571 research outputs found

    The Theological and Ethical Grounds against Keeping Elephants Captive

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    As set forth below, animal theology experts Dr. Andrew Linzey and Dr. Clair Linzey of the Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics believe that Petitioner Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. (“NhRP”) has made a prima facie case that the elephants confined at Fresno Chaffee Zoo in Fresno, CA—Nolwazi, Amahle, and Mabu—are entitled to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, we respectfully urge the Supreme Court of California to issue an order to show cause in this matter

    The Theological and Ethical Grounds against Keeping Elephants Captive

    No full text
    As set forth below, animal theology experts Dr. Andrew Linzey and Dr. Clair Linzey of the Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics believe that Petitioner Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. (“NhRP”) has made a prima facie case that the elephants confined at Fresno Chaffee Zoo in Fresno, CA—Nolwazi, Amahle, and Mabu—are entitled to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, we respectfully urge the Supreme Court of California to issue an order to show cause in this matter

    Bartholomew Tardiveau letter to Arthur St. Clair, June 30, 1789

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    This letter written by B. Cardiveau to Arthur St. Clair in June 1789 argues that slaves from the Southern states should be allowed to continue their servitude in the Northwest Territory even though slavery was outlawed by the Northwest Ordinance. Cardiveau predicts that if slaves are not allowed to be kept in the territory, southerners will not settle north of the Ohio River, and the area "will infallibly remain for a long time in a state of infancy." Cardiveau also suggests that slavery could be completely repealed if and when Ohio became a state and the citizens had a right to decide for themselves. The seven-page letter measures 9" by 13" (10 by 32 cm) and is part of a larger collection of Arthur St. Clair letters that is owned by the State Library of Ohio and on permanent deposit at the Ohio History Connection. Arthur St. Clair (1734-1818) was governor of the Northwest Territory and administrator of Indian affairs for the western territories from 1787 to 1802. St. Clair led an army against a large alliance of American Indians, led by Shawnee chief Weyapiersenwah (Blue Jacket) and Miami chief Mishikinakwa (Little Turtle), who threatened war after their land was given to the U. S. government without their authorization, in November 1791. St. Clair suffered a disastrous defeat, losing half of his men. In response, President George Washington appointed General Anthony Wayne to defeat the region's American Indian tribes, which he did in 1794 at the Battle of Fallen Timbers. St. Clair also had many disagreements with the territorial legislature. He supported the division of the territory into different states that would be admitted separately to the Union despite the opposition of members of the legislature, including Thomas Worthington, who wished to hasten Ohio's admission for statehood. In 1802, Worthington and others asked President Thomas Jefferson to dismiss St. Clair from office, which he did on November 22, thus clearing the way for the legislature to begin drafting Ohio's constitution. St. Clair retired to his home in Lingonier, Pennsylvania, and died there in 1818

    Humphry Primatt (1735–1777): Animal Protection and Its Revolutionary Contexts

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    Humphry Primatt was a Church of England clergyman and author of A Dissertation on the Duty of Mercy and the Sin of Cruelty to Brute Animals (1776), one of the earliest and most influential works of animal protectionism. However, remarkably little is known about Primatt himself. This chapter seeks to remedy this, addressing a range of unexamined materials in order to reconstruct the wider contexts of Primatt’s thinking. In view of his break from the Anglican Church in 1774 and his involvement in Unitarianism, the chapter analyzes a constellation of Dissenting influences on Primatt. Resisting, however, any straightforward characterization of him as a “revolutionary” member of the establishment church, the chapter argues that Primatt occupied a moderate and mediating position, and that his influence was due less to his perceived singularity as to his ability to incorporate some of the more esoteric ideas of animal theologians, Anglican and Dissenting, into the public mainstream

    Human Duties, Animal Suffering, and Animal Rights: A Legal Re-evaluation

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    From the inception of animal protection legislation in the early 19th century there has been a strongly held view that the philosophy underpinning these laws was that of a Bentham-esque utility calculus. Indeed Bentham himself drew attention to the plight of animals, citing the reason for their neglect as a result of their interests being ignored due to such abstract notions as their inability to talk and reason. For Bentham, of course, the only valid consideration was that animals had the capacity to suffer and, if so, this suffering should form a part of the utility calculus. Consequently, for the next 200 years this simple formula has, to a lesser or greater extent, been utilised in the delineation between suffering that is deemed “necessary” and that which is not. This paper will, however, challenge this notion and consider, instead, a duty based approach to animal protection. The paper offers an explanation of the duty-based approach and locates it within mainstream jurisprudence and legal theory, and will provide a discussion of the benefits of a duty-based approach in contemporary society. Furthermore it will be shown that rather than being a novel reinterpretation of the unnecessary suffering test in the 21st century, the duty-based approach underpinned the legislative intent two centuries ago when the first animal protection laws were promulgated

    Buddhism: Between Paradox and Practice-Morally Relevant Distinctions in the Buddhist Characterization of Animals

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    Buddhist cosmology proposes a hierarchical taxonomy of sentient beings cycling endlessly through samsaric realms propelled by their karma. Within this hierarchy, the status and capacities of animals are characterised as subordinate to those of human beings; rebirth as an animal is considered unfortunate while rebirth as a human is considered particularly fortunate. The Buddhist hierarchy of sentient beings is thus superficially similar to Aristotle’s scala naturae in which animals also occupy a lowly position. A lasting consequence of Aristotle’s scala naturae and reflected in The Politics, is the belief that all natural things are located in a graduated scale and oriented toward some end, with animals being intended for the use of humans (Newmeyer, 2011). For Aristotle, animals’ lack of rational capacity was a sufficient morally relevant distinction justifying the possibility of exploitation (Engle and Jenni, 2010). This morally relevant distinction was later incorporated into Christian theology through Thomas Aquinas whose Summa Theologica reflects and modifies Aristotle’s scala naturae with the result that, once again, animals were subordinated to the desires and needs of humans (McInerney, 1998). This presentation argues that while Buddhism also subordinates the capacities of animals to those of humans, it does not find a morally relevant distinction within this framework justifying the ordering of animals to human ends. This apparent paradox of subordination-without-exploitation is explained by the very different way Buddhist philosophy characterises animals. The Buddhist characterisation of animals is reflected in practices intended to benefit animals while acknowledging the significant differences between human and animal capacities
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