1,720,998 research outputs found
Replication Data for: Americans, Not Partisans: Can Priming American National Identity Reduce Affective Polarization?
No full textIn recent years, Americans have become more affectively polarized: that is, ordinary Democrats and Republicans increasingly dislike and distrust members of the opposing party. Such polarization is normatively troubling, as it exacerbates gridlock and dissensus in Washington. Given these negative consequences, I investigate whether it is possible to ameliorate this partisan discord. Building on the Common Ingroup Identity Model from social psychology, I show that by heightening subjects’ sense of American national identity, they come to see members of the opposing party as fellow Americans, rather than rival partisans. As a result, they like the opposing party more, thereby reducing affective polarization. Using several original experiments, as well as a natural experiment surrounding the July 4th holiday and the 2008 Summer Olympics, I find strong support for my argument. I conclude by discussing the implications of these findings for efforts to reduce polarization more generally
Replication Data for: Our Common Bonds
No full textreplication data for the analyses in Our Common Bonds (University of Chicago Press, 2023)
Replication Data for: Americans, Not Partisans: Can Priming American National Identity Reduce Affective Polarization?
No full textIn recent years, Americans have become more affectively polarized: that is, ordinary Democrats and Republicans increasingly dislike and distrust members of the opposing party. Such polarization is normatively troubling, as it exacerbates gridlock and dissensus in Washington. Given these negative consequences, I investigate whether it is possible to ameliorate this partisan discord. Building on the Common Ingroup Identity Model from social psychology, I show that by heightening subjects’ sense of American national identity, they comes to see members of the opposing party as fellow Americans, rather than rival partisans. As a result, they like the opposing party more, thereby reducing affective polarization. Using several original experiments, as well as a natural experiment surrounding the July 4th holiday and the 2008 Summer Olympics, I find strong support for my argument. I conclude by discussing the implications of these findings for efforts to reduce polarization more generally
Replication Data for: How Does Local TV News Change Viewers' Attitudes? The Case of Sinclair Broadcasting
No full textReplication Data for: How Does Local TV News Change Viewers' Attitudes? The Case of Sinclair Broadcasting, to appear, Political Communicatio
Replication Data for: We Need to Talk: How Cross-Party Dialogue Reduces Affective Polarization
No full textReplication data for We Need to Talk: How Cross-Party Dialogue Reduces Affective Polarizatio
Replication Data for: "Finding Common Ground: Experimental Efforts to Reduce Partisan Animus"
No full textData for "Finding Common Ground" In Reconsidering Parties (eds. Christopher Karpowitz and Jeremy Pope), University of Michigan Press, forthcoming
Replication Data for: "When Efforts to Depolarize the Electorate Fail"
No full textThe mass public has become affectively polarized—ordinary Americans increasingly dislike and distrust those from the other party, with accompanying negative consequences for our politics. Drawing on work in political and social psychology, this paper tests two mechanisms for reducing this discord, both of which have been shown to reduce similar biases in other settings: heightening partisan ambivalence, and using self-affirmation techniques. Employing a population-based survey experiment, I find that neither strategy reduces affective polarization in the aggregate. But this masks an important heterogeneity: heightening partisan ambivalence reduces affective polarization for ideological moderates, but increases such discord for those with more extreme ideological identities. Efforts to depolarize the electorate can make it more deeply divided, with important implications for our understanding of contemporary politics and the durability of affective polarization
Replication Data for: Americans, Not Partisans: Can Priming American National Identity Reduce Affective Polarization?
No full textIn recent years, Americans have become more affectively polarized: that is, ordinary Democrats and Republicans increasingly dislike and distrust members of the opposing party. Such polarization is normatively troubling, as it exacerbates gridlock and dissensus in Washington. Given these negative consequences, I investigate whether it is possible to ameliorate this partisan discord. Building on the Common Ingroup Identity Model from social psychology, I show that by heightening subjects’ sense of American national identity, they come to see members of the opposing party as fellow Americans, rather than rival partisans. As a result, they like the opposing party more, thereby reducing affective polarization. Using several original experiments, as well as a natural experiment surrounding the July 4th holiday and the 2008 Summer Olympics, I find strong support for my argument. I conclude by discussing the implications of these findings for efforts to reduce polarization more generally
Replication Data for: Americans, Not Partisans: Can Priming American National Identity Reduce Affective Polarization?
No full textIn recent years, Americans have become more affectively polarized: that is, ordinary Democrats and Republicans increasingly dislike and distrust members of the opposing party. Such polarization is normatively troubling, as it exacerbates gridlock and dissensus in Washington. Given these negative consequences, I investigate whether it is possible to ameliorate this partisan discord. Building on the Common Ingroup Identity Model from social psychology, I show that by heightening subjects’ sense of American national identity, they comes to see members of the opposing party as fellow Americans, rather than rival partisans. As a result, they like the opposing party more, thereby reducing affective polarization. Using several original experiments, as well as a natural experiment surrounding the July 4th holiday and the 2008 Summer Olympics, I find strong support for my argument. I conclude by discussing the implications of these findings for efforts to reduce polarization more generally
Replication Data for: "What Do We Measure When We Measure Affective Polarization?"
No full textAffective polarization—the tendency of Democrats and Republicans to dislike and distrust one another—has become an important phenomenon in American politics. Yet despite scholarly attention to this topic, two measurement lacunae remain. First, how do the different measures of this concept relate to one another—are they interchangeable? Second, these items all ask respondents about the parties. When individuals answer them, do they think of voters, elites, or both? We demonstrate there are differences across items, and scholars should carefully think about which items best match their particular research question. Second, we show that when answering questions about the other party, individuals think about elites more than voters. More generally, we find that individuals dislike voters from the other party, but they harbor even more animus toward the other party’s elites. We conclude by discussing the consequences for both measuring this concept and understanding its ramifications
- …
