444 research outputs found
Topics on social and economic networks
Get PDFLaan, G. van der [Promotor]Lindner, I.D. [Copromotor]Koster, M.A.L. [Copromotor
Review Essay on `Voting and Collective Decision-making' by Annick Laruelle and Federico Valenciano (Cambridge University Press)
Get PDFThe book 'Voting and Collective Decision Making' by A. Laruelle and F. Valenciano provides a critical revision of the theoretical foundations of collective yes-or-no decisions. It is a study of the theory of bargaining and voting power, revolving around a fundamental question: given a committee, what voting rule should be used? © 2010 The Author(s)
From Tradition to Modernity: Economic Growth in a Small World
No full textThis paper introduces the Small World model into the theory of economic growth and investigates how increasing economic integration affects firm size and efficiency, norm enforcement, and aggregate economic performance. When economic integration is low and local connectivity is high, informal norms control entrepreneurial behavior and more integration mainly improves search for investment opportunities. At a higher level of economic integration neighborhood enforcement deteriorates and formal institutions are needed to keep entrepreneurs in check. A gradual take-off to perpetual growth is explained by a feedback effect from investment to the formation of long-distance links and the diffusion of knowledge. If formal institutions are weak, however, the economy does not take off but stagnates at an intermediate income level. Structurally, the equilibrium of stagnation differs from balanced growth by the presence of many small firms with low productivity. © 2014 Elsevier B.V
Cases where the Penrose Limit Theorem does not hold
Get PDFThe article of record as published may be located at http://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.01.005Research performed while at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, United States.Penrose's limit theorem (PLT, really a conjecture) states that the relative power measure of two voters
tends asymptotically to their relative voting weight (number of votes). This property approximately holds in
most of real life and in randomly generated WVGs for various measures of voting power. Lindner and
Machover prove it for some special cases; amongst others they give a condition for this theorem to hold for
the Banzhaf–Coleman index for a quota of 50%. We show here, by counterexamples, that the conclusion
need not hold for other values of the quota. In doing this, we present an analytic proof of a counterexample
recently given by Chang et al. using simulation techniques
DNS of inertial wave attractors in a librating annulus with height-dependent gap width
No full textDirect numerical simulations (DNS) of inertial wave attractors have been carried out in a librating Taylor-Couette system with broken mirror symmetry in the radial-axial cross-section. The inertial wave excitation mechanism and its localisation at the edges was clarified by applying boundary layer theory. Additional resonance peaks in the simulated response spectra were found to agree with low-order wave attractors obtained by geometric ray tracing. Numerics and theory are in qualitative agreement with recent lab experiments
A Special Case of Penrose’s Limit Theorem When Abstention is Allowed
Get PDFlimit theorems, ternary voting games, voting power, weighted voting games, C 71, D71,
A generalization of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem to weighted voting games with many small voters
Get PDFCondorcet’s Jury Theorem, Weighted voting games, Majority games, C71, D71,
The power of a collectivity to act in weighted voting games with many small voters
Get PDFWe analyze the propensity to approve a random proposal of a large committee that makes decisions by weighted voting. The approach is a generalized version of James Coleman's "power of a collectivity to act". Throughout the paper it is assumed that the voters are of two kinds: a fixed (possibly empty) set of "major" (big) voters with fixed weights, and an ever-increasing number of "minor" (small) voters, whose total weight is also fixed, but where each individual's weight becomes negligible. As our main result, we obtain that asymptotically many minor voters act like a modification of the quota for the vote among major voters. The paper estimates the rate of convergence which turns out to be very high if the weight distribution among the small voters is not too skewed. The results obtained are illustrated by evaluating the decision rules for the Council of Ministers of the EU for various scenarios of EU enlargement. © 2007 Springer-Verlag
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