913
Old Regime polities typically suffered from fiscal fragmentation and absolutist rule. By the start of World War I, however, many such countries had centralized institutions and limited government. This article uses a new panel data set to perform a statistical analysis of political regimes and public revenues in Europe from 1650 to 1913. Panel regressions indicate that centralized and limited regimes were associated with significantly higher revenues than fragmented and absolutist ones. Structural break tests also suggest close relationships between major turning points in revenue series and political transformations
Cisplatin plus gemcitabine as adjuvant chemotherapy for resected non-small cell lung cancer (NSCLC): a phase II tolerability study
A comment on Dincecco et al. (2022): Pre-colonial warfare and long-run development in India
We test the reproducibility and replicability of M. Dincecco, J. Fenske, A. Menon and S. Mukherjee (2022), which reports a positive relationship between pre‐colonial interstate warfare and long‐run development patterns across India. Overall, we confirm that all of the study's estimates are computationally reproducible using the provided replication package in Stata, but note that the ease of replication could be improved by the provision of code and intermediate data sets for the conflict exposure measure. We test for and find no evidence of data manipulation in the final data sets. Concerning direct replicability, we consider different ways of measuring distance to conflicts and also alternative proxies for both the dependent variable and variables that capture channels by which the main effects operate. We find that some estimates are sensitive to the type of conflict considered. Other estimates are sensitive to the time period considered, most likely due to time heterogeneity in the number of conflicts recorded. Nevertheless, most estimates are substantially in line with the original study
