1,777,773 research outputs found
Position statement on telemedicine/telehealth
No full text"Board approved January 9, 2019"--Unnumbered page 2; "Created: 1/10/2019..."--Document properties screenThough created and approved prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, this document was shared as part of the Ohio Veterinary Medical Licensing Board's response to the pandemi
Health Licensing Office: consumer's bill of rights
No full textThis archived document is maintained by the Oregon State Library as part of the Oregon Documents Depository Program. It is for informational purposes and may not be suitable for legal purposes.At head of title: Health Licensing OfficeTitle from captionMode of access: Internet from the Oregon Government Publications Collection
Licensing and Patent Protection
Full text linkWe show the impact of technology licensing on optimal patent policy. Strong patent protection that eliminates imitation may not be the equilibrium outcome in the presence of licensing. Depending on the cost of innovation, licensing may either increase or reduce the strength of the patent protection.Patent protection; Technology licensing; Welfare
Technology licensing with strategic tax policy
Full text linkDespite the important insights it has provided, technology licensing literature remains restrictive by not allowing government policies. We show that in the presence of strategic tax policies, an outside innovator and, more interestingly and in contrast to the existing works, the consumers are better off under royalty licensing compared to auction (or fixed-fee licensing) if the number of potential licensees is sufficiently large. It follows from our analysis that a combination of fixed-fee and output royalty can be preferable to the innovator compared to both royalty licensing and auction (or fixed-fee licensing).Licensing; Tax; Auction; Royalty
Licensing in a Vertically Separated Industry
Full text linkThe literature on technology licensing has ignored the importance of market power of the input supplier. In this paper we examine the impact of licensing in the downstream industry when the firms in the upstream industry have market power. We show that licensing in the downstream industry can make the upstream industry more competitive. However, licensing in the downstream industry is profitable if and only if licensing changes the concentration in the upstream industry. We also show that a monopolist in the final goods market has the incentive for licensing if licensing changes the market structure of the upstream industry.Entry, Licensing, Downstream industry, Upstream industry
Technology licensing in a differentiated oligopoly
Full text linkWe show the effects of product differentiation and competition on technology licensing by an outside innovator. Both the innovator and the society are better off under royalty licensing compared to auction (or fixed-fee) if the number of potential licensees is sufficiently large, irrespective of Cournot and Bertrand competition. We find that the relationship between product differentiation and the minimum number of potential licensees that is required to make royalty licensing profitable to the innovator is non-monotonic under Cournot competition, while it is positive under Bertrand competition. Hence, there are degrees of product differentiation for which neither the innovator nor the antitrust authority requires information about the type of product market competition while deciding on the licensing contract. It follows from our analysis that the innovator prefers auction plus royalty licensing (or fixed-fee plus royalty) over either royalty licensing or auction.Auction; Licensing; Royalty; Product Differentiation
Innovation, Licensing and Welfare
Full text linkThis paper examines how the option for licensing affects research and development (R&D) and social welfare. We find that if cost reduction from R&D is sufficiently small and there is an option of licensing, firms will do non-cooperative R&D. In absence of licensing, firms will do cooperative R&D for sufficiently small cost reduction from R&D. Whether the option for licensing increases social welfare is ambiguous. If the possibility of licensing increases probability of success in R&D significantly then welfare is higher in presence of licensing.Cooperative R&D, Licensing, Welfare
THE LICENSING DILEMMA: UNDERSTANDING THE DETERMINANTS OF THE RATE OF LICENSING
Full text linkLicensing entails a tradeoff: licensing payments net of transaction costs (revenue effect) have to be balanced against the lower price-cost margin and/or reduced market share that the increased competition (profit dissipation effect) from the licensee implies. We argue that the presence of multiple technology holders, who compete in the market for technology, changes such tradeoff and triggers a more aggressive licensing behavior. To test our theory we analyze technology licensing by large chemical firms during the period 1986-96. We find that the rate of licensing is initially increasing and then decreasing in the number of potential technology suppliers, negatively related to the licensor’s market share and to the degree of product differentiation.
Licensing under Asymmetric information
Full text linkIn a world with private information about the quality of technology we find that there are situations where relatively more technologically superior firm will license its technology but relatively less technologically superior firm will not license its technology. This finding is opposite to the result found on licensing under complete information. Further, we show that under incomplete information welfare could be higher than under complete information.Asymmetric information, Licensing, Welfare
The licensing dilemma: understanding the determinants of the rate of technology licensing.
Full text linkThe licensing of technology entails a trade-off: licensing payments net of transaction costs (revenue effect) must be balanced against the lower price-cost margin and/or reduced market share implied by increased competition (profit dissipation effect) from the licensee. We argue that the presence of multiple technology holders, which compete in the market for technology, changes such a trade-off and triggers more aggressive licensing behavior. To test our theory, we analyze technology licensing by large chemical firms during the period 1986-96 for 107 chemical products. We find that the rate of technology licensing displays an inverted U-shaped relationship with the number of potential technology suppliers and is negatively related to the licensor's market share and to the degree of technology-specific product differentiation.Licensing; Revenue effect; Profit dissipation effect; Chemical industry;
- …
