1,721,253 research outputs found
Differential Games in Industrial Economics
No full textGame theory has revolutionised our understanding of industrial organisation and the traditional theory of the firm. Despite these advances, industrial economists have tended to rely on a restricted set of tools from game theory, focusing on static and repeated games to analyse firm structure and behaviour. Luca Lambertini, a leading expert on the application of differential game theory to economics, argues that many dynamic phenomena in industrial organisation (such as monopoly, oligopoly, advertising, R&D races) can be better understood and analysed through the use of differential games. After illustrating the basic elements of the theory, Lambertini guides the reader through the main models, spanning from optimal control problems describing the behaviour of a monopolist through to oligopoly games in which firms' strategies include prices, quantities and investments. This approach will be of great value to students and researchers in economics and those interested in advanced applications of game theory
Coordinating Research and Development Efforts for Quality Improvement along a Supply Chain
Full text linkThe optimal design of two-part tariffs is investigated in a dynamic model where two firms belonging to the same supply chain invest in R&D (research and development) activities to increase the perceived quality of the final product. It is shown that the replication of the vertically integrated monopolist’s per- formance can be attained using a two-part tariffin which the fee is a linear function of either the up- stream R&D effort or product quality itself. The possibility of relying on R&D figures appearing in the upstream firm’s balance sheet is desirable as quality enhancement might not be observable or verifiable
An Economic Theory of Managerial Firms: Strategic Delegation in Oligopoly
No full textThe separation between ownership and control has become common practice over the last century, in most medium and large firms across the world. Throughout the twentieth century, the theory of the firm and the theory of industrial organization developed parallel and complementary views on managerial firms. This book offers a comprehensive exposition of this debate. In its survey of strategic delegation in oligopoly games, An Economic Theory of
Managerial Firms is able to offer a reinterpretation of a range of standard results in the light of the fact that the control of firms is generally not in the hand of its owners. The theoretical models are supported by a wealth of real-world examples, in order to provide a study of strategic delegation that is far more in-depth than has previously been found in the literature on industrial organization. In this volume, analysis is extended in several directions to cover applications concerning the role of:managerial firms in mixed market; collusion and mergers; divisionalization and
vertical relations; technical progress; product differentiation; international trade; environmental issues; and the intertemporal growth of firms. This book is of great interest to those who study industrial economics,
organizational studies and industrial studies
Cournot conjectures under price competition
Full text linkIn a homogeneous oligopoly, under standard regularity conditions, we prove that the Cournot–Nash equilibrium emerges under price competition and Cournot conjectures. We illustrate this result also under exogenous product differentiation
Elegia degli spazi occupati: Ratigher
No full textil DIY è l’essenza della produzione culturale underground anni Novanta e 2000. Prima dell’avvento massiccio di internet e della smaterializzazione nell’etere della musica, flyer, volantini, copertine di dischi, fanzine, poster, adesivi, spillette, magliette, libretti, fumetti, manifesti venivano prodotti con macchine da scrivere o a mano e riprodotti mediante ciclostili,
fotocopiatrici, tecniche di stampa serigrafiche. Tutto questo materiale rappresentava la forma politica dell’azione diretta dei punk in campo culturale e comunicativo ed era caratterizzato da una forte artigianalità, un deciso sperimentalismo espressivo ed un messaggio che voleva essere provocatorio spesso attraverso una ironia surreale e per nulla consolatoria. Abbiamo intervistato Francesco D’Erminio alias Ratigher, fumettista, oggi direttore editoriale della Cononino Press,
allora membro dei Laghetto, gruppo punk hardcore delirante e della Donna Bavosa Records & Comics, etichetta che fomentava il DIY e in cui pubblicarono fumetti tra gli altri Tuono Pettinato, Blu&Ericailcane, Maicol e Mirc
Stackelberg leadership and managerial delegation under hyperbolic demand
Full text linkWe revisit the traditional Stackelberg model considering a hyperbolic demand function. We show that, in duopoly, there exists no incentive to acquire leadership or to separate ownership and control by hiring a manager. The reason is that best replies are orthogonal in a complete neighbourhood of the Nash equilibrium. The unilateral incentive either to lead or to hire a manager is restored if the industry is at least triopolistic. This holds irrespective of the specific delegation contract being adopted
On the collusive nature of managerial contracts based on comparative performance
Full text linkWe show that managerial delegation based upon comparative performance may generate collusive outcomes observationally equivalent to those typically associated with repeated games or cross ownership. This happens when rivals’ profits are positively weighted in the managerial incentive scheme. We also identify the level of time discounting at which a repeated game based upon Nash reversion would achieve the same degree of collusion. Accordingly, such managerial contracts should attract the attention of antitrust authoritie
Innovation and product market concentration: Schumpeter, arrow,and the inverted U-shape curve
Full text linkWe investigate the relationship between market concentration and industry innovative
effort within a familiar two-stage model of R&D race in which firms compete a` la
Cournot in the product market. With the help of numerical simulations, we show
that such a setting is rich enough to generate Arrovian, Schumpeterian, and inverted
U curves. We interpret these different patterns on the basis of the relative strength
of the technological incentive and the strategic incentive. We then bridge our theoretical
results and some recent empirical research
Optimal emission taxation and the Porter hypothesis under Bertrand competition
Full text linkIs socially efficient taxation conducive to the win-win solution associated with the strong version of the Porter Hypothesis? Using a Bertrand duopoly yielding a continuum of Nash equilibria, we show
that this is true for almost any level of environmental damage and equilibrium pricing strategy. We also prove that the only case in which no conflict arises between private and public incentives is where
firms price at marginal cost. This finding suggests that coordination between environmental and competition authorities would be highly desirable
Folk Theorems for a Class of Additively Separable Games
No full textWe study a class of games featuring payoff functions where best reply functions are orthogonal and therefore the pure-strategy non-cooperative solution is attained as a Nash equilibrium in dominant strategies. We prove that the resulting threshold of the discount factor above which implicit collusion on the Pareto frontier is stable in the infinite supergames is independent of the number of players. This holds irrespective of whether punishment is based on infinite Nash reversion or one-shot stick-and-carrot strategy. We outline two examples stemming from economic theory and one from international relations
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