1,721,006 research outputs found
Budgetary Punctuations: A Fiscal Management Perspective
Full text linkAlthough the development of punctuated equilibrium theory (PET) makes broad reference to the bureaucratic procedures that regulate budgetary decision-making and makes reasonable assumptions about the influence that those procedures have on the dynamic of resource allocation, little is known about how the specific mechanisms work. This has led to a call to “understand the processes which lead to friction in greater detail” (Baumgartner et al, 2009). This research examines how budgetary output patterns are influenced by fiscal strategic choices made by governments. We find significant deviations of budgetary output patterns in capital projects, restricted funds, and entitlement spending, thus signifying the influence of fiscal management practices on resource allocation decisions. Furthermore, we empirically associate spending punctuation patterns with the growing democratic institutional development in Hong Kong. By examining legislative filibuster cases related to capital projects, we found evidence associating democratization with greater institutional frictions and consequently with larger budgetary output punctuations
Effective Resource Management of Governments and Corruption
Full text linkThis paper shows theoretically and empirically that public officials’ corruption is likely to degrade the quality of government management practices. By shedding light inside the classic “black box” idea of management, we explain how public corruption exerts a bad influence upon leadership, use of information and resource allocation. This bad influence of public corruption, as a consequence, will deteriorate the overall management quality of governments by weakening the integration of management subsystems. Data support our arguments by showing that increase in public corruption in an American state government decreases the probability significantly that the state may maintain its management excellence. The paper also demonstrates that infrastructure management of state governments is most vulnerable to corruption. Two-stage least squares instrumental variable (2SLS-IV) regressions support the robustness of our model and the empirical results
Public Corruption and Government Management Capacity
No full textThis article demonstrates, theoretically and empirically, that public corruption is likely to degrade government management capacity and its sub-dimensions such as human resource management, information management, financial management, and capital (infrastructure) management. By shedding light on the classic black box idea of management, we explain that public corruption deteriorates government management capacity by hampering an effective integration of the sub-dimensions of management. Using panel ordered logit regressions and the generalized method of moments estimations, we find a statistically significant negative association between public corruption and the overall management capacity of the U.S. state governments. Across the sub-dimensions of government management capacity, the harmful impact of corruption is most evident in capital and infrastructure management, even in the context of the U.S. state governments. This requires policymakers’ special attention to capital and infrastructure management practices, even in the most advanced country of the management system.1
Testing the Determinants of Corruption from Multiple Theoretical Lenses: The Case of the U.S. States
Full text linkThis article compares the determinants of public corruption from multiple theoretical lenses and then tests which ones are more effective in curbing public corruption in the context of the U.S. states. We find that the stringency of state tax and expenditure limits, fiscal transparency, voter turnout rates, unified Democratic control, divided control of state governments, political competitiveness, population with Scandinavian ancestry, and educational attainment are all significantly and negatively associated with the extent of public corruption. Compared with other approaches to curbing corruption (i.e., the lawyer’s approach, the businessman’s approach, and the economist’s approach), those that restrict public officials’ discretionary power and encourage educated citizens’ participation appear to be more effective in reducing corruption in the U.S. states
Corruption and Tax Structure in American States
Full text linkWe examine the extent to which public corruption influences the tax structure of American states. After controlling for other tax structure influences, we find that states with greater measured public corruption have more complex tax systems, have higher tax burdens, rely more heavily on regressive indirect taxes, and have smaller shares of their tax burdens with initial impact on business. These are significant structural impacts on the tax systems.1
The Impact of Public Officials’ Corruption on the Size and Allocation of U.S. State Spending
No full textThis article demonstrates the impact of public officials’ corruption on the size and allocation of U.S. state spending. Extending two theories of “excessive” government expansion, the authors argue that public officials’ corruption should cause state spending to be artificially elevated. Corruption increased state spending over the period 1997–2008. During that time, the 10 most corrupt states could have reduced their total annual expenditure by an average of $1,308 per capita—5.2 percent of the mean per capita state expenditure—if corruption had been at the average level of the states. Moreover, at the expense of social sectors, corruption is likely to distort states’ public resource allocations in favor of higher‐potential “bribe‐generating” spending and items directly beneficial to public officials, such as capital, construction, highways, borrowing, and total salaries and wages. The authors use an objective, concrete, and consistent measurement of corruption, the number of convictions.1
공직자 부패가 지방정부의 채권 가격에 미치는 영향
No full textThis paper demonstrates that capital markets take surrounding environments in the states into consideration when determining prices on local debt, above and beyond the underlying features of municipal bonds. We empirically show that corruption premium exists in the US municipal bond market. Local governments in more corrupt states pay higher costs for long-term borrowing in the market. Moreover, fiscal institutions that are traditionally thought to bring fiscal discipline to local governments become ineffective in the states with relatively higher levels of public sector corruption.
본 논문은 지방정부가 발행하는 채권의 가격 변동에 영향을 미치는 요인들에 관해 연구하였다. 특별히 미국 지방정부채권의 가격에 대한 주정부의 다양한 영향력과 공직자의 부패의 악영향에 대해 고찰한다. 장기 채권시장에서 지방정부채권의 가격을 결정할 때, 채권가격투자자들은 지방채권 자체의 특성뿐만 아니라, 해당 주정부의 경제적ㆍ정치적 요인을 반영하는 것으로 분석되었다. 무엇보다 부패가 심한 정부에서 발행되는 지방채권들일수록 높은 이자가격을 부담하고 있음이 발견되었다. 이는 지방채권의 이자가격 산정에 있어서 “부패프리미엄”이 존재함을 의미한다.2
Property Tax Stability: A Tax System Model of Base and Revenue Dynamics Through the Great Recession and Beyond.
No full textAmerican local government property tax collections have remained surprisingly stable during the Great Recession of 2007-2009 and its aftermath, even as the value of housing, a major component of that tax base, has fallen precipitously. This puzzle can be understood within the context of the overall property tax system, a system differing from that used for other major taxes in that it is taxpayer passive and administered with significant lags and budget adjustments. Behavior of the finances of cities with populations over 150,000 over the 1999-2011 period is examined within the Slemrod tax system concept, particularly employing a three component model of property tax assessing, taxing, and collecting. The model reported in this paper breaks new theoretical ground by linking the three elements of the property tax system, highlighting the structural uniqueness of the property tax, utilizing actual tax base data, and, by using data that extends through 2011, providing a more complete investigation of how lags shaped the system response to the housing market collapse. Each element contributes to the stability pattern, although recent behavior of the delinquency rate (the third component) found in this article suggests some future interruption of the prior stability.1
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