1,720,983 research outputs found

    Card payment systems and competition concerns: multilateral interchange fees and no-discrimination rules, a necessary evil?

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    Purpose - to explore the competition issues arising from credit card payment systems under European Commission (EC) rules and suggest possible regulatory approaches.Design/methodology/approach - the central role of credit cards in the modern economy is discussed from the viewpoint of the current methods of regulation through the no-discrimination rules (NDRs) and multilateral interchange fees (MIFs). Emphasizes the antitrust assessment of MIFs which takes account of comparative elements arising from the US market and briefly considers NDRs in order to emphasize their possible link with MIFs. Discusses the consequences of a possible abolition of MIFs in conjunction with alternative regulatory frameworks.Findings - while it is true that both MIFs and NDRs represent blatant restriction on competition, economists have striven to emphasize the peculiar aspects of four-party payment networks as two-sided markets where, within such markets, competitive forces operate in a sui generis way to render MIFs and NDRs essential for the correct functioning of card payment networks. Concludes that the time is arguably ripe for a reassessment of the antitrust implications of MIFs and NDRs and empirical evidence appears to demonstrate both their anti-competitiveness and their non-essential nature for the functioning of card payment networks. Suggests that alternatives, such as bilateral negotiations between the members of card payment systems, could represent a feasible and more competition-friendly way to recover transaction costs for the members of a four-party card payment scheme.Originality/value - clarifies some of the competition issues associated with the regulatory framework for credit card transactions in the European Union (EU)

    The need for speed: Court of Appeal interprets UCP 600

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    Under art 16(c) of UCP 600, issuing or confirming banks must serve notice in case of non-compliance between the documents tendered by the seller and the letter of credit. The notice needs to specify any discrepancies and the documents should be returned to the seller, although art 16 is silent in relation to timing. Confirming the first instance judgment, the Court of Appeal in Fortis Bank SA/NV v Indian Overseas Bank [2011] EWCA Civ 58 re-emphasised the importance of a prompt return of documents to sender

    Back to the future: in search for a new paradigm for the identification of market power in the Big Data Sector

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    The aim of this article is to re-consider the current status quo in relation to the interface between market power and the application of competition law to the Big Data market, with the view to suggesting possible alternative approaches.In order to do so, we shall first assess the nature of the big data sector and its antitrust implications, with emphasis on the possible competition concerns arising from the individual or joint accumulation of large sets of data by undertakings operating within this market; emphasis will be placed on the assessment of market power in big data mergers and on abuses of dominant position in EU data driven markets, as well as on the Database Directive and the UK scenario.The article will thereafter attempt to re-consider neoclassic competition theories such as market contestability and the notion of essential facility and their application to the big data industry. The aim is to understand the real nature of big data markets, to consider the current antitrust assessment methodology of market power and assess its suitability for the application of competition law to the Big Data industry.Finally, an attempt to theorise a new paradigm for the antitrust evaluation of market power in the Big Data sector will be made, alongside with the development of new standards and new theories of harm as an alternative approach to the current regulatory regime.<br/

    Stairway to heaven or highway to hell: what next for insurance competition regulation?

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    The purpose of this article is to critically analyse the need for a block exemption in the insurance industry, in light of the recent introduction of the new Block Exemption Regulation in March 2010. Emphasis is on the epistemological rationale for allowing a high degree of cooperation between insurance undertakings and for setting aside the application of the EC competition rule
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