140,934 research outputs found
Shareholder Lock-In Contracts: Share Price and Trading Volume Effects at the Lock-In Expiry
No full textThis paper unveils the diversity in lock-in agreements of firms listed on the Nouveau Marche stock exchange in France.We give the main economic reasons why shareholders adopt lock-in agreements that are more stringent than legally required.We relate the abnormal returns and the abnormal volume at the expiry dates of the different types of lock-in contracts to the degree of underpricing, venture-capitalist reputation and underwriter reputation.Abnormal returns and trading volume increase at the lock-in expiry; this is especially pronounced at the expiry dates of insider lock-in contracts as insiders are legally required to be locked-in.We do not find significant abnormal returns at the expiries of VC contracts, even though trading volume increases at their lock-in expiry.There is also no evidence of a positive (negative) relation between abnormal returns (abnormal volume) and more stringent lock-in contracts.Lock-in contracts and the degree of underpricing are complementary signalling devices.shareholders;venture capital;lock-in agreements;lock-up contracts;lock-in expiry;lock-up expiry;signaling;underwriter reputation;underpricing
LOCK CONGESTION AND ITS IMPACT ON GRAIN BARGE RATES ON THE UPPER MISSISSIPPI RIVER
No full textAn anticipated increase in lock delays on the upper Mississippi River has generated concern about its future navigational efficiency. The objective of this paper is to identify selected factors affecting lock delay on the River's busiest locks and to examine the impact of lock delay on grain barge rates. Results show that lock unavailability, traffic level, and delay at nearby locks affect lock delay. Further, barge rates are affected by lock delay, however, the impact is modest.Public Economics,
Learning or Lock-in: Optimal Technology Policies to Support Mitigation
No full textWe investigate conditions that aggravate market failures in energy innovations, and suggest optimal policy instruments to address them. Using an intertemporal general equilibrium model we show that “small” market imperfections may trigger a several decades lasting dominance of an incumbent energy technology over a dynamically more efficient competitor, given that the technologies are very good substitutes. Such a “lock-in” into an inferior technology causes significantly higher welfare losses than market failure alone, notably under ambitious mitigation targets. More than other innovative industries, energy markets are prone to these lock-ins because electricity from different technologies is an almost perfect substitute. To guide government intervention, we compare welfare-maximizing technology policies in addition to carbon pricing with regard to their efficiency, effectivity, and robustness. Technology quotas and feed-in-tariffs turn out to be only insignificantly less efficient than first-best subsidies and seem to be more robust against small perturbations.renewable energy subsidy, renewable portfolio standard, feed-in-tariffs, carbon pricing
Prospective voluntary agreements to escape carbon lock-in
No full textThe paper looks for co-evolutionary policy responses to carbon lock-in - a persistent state that creates systemic market and policy barriers to carbon low technological alternatives. We address the coordination role for authorities rather than the corrective optimisation and analyse experiences from environmental voluntary agreements and foresight activities. The paper argues that combining the virtues of these tools into a new policy tool, named Prospective Voluntary Agreement (PVA), can help facilitate an escape from carbon lock-in and provide policy resources for addressing lock-in related issues.Lock-in , Carbon, Policy responses, Agreements
Lock-key model for the EcoRI restriction enzyme.
No full textLock-key model for the EcoRI restriction enzyme.</p
Capital Gains Taxes and Asset Prices: Capitalization or Lock-In?
No full textThis paper examines the impact on asset prices from a reduction in the long-term capital gains tax rate using an equilibrium approach that considers both demand and supply responses. We demonstrate that the equilibrium impact of capital gains taxes reflects both the capitalization effect (i.e., capital gains taxes decrease demand) and the lock-in effect (i.e., capital gains taxes decrease supply). Depending on time periods and stock characteristics, either effect may dominate. Using the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 as our event, we find evidence supporting a dominant capitalization effect in the week following news that sharply increased the probability of a reduction in the capital gains tax rate and a dominant lock-in effect in the week after the rate reduction became effective. Nondividend paying stocks (whose shareholders only face capital gains taxes) experience higher average returns during the week the capitalization effect dominates and stocks with large embedded capital gains and high tax sensitive investor ownership exhibit lower average returns during the week the lock-in effect dominates. We also find that the tax cut increases the trading volume during the week immediately before and after the tax cut becomes effective and in stocks with large embedded capital gains and high tax sensitive ownership during the dominant lock-in week.
Kingston Lock-tender's House near Princeton
No full textThe Kingston Lock-tender�s House was built 1834. Construction of the D&R Canal began at Kingston in 1830. Adjacent to the Locktender�s House is the tollhouse telegraph station and the Lock itself.
Lock tenders and lock houses were regular features on most canals; however, the D&R also required bridge tenders and bridge houses for its swing bridges. These houses were the homes for the Canal Company employees stationed at each lock and bridge location along this sixty-six mile canal.
Bridge and lock tenders were given free use of a canal house for themselves, and their families, as part of their wages. These modest homes were their primary residence. Small to our modern standards,Original file name IMG_2658.jp
Avoiding Carbon Lock-In: Policy Options for Advancing Structural Change
No full textA major obstacle for the transformation to a low-carbon economy is the risk of a carbon lock-in: fossil fuel-based ('dirty') technologies dominate the market although their carbon-free ('clean') alternatives are dynamically more efficient. We study the interaction of learning-by-doing spillovers and the substitution elasticity between the clean and the dirty sector in an intertemporal general equilibrium model. We find that the substitution possibilities between the two sectors have an ambivalent effect: although a high substitution elasticity requires less aggressive mitigation policies than a low one, it creates a greater lock-in in the absence of regulation. The optimal policy response consists of a permanent carbon tax as well as a learning subsidy for clean technologies. A single policy instrument can also avoid high welfare losses, but a more stringent mitigation target can only be achieved at painful costs. We demonstrate that the policy implication of [Acemoglu et al. 2012] is limited in scope. Our numerical results also highlight that infrastructure provision is crucial to facilitate the low-carbon transformation.structural change, low-carbon economy, carbon lock-in, mitigation policies, learning-by-doing
Kingston Lock-tender's House near Princeton
No full textThe Kingston Lock-tender�s House was built 1834. Construction of the D&R Canal began at Kingston in 1830. Adjacent to the Locktender�s House is the tollhouse telegraph station and the Lock itself.
Lock tenders and lock houses were regular features on most canals; however, the D&R also required bridge tenders and bridge houses for its swing bridges. These houses were the homes for the Canal Company employees stationed at each lock and bridge location along this sixty-six mile canal.
Bridge and lock tenders were given free use of a canal house for themselves, and their families, as part of their wages. These modest homes were their primary residence. Small to our modern standards
Kingston Lock-tender's House near Princeton
No full textThe Kingston Lock-tender�s House was built 1834. Construction of the D&R Canal began at Kingston in 1830. Adjacent to the Locktender�s House is the tollhouse telegraph station and the Lock itself.
Lock tenders and lock houses were regular features on most canals; however, the D&R also required bridge tenders and bridge houses for its swing bridges. These houses were the homes for the Canal Company employees stationed at each lock and bridge location along this sixty-six mile canal.
Bridge and lock tenders were given free use of a canal house for themselves, and their families, as part of their wages. These modest homes were their primary residence. Small to our modern standards,Original file name IMG_2658.jp
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