2,541 research outputs found
What’s wrong with ‘mental’ disorders? : a commentary on ‘What is a mental/psychiatric disorder? : from DSM-IV to DSM-V’ by Stein et al
No full textThe editorial by Stein et al. (2010) is timely and
relevant given the development of DSM-V and the
likely impact that such a development will have on
mental health services in the USA. The revision of the
DSM will also affect international psychiatric research
and global practice thanks to the interplay between the
development of DSM and ICD (Fulford & Sartorius,
2009). The editorial by Stein and colleagues is very rich
and there are many themes suitable for further examination
and discussion. For this response, however,
we have chosen to focus on two themes: the use of the
term ‘mental’ and the idea of psychiatric disorders
being ‘in’ an individual
The future of scientific psychiatry
No full textNeuroscience has long had an impact on the field of psychiatry, and over the last two decades, with the advent of cognitive neuroscience and functional neuroimaging, that influence has been most pronounced. However, many question whether psychopathology can be understood by relying on neuroscience alone, and highlight some of the perceived limits to the way in which neuroscience informs psychiatry
Delusional beliefs and reason giving
No full textDelusions are often regarded as irrational beliefs, but their irrationality is not sufficient to explain what is pathological about them. In this paper we ask whether deluded subjects have the capacity to support the content of their delusions with reasons, that is, whether they can author their delusional states. The hypothesis that delusions are characterised by a failure of authorship, which is a dimension of self knowledge, deserves to be
empirically tested because (a) it has the potential to account for the distinction between endorsing a delusion and endorsing a framework belief; (b) it contributes to a
philosophical analysis of the relationship between rationality and self knowledge; and (c) it informs diagnosis and therapy in clinical psychiatry. However, authorship cannot provide a demarcation criterion between delusions and other irrational belief states
Tecnica MRI Quantitativa nell’analisi di modelli di imbibizione dell’acqua in materiali porosi trattati con composti protettivi fluorurati ecologicamente sostenibili
No full textImmagini MRI di sezioni interne di materiali porosi consentono di valutare l’efficacia di prodotti e trattamenti protettivi al fine di ottimizzare protocolli di intervento. Sono stati sintetizzati prodotti contenenti blocchi perfluoropolieterei, solubili in alcol e in solventi idroalcolici, ma non in CFC. Mediante MRI quantitativa ed un software sviluppato ad hoc é stato possibile determinare l’altezza del fronte di imbibizione dell’acqua in campioni di biocalcarenite trattati con questi prodotti e con altri commerciali. Sono stati ottenuti buoni fit dei dati a modelli ottenuti partendo dal modello di Washburn [1]. I risultati dimostrano la migliore efficacia dei nuovi prodotti, non dannosi per l’ambiente.
[1] M. Gombia, V. Bortolotti, R.J.S. Brown, M. Camaiti, P. Fantazzini J Appl Phys 103 (2008) 094913
Correction: Kinetics of trifurcated electron flow in the decaheme bacterial proteins MtrC and MtrF (Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (2019) 116 (3425-3430) DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1818003116)
No full textCorrection for "Kinetics of trifurcated electron flow in the decaheme bacterial proteins MtrC and MtrF," by Xiuyun Jiang, Bastian Burger, Fruzsina Gajdos, C. Bortolotti, Zdenek Futera, Marian Breuer, and Jochen Blumberger, which was first published February 12, 2019; 10.1073/pnas.1818003116 (Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 116, 3425-3430)
Affective dimensions of the phenomenon of double bookkeeping in delusions
No full textIt has been argued that schizophrenic delusions are "behaviourally inert." This is evidence for the phenomenon of "double bookkeeping," according to which people are not consistent in their commitment to the content of their delusions. The traditional explanation for the phenomenon is that people do not genuinely believe the content of their delusions. In the article, we resist the traditional explanation and offer an alternative hypothesis: people with delusions often fail to acquire or to maintain the motivation to act on their delusional beliefs. This may be due to avolition, to emotional disturbances, or to the fact that, given the peculiar content of some delusions, the surrounding environment does not support the agent's motivation to act. © 2012 The Author(s)
How is the urban governance changing in response to the pandemic? The case of Milan
No full textThis article deals with the effects of COVID-19 on the urban governance of Milan. The author argues that, despite the changeable situation still ongoing, looking at the measures assumed in 2020, the Municipality of Milan took middle-term strategies and radical decisions for the design and the use of the city from a perspective of sustainable prosperity together with the pandemic management. According to the "Milano 2020" Adaptation Strategy, several policies were adopted in order to decongest public areas through the enlargement of spaces and services. In particular, during that period, the administration planned new policies in order to empower urban flexibility, rhythms and times, diversified mobility, public and green spaces, infrastructures, cooperation, and inclusion. In conclusion, the author argues that the pandemic has redefined the urban prosperity of Milan in relation to the sustainable transition and the new social challenges determined by the global scenario
Delusions and Responsibility for Action: Insights from the Breivik Case
No full textWhat factors should be taken into account when attributing criminal responsibility to perpetrators of severe crimes? We discuss the Breivik case, and the considerations which led to holding Breivik accountable for his criminal acts. We put some pressure on the view that experiencing certain psychiatric symptoms or receiving a certain psychiatric diagnosis is sufficient to establish criminal insanity. We also argue that the presence of delusional beliefs, often regarded as a key factor in determining responsibility, is neither necessary nor sufficient for criminal insanity. © 2013 The Author(s)
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